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FROM THE EDITORS
The Trump administration’s evident determination to reorder fundamentally 
the nation’s trade relationships with friends and adversaries alike arguably has 
served as a salutary warning to the current Chinese leaders in particular that they 
no longer can expect to carry on business as usual with the United States� On 
the other hand, it also has had the unintended consequence of obscuring larger 
issues in the U�S�-Chinese relationship� China is not just a trading partner that 
long has gotten away with sharp practice; it is increasingly clear that the Chinese 
aspire to challenge and eventually supplant the United States as the world’s lead-
ing power� This case is laid out in authoritative detail in two contributions in this 
issue� James E� Fanell, in “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force 
Structure: Pathway to Hegemony,” focuses on the PRC’s massive naval buildup of 
recent decades and its implications for China’s increasingly bold global engage-
ment and presence� In “Ships of State?,” Christopher R� O’Dea provides a comple-
mentary analysis of the second prong of China’s global maritime strategy, its 
so-called Belt and Road Initiative� O’Dea demonstrates that Chinese state-owned 
companies have built a global network of ports and associated logistic facilities 
and infrastructure, ostensibly for commercial purposes, that seems nonethe-
less designed to support military power-projection operations over the longer 
term as well as to acquire economic and political leverage over host countries� A 
largely unrecognized but alarming harbinger of things to come is China’s effec-
tive control of the Port of Piraeus in Greece, but this is only one example among 
a great many that extend throughout the Indian Ocean to Africa and even Latin 
America� Captain James Fanell, USN (Ret�), served most recently as Director of 
Intelligence and Information Operations for the U�S� Pacific Fleet; Christopher 
O’Dea is a Chicago-based international commercial analyst�
As naval combat between major powers becomes less theoretical as a scenario 
than at any time since the end of the Cold War, the maritime dimension of World 
War II is more worthy of revisiting than ever� In “Operation RHINE EXERCISE, 
May 18–27, 1941,” Milan Vego provides a detailed, operational-level analysis of 
one of the major encounters at sea between British and German surface forces 
in that conflict: the hunt for and eventual destruction of the German battleship 
Winter2019Review.indb   3 12/4/18   11:13 AM
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Bismarck in the North Atlantic in the spring of 1941. Milan Vego is a professor of 
joint military operations at the Naval War College.
Be on the lookout: The Naval War College Press is about to publish the second 
volume in our John A. van Beuren Studies in Leadership and Ethics. Assembled 
by general editor Timothy J. Demy of the NWC faculty, the book will be an an-
thology of Naval War College Review articles from the last decade on the subject 
of leadership and ethics, with some additional material. It will be available from 
the Government Publishing Office at www.gpo.gov/.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W309, 330, 333, 
334, 335). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236).
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC 3685, PS Form 3526-R, July 
2014) of the Naval War College Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year at 686 
Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. General business offices of the publisher are located at the 
Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of publisher is 
President, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of editor 
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is respon-
sible for educating future leaders, developing their 
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and en-
hancing their capability to advise senior leaders and 
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included command 
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and 
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary 
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command 
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations 
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew 
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie 
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat 
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minne-
sota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political 
science, and received master of arts degrees from the 
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he 
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE once again demonstrated its unique 
capability to enhance global maritime partnerships when naval 
leaders from more than a hundred nations converged in Newport, Rhode Island, 
at the Chief of Naval Operations’ twenty-third International Seapower Sympo-
sium (ISS) in mid-September 2018. They met to discuss cooperative strategies 
for enhancing global security, order, and prosperity. ISS is the world’s premier 
naval gathering, bringing together delegations from maritime services around 
the globe to bolster maritime and national security by discussing common chal-
lenges and facilitating shared opportunities.
The College was honored to be the location for this extraordinary event spon-
sored by the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson. 
The symposium participants included ninety-seven Heads of Navies or Coast 
Guards and the Presidents of nine Naval War Colleges around the world. Keynote 
speakers included U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis; Secretary of the Navy 
Richard V. Spencer; Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.); and Peter W. Singer, 
strategist and senior fellow at New America.
Secretary Spencer noted: “We seek a true partnership based upon the concept 
of shared risks producing shared rewards; a partnership in which no single nation 
is the expert, and the ability to lead resides within all of us. When we work togeth-
er this way, we can produce an equation where 1+1 = 3, and everyone benefits.”
Panelists and speakers at ISS frequently expressed a shared goal to improve 
interoperability among the world’s navies, acting on the principle that “we are 
stronger together.” Working together in exercises and joint deployments, par-
ticipating in personnel exchanges and exchange enrollments in schools, and 
International Seapower Symposium:  
Security, Order, Prosperity
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gathering at events such as ISS enhance mutual security, protect the rules-based 
order that benefits all nations, and contribute to global prosperity�
In a crisis, the ability to respond quickly and collectively relies on these preex-
isting bonds among navies and nations� It often is said that you can surge forces 
to meet a contingency, but you cannot surge trust and confidence among allies� 
“Every day, our allies and partners join us in defending freedom, deterring war, 
and maintaining the rules that underwrite a free and open international order,” 
said Secretary Spencer�
Oceans that once were the physical and psychological barriers that kept na-
tions apart are now the maritime superhighways that bring nations together� 
Strong maritime forces are uniquely suited to help manage the increasing 
pace and complexity of change—they make uniquely productive relationships 
possible� And they have a long history of behaving in accordance with a well- 
understood and agreed-to set of rules, and of advocating for such behavior�
“ISS-23 is a manifestation of this desire to strengthen the bonds of trust and 
confidence among partners, and to explore new opportunities on which we can 
collaborate and from which we can learn,” said Admiral Richardson� “Make no 
mistake, this desire to sail together in support of our fellow citizens—regardless 
of the winds, waves, and weather around us—is the current that has drawn us 
here to Newport�”
Panel discussions, presentations, and one-on-one conversations among the 
delegates addressed common issues inherent in the maritime domain� These 
included combined operations, communication at sea, drug trafficking, piracy, 
smuggling, natural disaster relief, and methods of securing free and open ocean 
spaces�
The symposium also provided the opportunity to showcase some of the most 
modern ships in the U�S� fleet� The amphibious transport dock USS New York 
(LPD 21), the guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82), the expeditionary 
fast transport USNS City of Bismarck (T-EPF 9), and the U�S� Coast Guard cutter 
Lawrence Lawson (WPC 1120) hosted visits and social events aboard the ships for 
delegates and over one hundred spouses; the latter also participated in portions 
of the symposium program�
The first biennial ISS was held here in Newport in 1969� It was designed then, 
and continues now, to allow naval leaders from around the world to meet and 
discuss common issues and ways to address shared challenges� Previous years’ 
symposia have resulted in enhanced cooperation in countering piracy, providing 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coordinating search and rescue at sea 
(including submarine rescue), and countering arms/drug/human trafficking and 
fishery/pollution violations�
Winter2019Review.indb   8 12/4/18   11:13 AM
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Long-range planning already has begun for ISS-24, which will take place here 
at the Naval War College in 2020� Working seamlessly with our global partners 
takes a steady hand on the helm and constant vigilance to remain on course� We 
take this responsibility seriously, and there is no more important task as we con-
tribute to the peace and security of our nation and those of our allies�
JEFFREY A� HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
(Portions derived from Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kristi Nanco, 
“Global Leaders Assemble at 23rd International Seapower Symposium,” America’s 
Navy, September 23, 2018, www.navy.mil/.)
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Captain James E. Fanell served for twenty-eight 
years as a naval intelligence officer specializing in 
Indo-Pacific security affairs, with an emphasis on 
China’s navy and operations. His most recent Navy 
assignment was as Director of Intelligence and Infor-
mation Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Prior 
to that he served in a series of afloat and ashore as-
signments focused on China, as the Assistant Chief 
of Staff for Intelligence for the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
aboard USS Blue Ridge as well as with the USS Kitty 
Hawk aircraft carrier strike group, both forward 
deployed to Japan. Ashore, he was the U.S. Navy’s 
China Senior Intelligence Officer at the Office of Na-
val Intelligence. He is currently a Government Fellow 
with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is also 
the creator and, since 2005, the manager of the Indo-
Pacific security forum Red Star Rising�
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This article is derived from Captain Fanell’s testimony at the hearing before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 17, 2018. The full text  
of his original testimony more forcefully reflects his admonitions to the committee, and it is  
available online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/james_e._fanell_hpsci 
_testimony_-_final_-_17may18.pdf.
 China’s unilateral expansion into and through the international waters within the first island chain—or what Beijing now calls China’s Blue Territories—
over the past six years has altered the strategic balance of power dramatically in 
the Indo-Pacific region�1 That strategic balance has shifted in favor of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and against America’s security and interests�
In addition to building a modern, blue-water navy, the PRC has taken a wide 
range of destabilizing actions that pose an increasing threat to global security� 
Among these actions are the construction of naval air stations in the South China 
Sea, including on Mischief Reef, which is located within the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, a U�S� ally; its declaration of an air-defense identi-
fication zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea near Japan; its claims of sovereignty 
over the Senkaku Islands; and its flat-out repudiation of the authority of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the world’s oldest standing international-
law arbitral body�2 The threatening actions also include China’s unprecedented 
and increasing naval operations in the western Pacific, South Pacific, and Indian 
Oceans; the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas; the Arctic and Antarctic; and, finally, 
the Atlantic Ocean� These actions are clear empirical indicators of China’s future 
malign intentions and actions�
These intentions and actions position China’s military forces, particularly its 
navy, air force, missile forces, and rapidly expanding marine corps, as the arbiters 
of a new global order—one that stands opposed to U�S� national interests and 
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values and those of our friends and allies� China has spent billions of dollars on 
a military that can achieve the dreams of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)�
It is crucial to establish firmly and quickly why the PRC’s rapid, global, and 
very expensive naval expansion matters� The CCP is engaged in a total, pro-
tracted struggle for regional and global supremacy� This supremacy is at the 
heart of the “China Dream�”3 China’s arsenal in this campaign for supremacy 
includes economic, informational, political, and military warfare� The campaign 
at its heart is opportunistic; we have witnessed already China’s expansion into the 
vacuum of a diminishing U�S� presence in East Asia�
If one has not read Xi Jinping’s words and realized the supremacist nature of 
the China Dream and carefully watched the nature of China’s rise, then one in-
nocently might ask the obvious question: Why does it matter that the PRC seeks 
regional, or even global, hegemony? That is, why does the world not simply 
abide a “rising China,” a seemingly benign term so often employed by Beijing’s 
propaganda organs and PRC supporters worldwide? After all, fewer would be 
concerned if, for instance, a “rising Brazil” or a “rising India” sought regional 
hegemony and proclaimed a desire to lead the world into the twenty-first century�
The answer goes to the core of China’s leadership and how it behaves� Under 
the CCP, the PRC is an expansionist, coercive, hypernationalistic, militarily and 
economically powerful, brutally repressive, totalitarian state� The world has 
seen what happens when expansionist totalitarian regimes such as this are left 
unchallenged and unchecked� In a world under this type of hegemon, people are 
subjects—simply property—of the state, and ideals such as democracy, inalien-
able rights, limited government, and rule of law have no place�
Clear empirical indicators directly contradict the oft-quoted pledge by China’s 
leaders to pursue a “peaceful rise,” one in “harmony” with the rest of Asia and 
the world� By its expansionist actions and words, China has challenged the post–
World War II norms of international behavior and, most importantly, the peace 
and stability that the Indo-Pacific region has enjoyed over the past seventy years�
For instance, in spite of the country’s having a gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita on par with that of the Dominican Republic, China’s leadership has invested 
staggering amounts of national treasure in a world-leading complex of ballistic mis-
siles, satellites, and fiber-linked command centers with little utility but to pursue 
military dominance aggressively�* Despite China’s need to keep its children indoors 
because of hazardous levels of pollution, a health care system in crisis, toxic rivers, 
a demographic time bomb caused by government-directed population expansion 
and then forced contraction, and only one-third the GDP per capita of the United 
States, Beijing chooses to spend its precious resources on military force buildup�
 * For instance, the DF-21D anticarrier ballistic missile was designed by the People’s Liberation Army 
specifically to destroy U�S� aircraft carriers in the western Pacific�
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Much of that investment has gone into the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN)� The momentum created by the PLAN’s rapid advances in the maritime 
domain threatens to do for the rest of the world what the Communist Party has 
done for China Proper and its neighbors (Xinjiang and Tibet, Cambodia and 
Laos), establishing military, political, and economic domination, to varying 
degrees—as the PRC pursues what President Xi calls his China Dream�
The PLAN is China’s point of the spear in its quest for global hegemony� As 
of 2018, the PLAN consists of over 330 surface ships and sixty-six submarines—
nearly four hundred combatants� As of May 4, 2018, the U�S� Navy consisted of 
283 battle-force ships, including 211 surface ships and seventy-two submarines�4 
By 2030, it is estimated the PLAN will consist of some 550 ships: 450 surface ships 
and ninety-nine submarines�5 These numbers are a current subject of debate in 
the halls of the Capitol and the Pentagon, and it remains unclear whether the U�S� 
Navy of 2030 will reach a total of even 355 ships and submarines�
Numbers matter� In the past, it was fair to say that numbers of hulls, or even 
tonnage, were not a complete measure of force-on-force capabilities and that 
American technology would outweigh the PLAN’s numbers� Today, that argu-
ment is no longer credible� From a technological standpoint, the PRC quickly 
has achieved parity with USN standards and capacities for warship and subma-
rine production� PLAN ships and submarines do not have to match U�S� naval 
capabilities precisely; they only have to be good enough to achieve more hits and 
win any given battle� That said, the quality of PRC warships already presents a 
credible threat across the Indo-Pacific region today� Consequently, we should be 
gravely concerned about America’s ability to deter or defeat the PRC’s naval spear�
We do not have much time left—certainly not until the year 2030, when the 
PRC’s navy will be double the size of the U�S� Navy� For reasons laid out below, 
the window of vulnerability—the decade of greatest concern—begins in less than 
twenty-four months� If some currently unintended event does not provoke a mili-
tary confrontation before then, we have until 2020—the deadline that Xi Jinping 
has given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to invade Taiwan� From 
that point on, we can expect China to strike�
My detailed assessment of this imminent and ever-increasing maritime threat 
follows, as well as my recommendations: the actions our country must take to 
avoid geopolitical defeat and a likely naval disaster, the likes of which we have not 
experienced since the early, dark days of World War II�
A CHINESE MARITIME DREAM
In 2013, as President Xi Jinping unveiled his China Dream in a speech to the PRC 
National People’s Congress, China Central Television (CCTV) aired the week-
long series Shaping China’s Tomorrow, which explored what Chinese people think 
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about the Dream� It is noteworthy that CCTV began the series with the story of a 
PLAN East Sea Fleet–based executive officer just returned from his third escort 
mission in the Gulf of Aden� Lieutenant Commander Shi Lei related that when 
he joined the PLAN a decade prior, he never had envisioned sailing so far from 
land� But now he believes the PLAN one day will have a blue-water navy whose 
sailors can take on any mission on the open sea� Significantly, this CCTV series 
vignette symbolizes China’s shift in maritime strategy over the past decade, from 
solely a near-seas, active-defense strategy to a national maritime strategy focused 
on responsibilities and presence across the global maritime domain� Not surpris-
ingly, it aligned President Xi’s 
call for China to become “a 
strong maritime power” with 
former president Hu Jintao’s 
direction to “resolutely safe-
guard China’s maritime rights 
and interests, and build China 
into a maritime power�”6 Since 
the end of the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan in 2000, the PRC has 
embarked on an ambitious naval-construction program that dramatically has 
increased the blue-water operations of the PLAN and the China Coast Guard 
(CCG) within the first and second island chains, while substantially increasing 
far-seas deployments around much of the globe�7
The theme of China’s national rejuvenation only has strengthened during the 
first five years of President Xi’s rule� For instance, at the Nineteenth National 
Party Congress of the CCP in October 2017, Xi Jinping stated, “The theme of 
the Congress is: remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission 
firmly in mind � � � and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national 
rejuvenation�”8
Most importantly, realization by Xi and the CCP of the China Dream of na-
tional rejuvenation and restoration is linked to, and firmly dependent on, a global 
naval capability� The PRC has both the will and the means to push for rapid in-
creases in the PLAN’s order of battle in support of an expanding set of missions to 
fulfill the China Dream� Undergirding this thesis are China’s present and future 
naval-construction capabilities and capacity; successful, ongoing expansion of 
naval operations; and official advocacy for a modern, global, naval force—one 
that already is posing a very serious challenge for its neighbors and the U�S� Navy�
This projection of China’s maritime power relies on several assumptions� 
First, regardless of potential domestic, political, or economic difficulties, China’s 
The PLAN is China’s point of the spear in its 
quest for global hegemony. . . . China’s in-
creasingly well-publicized naval presence and 
operations throughout Southeast Asia have 
contributed to a tectonic shift in this sensitive 
region, a shift toward Beijing and authoritari-
anism and away from the United States and 
its values of democracy and the rule of law.
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leaders will continue investment “in the Navy, Coast Guard, and maritime in-
dustries to more actively and effectively assert its security and economic interests 
in the coming decades�”9 Second, China will continue to enjoy a military ship-
building cost advantage over rivals�10 And third, China will master the technical 
advances required to overcome issues arising from the production and incorpo-
ration of advanced naval systems—from phased-array radars to nuclear reactors�
While Beijing prefers to achieve its strategic aims through military intimida-
tion rather than combat, as it did at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, it is also clear that 
the PRC is prepared to use military force to achieve its strategic goals, as it already 
has done—with deadly effect—in the Paracel and Spratly Islands�11 Those goals 
are, first, to consolidate the country’s perceived territory, largely in the maritime 
domain of the first island chain—a precondition for compelling the submission 
of Taiwan—and, second, to exert its influence and power around the globe�
FORCE STRUCTURE EXPANSION AND MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Over the course of nearly two decades, the PLA has benefited from the CCP’s 
military modernization effort, the largest by any nation since the end of World 
War II� This transformation has not been limited to the procurement of combat 
platforms such as ships, submarines, aircraft, tanks, and rockets, but also has en-
compassed areas ranging from combat-support services to command and control 
and civil-military integration�
Throughout these years, the PLA has been charged with the overarching goal 
of “realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful military�”12 
President Xi has made clear that the CCP has “developed a strategy for the 
military under new circumstances, and ha[s] made every effort to modernize 
national defense and the armed forces�”13
Military and Command Reorganization
Since taking office, President Xi has restructured the PLA in China’s seven mili-
tary regions into five theater commands� He also reorganized the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) by establishing and subordinating the army’s service head-
quarters; raising the stature and role of the strategic missile, air, and naval forces; 
and establishing a Strategic Support Force (SSF) to integrate space-, cyber-, 
and electronic-warfare capabilities�14
Furthermore, by early 2016, President Xi had reorganized and streamlined 
the senior echelons of the PLA by discarding “the PLA’s four traditional gen-
eral departments in favor of 15 new CMC functional departments�”15 To put a 
capstone on this transformation, Xi announced that the CMC would now be in 
charge of the “overall administration of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, militia, 
and reserves,” with the new theater commands (sometimes referred to as joint 
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war zones) focusing on combat preparedness� Meanwhile, the various services 
would be responsible for the development of programs to man, train, and equip 
the force (in the United States, in relation to the National Guard, these are called 
the Title 10 authorities)�16
Also of significant concern, Xi has placed authority over the CCG under the 
CMC� Thus, the CCG, Asia’s largest coast guard, is no longer under the civilian 
command of the State Oceanic Administration� It now falls under Xi’s direct 
command, through his control of the People’s Armed Police�17
A closer examination of each of the PLA forces is necessary to understand and 
appreciate their rapidly expanding capabilities�
The People’s Liberation Army Navy
Since 2000, the PRC has embarked on an ambitious naval-construction program 
that dramatically increased the PLAN’s and the CCG’s blue-water operations 
within the first and second island chains, while substantially increasing far-seas 
deployments around much of the globe�18
With the realization of the China Dream firmly linked to a global naval capa-
bility, China’s leaders are on the cusp of achieving their military and economic 
goals� They are increasing the PLAN’s order of battle rapidly in support of an 
expanding set of global missions to fulfill their China Dream of national restora-
tion and rejuvenation, which will in turn fuel and secure their global economic 
expansion through the $1�6 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)� Previously 
called the One Belt One Road, and before that the Maritime Silk Road, the scope 
of the initiative spans eighty countries�19
While official Chinese documents describe the BRI as purely commercial and 
a win-win for participants, studies have shown that internal PRC discussion of 
the BRI characterizes it as a stealthy conduit of political influence and not only 
maritime but also naval expansion�20 Between 2000 and 2014, China committed 
$126 billion to the transport and storage sectors�21 These commitments led to 
port deals worldwide that provide extensive expansion opportunities� China’s 
goals of present and future naval-construction capabilities and capacity; success-
ful, ongoing expansion of naval operations; and official advocacy for a modern, 
global, naval force already are posing a challenge for the country’s neighbors and 
the U�S� Navy�22
The PLAN’s expansion from 2000 to 2018 far exceeds the buildup in any other 
nation’s navy in the post–World War II era, save for the U�S� Navy under President 
Ronald W� Reagan during the 1980s� For China’s leaders to achieve their vision 
of a rejuvenated and restored China, they need a fleet that can expand China’s 
interior lines out into the maritime domain�23 In other words, they need naval, 
air, missile, and expeditionary forces that can take China’s regional military 
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dominance and intimidation to the global realm� Because of atrophy of U�S� naval 
forces over the last decade, Beijing’s goal is expected to be realized by 2020�
Concurrent with the PLAN modernization has been the changing pattern of 
its operations� Instead of continuing its role as a coastal naval force operating 
within fifty nautical miles (nm) of China’s coast, today the PLAN has pushed out 
into the blue water of the Pacific Ocean and beyond (figures 1 and 2)� An exami-
nation of PLAN blue-water operations during the past fifteen years reveals that 
“China’s ambitious naval modernization has produced a more technologically 
advanced and flexible force�” This evolving naval force will provide Beijing with 
the capability to conduct a military campaign successfully within the first island 
chain (for instance, to take Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands)�24 
This transformation has required a new force structure, one that has increased 
both the number and the type of naval platforms� With respect to far-seas op-
erations, the U�S� Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported that the PLAN’s 
“diversified missions and far seas operations” during the previous decade had 
stimulated an operational shift and catalyzed the acquisition of new multimission 
platforms�25 These multimission platforms are perfectly suited for naval combat 
against naval forces tasked to defend Japan’s southwest islands and Taiwan, and 
U�S� naval forces globally as well�26 The PLAN’s ability to confront and deny ac-
cess to U�S� naval forces regionally is now widely recognized, but its ability to 
confront—and defeat—U�S� naval forces globally merits more attention than it 
has received�
Figure 1: PLA Military Capabilities 2000 Figure 2: Expanding Military Capabilities 
2015 
Sources: Order of battle based on author’s compilation of open-source data. Build rate derived 
from Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities–
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2014), pp. 27–29. 
Sources: Order of battle based on author’s compilation of open-source data. Build rate derived from Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implica-
tions for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), pp. 27–29.
FIGURE 1
PLA MILITARY CAPABILITIES 2000
FIGURE 2
EXPANDING MILITARY CAPABILITIES 2015
= 25 advanced fighter/ 
strike aircraft
 = 3 submarines
 = 5 surface ships
 = 25 ballistic missiles
= 25 advanced fighter/ 
strike aircraft
 = 3 submarines
 = 5 surface ships
 = 25 ballistic missiles
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In their article “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life 
of Surface Fleets,” James R� Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara correctly assert that 
the PLAN is “particularly well-suited to seize islands�”27 They hypothesize that 
PLAN assault forces will be led by surface combatant strike groups composed of 
the service’s premier combatant, the Type 052D Luyang III–class guided-missile 
destroyers, along with the Type 054C Luyang II–class guided-missile destroyers, 
the Type 054A Jiangkai III–class guided-missile frigates, and the Soviet-built 
Sovremenny-class destroyers�
With their superior arsenal of antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), these surface 
action strike groups can provide withering naval gunfire support for an am-
phibious landing force� They have great range, speed, and survivability� These 
combatants also would provide a sea-based air defense that would constrain or 
even preclude U�S� or allied air operations near an amphibious operation�28 Given 
China’s superior number of advanced surface combatants, “it is far from clear 
that the United States retains its accustomed supremacy,” especially in a Taiwan 
invasion or Senkaku Islands campaign in which naval warfare will determine 
mission success�29
Regarding the Senkakus, PLAN forces have increased their operations in and 
around the islands since 2012, in addition to activity by China’s Maritime Law 
Enforcement, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships, and 
the largest civilian fishing fleets on the planet� Prior to 2012, PLAN warships 
generally patrolled on the west side of the median line between China and Japan; 
since 2012, Chinese warships have been operating for sustained periods east of 
the median line� This trend culminated on June 19, 2016, when the Japanese 
destroyer Setogiri confirmed that a PLAN Jiangkai I–class frigate had entered the 
contiguous zone of the Senkaku island of Kuba�30 
Following this pattern, the PRC also has been tightening the noose around 
Taiwan over the last two years� In April 2018, the PLA engaged in its largest-ever 
attack exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and in the first live-fire exercises there since 
2015� In addition, People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) nuclear-capable 
aircraft circled the island repeatedly during the month in efforts to intimidate 
the Taiwan government and populace� Other PLAAF aircraft circling Taiwan in-
cluded multiple fighter jets, H-6K bombers, and early-warning airplanes�31 PLA 
forces involved in the assault exercises reportedly included some ten thousand 
personnel, seventy-six fighter jets, forty-eight naval vessels, a nuclear-powered 
submarine, and the PLAN’s aircraft carrier Liaoning (CV 16), which conducted 
its first carrier strike group operations in the waters of the Philippine Sea just 
east of Taiwan�32
The challenge for the defending force of allied and U�S� warships operat-
ing within the first island chain is compounded by China’s ability to bring the 
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firepower of all three of its fleets into the sea area around these islands� In addi-
tion, China’s naval firepower will come from a densely populated submarine force 
armed with supersonic, sea-skimming, 290 nm–range YJ-18 ASCMs, as well as 
air-delivered ASCMs from the PLAAF�
With these surface, subsurface, and air forces on hand in the East China Sea, 
the PLAN has the capability to conduct a short, sharp war to fulfill its pledge of 
taking Japan’s Senkaku Islands� The United States and its allies have insufficient 
capabilities in the region and easily could lose a conventional war in the Senkakus 
if China strikes first� Taiwan would pose greater challenges for the PRC, but the 
PRC now has a significant capability to launch a devastating no-warning attack 
on the island democracy�
Further, while the PLAN’s forays by flotillas into European and African waters 
have drawn public attention, of greater concern is the PRC’s increasing ability to 
sustain those forces from a widening web of PRC-controlled naval logistic bases 
from Southeast Asia to the Mediterranean� These ports have been developed for 
military purposes, and many will control strategic choke points such as the Strait 
of Malacca and the Suez Canal� Most of China’s port deals are for a period of 
ninety-nine years or more�33
The commander of U�S� Pacific Forces warned Congress in early 2017 that 
China’s naval “presence and influence are expanding,” thanks in large part to the 
commercial network created by the BRI� The PRC is using state-owned compa-
nies and politically linked private firms to create a network of facilities designed 
to provide logistic support to deployed PLAN warships, employing a “first civil-
ian, later military” approach to port development across the region� Chinese 
warships already are taking advantage of the dual-use possibilities of commercial 
ports, bolstered by laws that oblige Chinese transportation firms working over-
seas to provide replenishment for navy vessels�34
PLAN Amphibious Forces
Perhaps the most important aspect of any successful Chinese maritime sover-
eignty campaign involves the act of physically occupying islands within the first 
and second island chains� The key to holding these contested islands is the ability 
to move forces ashore successfully to seize and hold the ground�
China continues to build and train its naval and amphibious forces in the 
art of expeditionary warfare, a skill set easily applied to regional island-seizure 
or global force-projection campaigns� In addition to the Taiwan Strait live-fire 
exercises alluded to previously, Chinese marines recently conducted amphibious 
assault exercises in the South China Sea using amphibious dock landing ships, 
air-cushion landing craft, and shipborne helicopters�35 This type of training is 
ubiquitous across the East and South China Seas and is the most tangible evi-
dence of the PLA’s preparation to conduct such a mission�
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One facet of President Xi’s transformation of the PLA includes a dramatic 
expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps (PLAMC) to one hun-
dred thousand personnel—an enormous increase for a nation ostensibly devoted 
to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and, in reality, threatened by no 
other nation. According to reports in the South China Morning Post, “two spe-
cial warfare brigades ha[ve] already been incorporated into the PLAMC, raising 
the forces’ complement of soldiers to 20,000.”36 These new PLAMC forces will 
be dispatched to far-flung installations such as Gwadar, Pakistan, and the new 
PLAN base in Djibouti. In these locations, they effectively will threaten America’s 
African and South Asian allies and buttress China’s allies operating in these re-
gions, including Russia, Pakistan, and Iran. They also threaten Taiwan and the 
Senkakus with potential invasion, as well as islands and countries in East Asia 
and Southeast Asia more generally. Growth in PLAMC personnel is necessary to 
tip the balance of power in these regions from favoring the United States and its 
allies to favoring China’s growing maritime and territorial ambitions.
To provide the amphibious lift needed for this vastly expanded marine corps, 
China is producing an increasing number of large, high-end, amphibious war-
ships and is intent on building many more over the near term. According to the 
ONI, as of 2015 the PLAN has fifty-six amphibious warships, ranging from a few 
World War II–era landing ships to four of the large, modern Yuzhao-class Type 
071 amphibious transport dock ships that provide a substantially greater capacity 
and more formidable capability than older landing ships.37 The Yuzhao-class ship 
is designed for a wide range of island campaigns, including against Taiwan or the 
Senkakus or in the South China Sea, and force projection into the Indian Ocean 
and globally. It can hold up to four of the new air-cushion landing craft as well as 
four or more helicopters, along with armored vehicles and troops.38
Not content with the Yuzhao, China has announced it “has started building a 
new generation of large amphibious assault vessels that will strengthen the navy 
as it plays a more dominant role in projecting the nation’s power overseas.”39 The 
PLAN commander, Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, reportedly visited the Hudong-
Zhonghua Shipbuilding Company in Shanghai in March 2017, where the new 
ship, identified as the Type 075 landing helicopter dock, is under construction.40
The Type 075 is much larger than any other amphibious warship previously 
built for the PLAN and is suited specifically to an opposed island-seizure cam-
paign and global force projection. It can carry a much larger number of attack 
and transport helicopters (as many as thirty) and has the ability to launch six 
helicopters simultaneously.41 For a PRC amphibious assault force, this greatly 
enhanced heliborne assault capability is critically important. For example, in a re-
gional Senkaku Islands seizure campaign, the closest PLA airfield to the Senkaku 
Islands from which the PLA could launch attacking helicopters is more than 180 
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nm away� The Type 075 will provide the critical element for the PLA to be able 
to project boots on the ground to targeted islands throughout the western Pacific 
and pose a credible threat to military targets globally�
At the current rate of amphibious assault ship production, the PLAN and the 
PLAMC will be well resourced and ready to take islands within the first island 
chain—or objectives as far away from the PRC’s shores as needed—by the early 
2020s�
While a detailed PRC shipbuilding plan for the next fifteen years has not been 
made public, analysis of available evidence permits extrapolation of the numbers 
of ships and submarines China will need by 2030 to achieve its national maritime 
goals� The following priorities are my assessment of what is most important for 
China’s future naval trajectory and its justification for a 550-ship/submarine fleet: 
(1) near-seas active-defense operations, (2) far-seas operations, (3) “goodwill” de-
ployments, (4) surge operations, (5) the BRI, (6) carrier strike group operations, 
(7) amphibious assault group operations, and (8) submarine-launched ballistic-
missile patrols�42
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
On November 23, 2013, the PRC abruptly declared an ADIZ in the East China 
Sea�43 While Beijing portrayed the ADIZ as being about protecting China’s main-
land, the zone represents the importance the regime places on the air domain in 
any attempt to take Taiwan or the Senkaku or Spratly Islands�
Since the East China Sea ADIZ declaration, the PLAAF has increased the 
scope and scale of flights in and around the Senkaku Islands� In December 2012, 
a Chinese maritime surveillance aircraft entered the Senkaku Islands’ territorial 
airspace for the first time in fifty years�44 This event, which went unopposed 
except for public statements, ushered in an era of expanded PLAAF activities in 
the East China Sea, where fighter, airborne warning and control, and signal- and 
electronic-intelligence aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles have expanded 
their air operations farther southeast toward the Senkaku Islands�45
As a result of this strategy shift, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) fight-
ers increased their reactions to Chinese aircraft probing Japan’s ADIZ, from ap-
proximately three hundred events in 2012 to nearly seven hundred in 2016�46 And 
while JASDF reactions to the PLAAF were fewer in 2017, owing in large part to 
the CCP’s Nineteenth National Party Congress, the overall increase in PLAAF air 
activity directed toward Japan’s airspace caused the JASDF to double the number 
of its interceptors from two to four fighter aircraft, a clear indication of Japan’s 
concern about the strategic trend line of the PLAAF�47
In addition, the PLAAF has completed an aggressive transition from being an 
exclusively territorial air-defense force to one that routinely operates over the vast 
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distances of the high seas within the first and second island chains� For instance, 
in 2013, the PLAAF began flights into the western Pacific Ocean via the Miyako 
Strait and since then has averaged between five and six events per year, with 
multiple aircraft�48 The aircraft types conducting flights have included bomber, 
fighter, refueling, electronic-intelligence, and airborne early warning aircraft—
attesting to the comprehensive nature of how China would employ airpower to 
help secure and maintain its control over the Senkaku Islands�
Adding complexity to the air domain, the PLAAF conducted “its first-ever 
exercise over the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel” in late March 2015�49 
Despite PLAAF public assertions that these drills were routine and not targeted 
against “any particular country, regions or targets,” there is little doubt that PLA 
air forces, including the PLAAF and the People’s Liberation Army Naval Air 
Force (the PLAN’s naval aviation branch, the PLANAF), entering the Philippine 
Sea via the Bashi Channel or the Miyako Strait provide the PLA with considerable 
operational and tactical flexibility in any island-seizure attack campaign within 
the first island chain�50
The PLAAF announced in mid-September 2016 that it would conduct regu-
lar exercises flying past the first island chain�51 True to its word, the PLAAF has 
conducted flights through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel, such as on 
March 3, 2017, when China sent thirteen aircraft through the Miyako Strait�52 
According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, this was “the largest number of 
foreign planes Japan has scrambled jets for since such data first became available 
in 2003�”53
The PLAAF also now routinely sends bombers to threaten Japan, Guam, and 
other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) allies� In March 2018, 
the PLAAF sent six H-6K bombers; one Tu-154; and one Y-8 intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft through the Miyako Strait into the 
western Pacific to exercise what the PLAAF stated was “long-range operational 
capabilities�” In reality, these were attack training profiles for strikes on Guam, 
while sending Su-35 fighters on their first combat patrol over the South China 
Sea�54 And most recently, on May 11, 2018, the PLA’s Eastern and Southern 
Commands dispatched two groups of H-6K bombers, accompanied by KJ-2000 
airborne early warning aircraft and Su-35 and J-11 fighters, in clockwise and 
counterclockwise patterns from the Chinese mainland through the Miyako Strait 
and the Bashi Channel, demonstrating the PLAAF’s ability to operate under 
“high-sea conditions” against Taiwan�55
The increasing proximity of Chinese aircraft to the Senkaku Islands is of par-
ticular significance� According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense, China has increased 
the number of PLAAF aircraft that fly south of 27 degrees north latitude, an un-
spoken demarcation line that Japan considers to be a defensive borderline�56 JASDF 
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tactical objectives are designed to keep Chinese planes from flying within a mini-
mum protective air umbrella of approximately 60 nm from the Senkaku Islands�
The combined failure of Japan and the United States to defend this line sends 
China the message that our resolve to defend the Senkakus themselves may be 
weak� The same can be said for our ability to defend the airspace around Taiwan 
and, worse still, in the South China Sea�
China easily could begin a campaign to take Japanese islands, Taiwan, or 
the islands of the South China Sea by exploiting and surprising local air com-
manders� Specifically, the PLAAF could launch a large number of fighters and 
other aircraft toward Okinawa via the Miyako Strait and up through the Bashi 
Channel, with the goal of diverting, diffusing, and degrading U�S� and allied 
defensive efforts to establish airspace control� On these islands, an assault by 
the main invasion force, either airborne from helicopters or seaborne, would be 
conducted concurrently� And both this combined-arms diversion and the main 
assault would take place under the cover of one of the most sophisticated missile 
and rocket forces on the planet�
Finally, if there was any doubt about the PRC’s intention to develop the capa-
bility for global power projection, specifically nuclear power, one need look no 
further than PLAAF commander Ma Xiaotian’s December 2016 assertion that 
“China is developing next-generation long-range bombers,” expected to be desig-
nated the H-20 bomber� This new bomber, according to Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, 
director of the PLAN’s Expert Consultation Committee, would be on par with the 
U�S� Air Force B-2 stealth bomber�57 This was reinforced again in May 2018 when 
the Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Corporation revealed a mysterious, new-model jet, 
rumored to be the PRC’s new stealth bomber�58
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces
In terms of kinetic fires, and per the Chinese military doctrine of joint-fire strike 
campaign, Beijing likely would use its extensive ballistic- and cruise-missile 
arsenal, from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF), PLAAF, 
PLANAF, and PLAN, to disrupt U�S� rear-area operations in Japan and through-
out the area of operations� Specifically, in a Senkakus or Taiwan attack scenario, 
Japan and the United States should expect attacks against military bases on the 
main Japanese island of Honshu, the Ryukyus, and Guam, where the majority 
of Japanese and U�S� military strength resides� In his article “Has China Been 
Practicing Preemptive Missile Strikes against U�S� Bases?,” Commander Thomas 
Shugart, USN, convincingly argues that “the greatest military threat to U�S� vital 
interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the grow-
ing capability of China’s missile forces to strike U�S� bases�”59
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The purpose of these supporting fires, as articulated in joint-fire strike cam-
paign doctrine, would be to coordinate and synchronize antiship ballistic and 
cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, air strikes with precision-guided 
munitions, and counter-C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) strikes with specialized weapons. 
These fires would facilitate the main objective of seizing Taiwan or the Senkaku 
Islands and isolating Japanese, Taiwan, and U.S. military forces arrayed across 
the region.
However, Beijing’s strategic designs extend well beyond the first island chain. 
For instance, in April 2018, the PLARF announced the establishment of a new 
DF-26 brigade and its deployment to an undetected site. The DF-26, with a range 
of nearly 2,200 nm, is the PRC’s second anticarrier ballistic missile. The first, 
the DF-21D, with a range of nearly 1,000 nm, when deployed to Hainan Island, 
places the entirety of the South China Sea within weapons range. Ultimately, both 
of these “carrier killer” missiles demonstrate the PRC’s commitment to power 
projection against the U.S. Navy. Interestingly, the PLARF also noted that “it has 
been sparing no effort to foster the capability to conduct nuclear retaliation and 
intermediate- and long-range precision strikes and has obtained a succession of 
breakthroughs in new weapons’ research and development.”60
Given the recent deployment of the YJ-12B surface-to-surface and HQ-9 
surface-to-air missiles to the PRC’s artificial island bases in the Spratlys, it is en-
tirely conceivable that the PRC’s rocket forces could be used in a similar fashion 
to deploy ballistic-missile systems to China’s emerging overseas military bases in 
Djibouti and Pakistan and elsewhere along the course of the BRI.61
PLA Informatization Department and Strategic Support Force
PLA strategy addresses informatization in both its offensive combat and counter-
intervention operations. Informatization—“the ability to transmit, process, and 
receive information”—is a vital enabler and is at the core of everything the PLA 
wants to accomplish. These missions include blue-water naval confrontations, 
amphibious assaults to take islands, high-tech missions in space and cyber-
space, long-range precision kinetic and nonkinetic strikes, and naval war-at-sea 
operations.62
Reforms to the PLA informatization department began in 2015 and are ex-
pected to be complete by 2020, when lines of responsibility between it and the 
SSF are further delineated. The SSF’s mission reportedly is focused on “strategic- 
level information support” for “space, cyber, electronic, and psychological 
warfare.”63 One of its main missions will be strategic denial of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.64
The SSF is a critical factor for joint operations through this mission of strategic- 
level information support. The SSF also has assumed responsibilities for strategic 
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information warfare� China’s cyber forces would play a critical role in any coun-
terintervention strategy against the United States, Taiwan, and Japan in any 
island-seizure conflict� These same cyber forces will support PLAN operations 
against U�S� forces and those of supporting friends and allies globally in other 
scenarios� The two organizations responsible for this, the Third Department of 
the PLA General Staff Headquarters (3PLA) and the Fourth Department (4PLA), 
are both subordinated to the SSF�65
China has invested heavily in countersatellite electronic-warfare capabilities 
to force a “no satellite, no fight” environment on the United States� The SSF has 
consolidated the management and control over space-based ISR assets� Equally 
troubling, it also may have nonkinetic antisatellite capabilities, such as directed-
energy weapons�
SSF and the Fight for Public Opinion. In any conflict within the Indo-Pacific 
region or globally, the PRC’s fight for public opinion will constitute the second 
battlefield, on which it will wage a wide range of political warfare (PW) opera-
tions� Accordingly, the overall PW effort, and the SSF’s support for it, requires 
special attention�
Guided by the doctrinal principle of “uniting with friends and disintegrating 
enemies,” the PRC continuously employs active PW measures to promote its rise 
and to combat perceived threats� Its PW operations employ strategic psychologi-
cal operations (psyops) to propagate the CCP’s narrative of events, actions, and 
policies to lead international discourse and influence policies of friends and foes 
alike� These PW operations at first may appear to be benign soft-power activities, 
but under scrutiny they often include coercive persuasion campaigns intended to 
manipulate international perceptions�66
Chinese strategic literature particularly emphasizes the role of psyops, legal 
warfare, and public opinion warfare—collectively known as the three warfares—
to subdue an enemy ahead of conflict or ensure victory if conflict breaks out� 
According to available literature and experience, it is certain that the PRC will 
engage in “hybrid warfare” similar to, but likely more sophisticated than, that 
employed in Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea� The PRC will augment conven-
tional military operations with nonconventional operations, such as subversion, 
disinformation and misinformation (now commonly referred to as “fake news”), 
and cyber attacks� The operationalization of psyops with cyber warfare is key to 
this strategy�67 China has empowered its psychological warfare forces fully, most 
notably at the three warfares base (or 311 base) in Fuzhou� These forces are sub-
ordinate to the SSF and integrated with China’s cyber forces�
While the CCP’s effective use of PW operations goes back to the beginning of 
the party, its operations—particularly its efforts to build what amounts to fifth 
columns overseas, through the CCP’s United Front Work Department—took on 
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new impetus with Xi Jinping’s ascension to the leadership of party and govern-
ment in 2012 and 2013, respectively� The United Front is the CCP organization 
that forges domestic and international political coalitions for influence opera-
tions worldwide� In Xi’s view, the time had come for a strong and confident China 
to move beyond former Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s advice to 
hide its assets and bide its time� Delegates to the party Central Committee’s Eigh-
teenth National Congress were lectured on the importance of United Front work, 
and the bureaucracy hastened to comply�68
Prior to initiating an offensive or other military confrontation, China will use 
worldwide psyops and public opinion warfare as part of a concerted PW cam-
paign� It will employ Chinese United Front organizations and other sympathiz-
ers, along with both Chinese and other nations’ mass-information channels such 
as the Internet, television, and radio�
The focus of these influence operations will be to support China’s position and 
demonize, confuse, and demoralize the United States and its supporting friends 
and allies� Internally, this campaign will be important in mobilizing mass support 
for the righteous action, while externally the campaign will attempt to gain sup-
port for China’s position from those nations undecided about which side (if any) 
to support� In addition to standard propaganda, disinformation will be employed, 
such as false reports of surrender of national governments or forces, fabricated 
atrocities and other violations of international law, and other untrue reports in-
tended to undermine decision-making by the United States and its friends and 
allies� Also, United Front organizations, working or in parallel with the PAFMM, 
China’s merchant marine, and its massive fishing fleets, may instigate incidents 
and other actions that disrupt USN and friendly-force maritime operations�
This PW campaign will continue through the military confrontation and 
after—regardless of the success or failure of the operation�
SSF Impact. In a further move that leaves no doubt about the role the CCP envi-
sions for its United Front in the battle for public opinion, on February 17, 2017, 
Xi issued a directive to cultivate greater support among the members of the es-
timated sixty-million-strong Chinese diaspora worldwide� He called for “closely 
uniting” with overseas Chinese in support of the Chinese Dream, as part of the 
greater efforts and activities of the United Front� Xi stressed that “to realize the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must work together with our sons 
and daughters at home and abroad� � � � It is an important task for the party and 
the state to unite the vast number of overseas Chinese and returned overseas 
Chinese and their families in the country and play their positive role in the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation�”69
Xi and the CCP will exploit these overseas Chinese citizens to weaken military 
and political adversaries worldwide and advance the CCP’s political and military 
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objectives�70 Prime among these efforts will be lobbying for the establishment of 
more PRC military bases�
Ultimately, the purpose of these SSF suborganizations is to ensure the sanc-
tity of national- and theater-level command and control as well as to enhance 
the war-fighting effectiveness of each of the individual services� Whether in a 
preferred short, sharp regional war to seize islands or in another confrontation 
that may take place globally, these invisible forces will provide precise situational 
awareness, target identification of opposing forces, network-defense capabilities, 
and real-time command and control that will enable the PLA to take and hold 
military objectives� They also will work to subvert, discourage, and confuse the 
national leadership and operational forces of the United States and its supporting 
friends and allies�
As an example of these efforts, in 2014 the PLA established a permanent joint 
operations command (JOC) center responsible for integrating the operations of 
its army, navy, and air forces� It was the first time such a JOC had been estab-
lished, and the center was seen as boosting “the unified operations of Chinese 
capabilities on land, sea, air, and in dealing with strategic missile operations�”71 
When these actions are combined with President Xi’s other PLA reforms, it seems 
clear that China’s ability to command and control all its forces and disrupt oppos-
ing forces in a military confrontation is well established and practiced�
THE PRC’S GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PRESENCE
China’s expanding naval force structure has allowed it to project power on an 
increasingly global scale� On its path to global maritime hegemony, the PLAN 
began as a marginally capable, coast-hugging, brown-water force� After Ameri-
can forces departed most of Southeast Asia in the 1970s, China tentatively pushed 
out into the blue waters of the South China Sea� By the 1980s, China’s naval forces 
began conducting small-scale, routine operations in both the South and East 
China Seas� This situation remained static and mostly benign through the 1990s, 
but by 2000 the PRC’s strategic goals became clear�
Over the past decade, we have seen the PLAN routinely operate and deploy 
warships as far away as the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, Baltic, and 
Arctic Seas� In fact, by 2015 China was making moves to acquire berthing in the 
Azores—about a third of the way to the U�S� East Coast from Portugal—as well 
as operating hydrographic research ships in the South Atlantic—a harbinger of 
future PLAN submarine operations in the North Atlantic�
In a reversal of old geopolitical truisms, China’s trade is leading the flag, as 
well as vice versa� China has sealed long-term port deals that span the globe, 
including in Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, the 
Strait of Malacca, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritius, 
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Namibia, and Greece� In addition, China currently is negotiating port deals in the 
Maldives, Scandinavia, and Greenland�
These ports already have started to provide critical berthing and logistics sup-
port to China’s merchant marine and the PLAN, including refueling, provisions, 
and maintenance� China’s merchant marine ships, meanwhile, are not regular 
commercial-transport ships� Since 2015, they have been required by Chinese law 
to be built to military specifications� The year prior, China coordinated many of 
its merchant marine ships to push back forcibly against Vietnamese vessels pro-
testing Chinese oil exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ�72
Vital strategic arteries are a focus of PRC control and acquisition planning� 
Chinese business interests have heavy influence over the Panama Canal, as evi-
denced by a milestone treaty signed by Panama and China in 2017� The treaty, 
which came into force in May 2018, is designed to promote maritime and port 
development by the PRC in Panama�73 Further, the PLAN has berthing agree-
ments in Malaysia near the Strait of Malacca, it operates a military base in Dji-
bouti, which is at a choke point for the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and the com-
mander of the U�S� Southern Command recently testified before Congress that 
it is “worth paying attention to” the prospect of the PRC building a naval facility 
in the Western Hemisphere�74 At the current rate, this Western Hemisphere PRC 
naval facility is not a matter of if, but when�
Of equal concern, influential PRC and Thai political leaders are conducting 
advanced planning for a PRC-built canal across the Kra Isthmus of Thailand 
that simultaneously would diminish Singapore’s economic and political viability 
while cutting travel time by three days compared with transit through the Ma-
lacca Strait� Since the Malacca Strait currently handles approximately 40 percent 
of global trade flows, this would increase PRC commercial power vastly�75 It also 
would fund, justify, and facilitate PLAN naval operations between the Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Siam� A similar canal has been proposed for Nicaragua�76
Since 2008, China has conducted nonstop antipiracy operations in the Gulf of 
Aden� These operations have been a boon for the PLAN’s development as a blue-
water naval fighting force and also have provided a portal for Chinese influence 
into the Middle East balance of power� For instance, since 2013 the PLAN has 
conducted regular deployments of nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean, 
and while submarines, especially nuclear-powered types, are suboptimal against 
pirates, they are a highly useful threat against India� The threatening of an emerg-
ing U�S� friend and Quad member, India, reveals the actual strategic purpose of 
China’s submarine and naval operations in the Indian Ocean region�77 In August 
2017, China deployed at least fourteen naval ships in the Indian Ocean�78
The PLAN also has conducted oceanographic research operations in the Indi-
an Ocean, East and South China Seas, and Atlantic Ocean, as well as commercial 
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oceanographic expeditions in the Mariana Trench (within Guam’s EEZ), other 
parts of Micronesia, Benham Rise (within the Philippine EEZ), and the western 
Pacific� China’s naval oceanography often is conducted in tandem with, or under 
the guise of, scientific or commercial oceanography, but its real intent is to gain 
important data about the undersea domain, principally anything of benefit to the 
PLAN elite submarine force�
In 2017, Chinese hydrographic survey vessels were caught mapping the ocean 
floor in the Philippines’ territorial waters of the Luzon and Surigao Straits and in 
the Caroline Islands of Micronesia� This ocean floor mapping assists the PLAN 
subsurface fleet in preparing to break out of the first and second island chains 
and into the western Pacific and Atlantic; doing so would leave global shipping, 
the continental United States, and all other territories vulnerable to submarine-
launched cruise missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attacks 
during wartime�79
In furtherance of these goals, the PLAN has developed a network of sensors 
that incorporates ships, submarines, buoys, satellites, and unmanned underwater 
gliders� The service’s hunger to acquire this information knows no bounds, as was 
demonstrated when a PLAN warship captured a U�S� underwater glider in 2016, 
in a brazenly open theft of U�S� military technology�80 The PLAN’s development 
of underwater listening arrays and passive sonar will erode, if not outrun, the 
current U�S� advantage over the next five to ten years if more U�S� funding is not 
made available in this high-priority, strategic area of naval warfare�
Russia-PRC JOINT SEA Exercises
The PLAN also has been conducting joint naval-warfare exercises, named 
JOINT SEA by the PRC, with the Russian navy since 2012, when the first exer-
cise occurred in the waters of the Yellow Sea� Since then the scope, scale, and 
complexity of the exercises in this series have expanded� Each year the PLAN 
has dispatched its warships to the Sea of Japan and the Mediterranean and Baltic 
Seas�
In the latest iteration, JOINT SEA 2017, three Chinese and ten Russian war-
ships conducted naval-warfare training for several weeks in the Baltic� This was 
the first time the PLAN had operated in the Baltic Sea, and by all accounts its 
performance in this joint operation was flawless� This sent a chilling hard-power 
diplomatic message to Eastern Europe, as China has never denounced Russia’s 
2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and Estonia frequently complains of 
Russian naval and air forces operating too closely to its shores� However, in a 
disturbing turn of events, European capitals apparently accepted the Chinese 
naval presence as the price to be paid for benefiting from Beijing’s BRI�81
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Tectonic Shifts in Southeast Asia
China’s naval advance in Southeast Asia has been swift in historical terms, but in-
cremental when viewed in the context of America’s blinkered four-year political 
cycle� It unfortunately has been met with almost no resistance and, most notably, 
by a failure of U�S� resolve to recognize and confront the dangers while the U�S� 
Navy still held the preponderance of power� China’s increasingly well-publicized 
naval presence and operations throughout Southeast Asia have contributed to a 
tectonic shift in this sensitive region, a shift toward Beijing and authoritarianism 
and away from the United States and its values of democracy and the rule of law� 
Key milestones in the PRC’s maritime and political expansion into Southeast Asia 
are outlined below�
In 1974, the PLA attacked and captured Duncan Island in the Paracels, killing 
dozens of South Vietnamese soldiers� The United States did nothing to assist its 
ally against China, despite having a carrier nearby�82 China subsequently occu-
pied all the Paracels, where it now has twenty naval outposts�83
In 1988, China captured Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands from lightly armed 
Vietnamese troops who were standing knee-deep on the shoal in an attempt to 
establish a presence� The PLAN murdered all sixty-four soldiers by opening fire 
from naval ships with large-caliber deck guns� The Philippines made a diplomatic 
protest of this occupation in its claimed EEZ, but the United States took no mili-
tary action, sending a message of U�S� ambiguity to China and our allies�84
In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, an unoccupied low-tide elevation 
within the EEZ of the Philippines� Again, the United States did nothing� China 
now has dredged and added naval outposts to all the Spratly islands that it 
controls�85
In 2012, the presence of PRC commercial ships at Scarborough Shoal, also 
within the Philippines’ EEZ, instigated a standoff that ultimately intimidated the 
Philippine coast guard and fishermen away from their ancestral fishing grounds� 
The U�S� State Department arguably abetted the PRC’s occupation when Kurt 
Campbell, then the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
negotiated a mutual withdrawal of PLAN and Philippine naval assets from Scar-
borough� The plan was flawed; the PRC immediately reneged, refusing to remove 
its vessels from the shoal and thereby establishing itself as the sole naval power 
at the shoal� This single event has had the negative consequence of providing 
President Duterte of the Philippines with a justification for siding with the PRC 
after he came to office� More importantly, this failure to support a treaty ally has 
damaged U�S� credibility severely, not only with the Philippines, but across the 
entire Indo-Pacific region�
China’s claim of the so-called nine-dash line as its sovereign boundary and 
its occupations of the Philippines’ EEZ were ruled illegal in 2016 by the PCA 
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in The Hague.86 But the United States took no action to recover lost Philippine 
rights, and its ally the Philippines already had given up on the possibility of U.S. 
protection.87
The PCA ruling was too little, too late. China now has announced plans to 
dredge Scarborough Shoal, just 120 nm from the U.S. Navy’s former deepwater 
base at Subic Bay. China’s YJ-12 and YJ-18 ASCMs both have an approximately 
290 nm range, suggesting that it would be foolhardy to conduct naval operations 
from Subic in the future without first establishing control of Scarborough.
Most significantly, China now has deployed YJ-12B ASCMs to Mischief, Subi, 
and Fiery Cross Reefs, despite 
the PRC’s prior assurances 
that it would not militarize 
these facilities. And to com-
plicate the situation further, 
President Duterte stated in a 
speech that he believed China 
had installed the missiles to 
protect rather than imperil the Philippines.88
There is significant concern that President Duterte’s pro-China policies could 
provide a basis for turning Scarborough Shoal into another PRC air and naval 
base. Standing up to Beijing would require adept and forceful diplomacy from 
Manila, as well as the placement of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets at the shoal 
to counterbalance similar Chinese assets.
Farther south, China’s accelerated dredging and militarization of its artificial 
islands since 2013 violates its promises in the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea, which it signed with ASEAN nations in 2002.89 
China’s naval outposts in the South China Sea include berthing for aircraft carri-
ers and submarines, runways sufficient for its military planes, antiaircraft guns, 
and—starting in 2018—ASCMs.90
The militarization of these islands, contradicting promises President Xi made 
to President Obama, is an increasingly powerful inhibitor of USN operations 
in the South China Sea. Counterintuitively, over time China’s militarization of 
the South China Sea increasingly has had the impact of forcing U.S. military 
commanders to get higher and higher levels of approval before being allowed to 
conduct routine operations in the South China Sea. This timidity has escalated to 
the point that presidential approval has been required for even simple freedom of 
navigation (FON) transits—an approval authority protocol that never had been 
required since the inception of the program in 1979.
Also in Southeast Asia, it is important to understand the dramatic tilt that the 
Kingdom of Thailand has taken toward the PRC. This tilt, particularly prominent 
While official Chinese documents describe the 
BRI as purely commercial and a win-win for 
participants, . . . internal PRC discussion of 
the BRI characterizes it as a stealthy conduit 
of political influence and not only maritime 
but also naval expansion.
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since the May 22, 2014, military coup in Thailand, is reflected in unprecedented 
Sino-Thai military-to-military training and cooperation� The first Sino-Thai na-
val exercises were held in the Andaman Sea in 2004 and in the Gulf of Thailand 
in 2005� Exercise STRIKE 2007 was the first joint exercise with any nation involv-
ing China’s special forces� Exercise BLUE STRIKE maritime drills commenced in 
2010, while the first Sino-Thai air force exercises, FALCON STRIKE, took place in 
2015� Thai officials have announced that the PRC will build a regional weapons 
and maintenance center in Thailand, and in 2017 Thailand purchased the first of 
three Chinese submarines�91
The submarine sale has serious, far-reaching implications� Not the least of 
these is that the PLAN likely will control a submarine maintenance and training 
facility at Sattahip naval base, which could preclude USN use of that important 
Southeast Asia naval facility�
Regarding China’s role in Malaysia, former prime minister Najib Razak visited 
China in 2014, and by the next year military personnel exchanges and joint ex-
ercises occurred between the Malaysian armed forces and the PLAN in the Strait 
of Malacca� In 2016, the two countries concluded a major military agreement, 
including Malaysia’s purchase of four littoral mission ships (LMSs), accompa-
nied by a statement by the prime minister against the United States� The LMS 
purchase was Malaysia’s first major defense deal with China, and it may include a 
new Malaysian office of China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Co� Ltd�, 
the LMS maker�92
In 2017, Malaysia’s defense minister spelled out the goals of the two countries 
as being an institutionalization of their “unique relationship” through a “high-
level defense committee” on military cooperation, intelligence exchange, educa-
tion, training, and strategic affairs� A “current issues” working group discussed 
the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and terrorism� On his visit to Beijing that 
year, the minister oversaw an agreement between Malaysia’s National Defense 
University and Peking University�93
Also in 2017, a PLAN submarine docked at Malaysia’s naval base at Kota 
Kinabalu; this occurred simultaneously with a Russian antisubmarine warfare 
ship docking in the Philippines� Whether intentional or not, these actions sent a 
message about the strength of the alliance between China and Russia, along with 
a lack of any significant resistance to their influence in the region�94
After the Chinese and Russian visits in 2017, a fellow at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences opined, “It is normal for Russia to increase the presence of its 
force in Southeast Asia as this region cannot be dominated by the U�S� Besides, 
Southeast Asia has seen a change in the balance of power� The influences of 
China and Russia in the region have heightened while the influence of the U�S� 
has declined� What’s more, with the U�S� failing to meet the security demands 
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of Southeast Asian countries, more countries in the region will turn to China 
and Russia for security�”95 Later in 2017, a PLAN Song-class submarine and a 
replenishment ship conducted a port call in Sabah, Malaysia, after conducting 
counterpiracy operations in Somalia—which sent another signal of the shifting 
sands in the South China Sea�96
Ceding Oceania in the Race for the Equator
As we focus on the PRC’s ability to break the first island chain, we also must be 
watching its inroads into the second and third island chains�97 Across the vast 
expanse of Oceania, China’s deepening economic and political relationships have 
paved the way for port leases and maritime construction efforts that serve the 
PRC’s global power-projection vision and threaten U�S� security interests�
China is making a large play for this resource-rich, strategically crucial region, 
from the continent of Australia to obscure island nations that most Americans 
might not recognize on a map� These are islands and waters that Americans de-
fended, or liberated island by bloody island, from brutal oppression more than 
seventy years ago� However, this time the outcome will be determined not only by 
U�S� naval and air power but also by who wins over the hearts and minds of local 
island populations� The reality at this moment is that massive Chinese investment 
to boost island economies is winning the hearts and minds of island leaders and 
well-off elites, if not necessarily populaces� Simultaneously, U�S� diplomatic and 
economic investment in the islands is often invisible, and sometimes even in 
retreat�
As a prime example, Australia, one of America’s closest allies, sold a ninety-
nine-year lease of its strategic port in Darwin to a financially distressed Chi-
nese company for $506 million in Australian dollars (AUD) in 2015� This sale 
occurred despite Darwin’s long and continuing usage by Australian and U�S� 
military forces, creating an enhanced security threat for operations and unpre-
dictability of access during a crisis� China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated 
at the time, “This investment by a Chinese enterprise is a normal business op-
eration that complies with market principles, international rules, and Australian 
laws�”98 But the Chinese company, Landbridge Group, was financially distressed 
and seeking cheap loans from the Chinese government� To obtain those loans, 
the chief executive officer described the port in terms consistent with China’s 
state goals, saying that the lease was part of China’s state-coordinated BRI� He 
also hired Australia’s former trade commissioner as a consultant for AUD 73,000 
per month, raising questions of corruption among Australia’s decision makers 
on the deal�99
China’s port in Darwin, Australia, is financially distressed� This is normal for 
China’s ports abroad, which are highly unprofitable—unless viewed from the 
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optic of China’s national security� Out of fifteen of China’s global port projects 
sampled by Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, the authors concluded that “only 
six are arguably or potentially profitable�”100 Unsurprisingly, the authors included 
Darwin as one of these six ports, as the port could obtain subsidized funding from 
the Chinese government only after being linked with the PRC’s BRI� The BRI is 
unambiguously a project to promote Chinese global hegemony, both through 
political influence and, more concretely, through naval power projection�101
Recent media reports suggest that Australian defense officials are concerned 
that China aims to establish a permanent naval base on the Pacific island re-
public of Vanuatu, a country known for its robustly independent foreign policy� 
Vanuatu was the first Pacific nation to join the Non-Aligned Movement in the 
1980s, and it has a long-standing commitment to decolonization in places such 
as East Timor, West Papua, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia� Some see 
Vanuatu as the political capital of Melanesia, since it hosts the secretariat for the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) of nations� Vanuatu may be forging closer 
ties with China because it is being threatened directly by Indonesia as a result 
of Vanuatu’s support for West Papuan independence, and at the same time is in 
negotiations with France over the disputed territories of Matthew and Hunter 
Islands� Although Australia usually is seen as the primary regional security 
provider, Melanesian nations such as Vanuatu increasingly see their security 
situation as compromised when it comes to Canberra’s policies on Indonesia and 
climate change�102
While the Vanuatu government and the PRC currently deny that any plans to 
establish such a base are afoot, the PRC initially also denied its plans for the base 
in Djibouti�103 China already has built a new wharf on the Vanuatu island of Es-
piritu Santo, making it one of the largest ports in the South Pacific, and is upgrad-
ing the airport and building sports stadia, convention centers, and roads—along 
with office buildings for Vanuatu’s foreign affairs staff and the prime minister’s 
new office� Vanuatu would be a logical location for China to establish a new 
satellite-tracking station and ground-support facility for its Yuanwang space 
event support ships�104 Chinese officials stated that they have more aid projects 
active in Vanuatu than in any other Pacific country; in return, Vanuatu an-
nounced in late 2016 that it would be the first Pacific country to recognize China’s 
claims in the South and East China Seas� Since then, other Pacific nations, includ-
ing Nauru and Papua New Guinea, have followed suit�
At the same time that Chinese investment and diplomacy are spiking in Vanu-
atu, so too is investment in New Caledonia, where some French officials are ner-
vous about potential violence and the referenda on independence� Across Ocea-
nia, the PRC also is showing deep interest in the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Tonga, Samoa, and French Polynesia� The interest in French Polynesia stems 
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from these islands’ utility not only for support and monitoring (the Yuanwang 
ships have made several visits) but also as a refueling and transshipment point 
between China and the Americas� Additionally, China sees French Polynesia as a 
significant future stepping-stone to growing operations in Antarctica�105
A Chinese company has agreed to invest almost a third of a billion U�S� dollars 
to set up an aquaculture project at French Polynesia’s large and remote Hao atoll� 
That amount is more than all the foreign direct investment that French Polynesia 
received between 2013 and 2016 combined� The atoll used to support a French 
military base for France’s nuclear-testing program� While the base has closed, 
much of its infrastructure is still intact� This includes the airport, which has a 
runway long enough to have been designated an emergency landing strip for the 
space shuttle�106 Fiji and other politically complex countries that are diplomati-
cally close to China also might be in Beijing’s sights as possible locations for naval 
logistics facilities�107
Chinese influence operations in Oceania also are reflected closer to U�S� terri-
tory in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)� In CNMI, 
just north of Guam, Chinese resort developers, serving PRC economic- and 
political-warfare interests, are stymieing U�S� military efforts to develop further 
a much-needed training area for amphibious operations, on Pagan Island� This 
thus-far-successful “blocking operation” is designed to degrade the readiness of 
frontline U�S� Navy and Marine Corps forces assigned or transiting there�
This now-well-established pattern to support Beijing’s global ambitions for the 
PLAN deserves Washington’s close attention� It starts with Chinese financial aid, 
political donations, and investment, along with commercial inroads, and then an 
increase in Chinese immigrants, all contributing to influence over local govern-
ments� Next, invariably, a PLAN-related military objective emerges� This angle 
can range from Chinese military access to ports and airfields to blocking efforts, 
as seen in CNMI and throughout Micronesia�108
New Threats in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
In recent years, the PRC has increased its influence and presence in South Asia 
significantly� Beijing is acquiring a naval facility near Gwadar, Pakistan, and a 
major maritime port facility in the same location on a forty-year lease� The first 
containership visited in March 2018, but Gwadar was not built exclusively for 
profit; rather, it also was envisioned to be China’s territorial foothold in Pakistan 
and to service naval power projection into the Arabian Sea�109
In Sri Lanka, Chinese companies gradually built their influence with arms sales 
amid a civil war and allegations of corruption and bribery at the highest levels� 
Vanity projects and growing debt predictably followed� From 2005 to 2014, China 
provided almost seven billion dollars in loans to Sri Lanka� By 2014, Sri Lanka 
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was having difficulty paying them back, and in September of that year it not only 
opened four of seven berths at the unprofitable Hambantota port to a Chinese 
company on a thirty-five-year lease but also hosted the PLAN warship Chang-
xingdao and nuclear submarine Changzheng-2� After an additional insolvency 
crisis in 2016, Sri Lanka sold a 70 percent equity stake in Hambantota to Chinese 
companies in exchange for forgiveness of a fraction of its debt to China� Chinese 
companies took control of the port, with a ninety-nine-year lease, in January 
2018� This port likely will see routine use by PLAN combatants early in the next 
decade, providing another indicator of the PRC’s success in achieving in the In-
dian Ocean region its goals for acquiring global power-projection capabilities�110
The Maldives provides another stark example� The country lurched toward 
Beijing (and away from New Delhi) with the election of a pro-PRC president in 
2013� The fractious aftermath of the hotly contested election led China to deploy 
warships in parts of the Indian Ocean to preserve its growing interests�111 Con-
sequently, the PRC has been granted exclusive trade and other access� In light 
of the Maldives’ strategic location south of India, this likely will lead to greatly 
enhanced PRC maritime surveillance and naval operational support�
The Maldives and Sri Lanka are two of the several Indian Ocean nations 
where China is obtaining footholds that could prove decisive in its future mari-
time strategy in the region� Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Myanmar also are 
being lured into China’s BRI� The PRC has a substantial stake in the deepwater 
Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar, identified by Chinese officials as one of several port 
locations for military supply and industry� In 2015, China’s state media described 
Kyaukpyu (Myanmar), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Colombo (Sri Lanka), Aden 
(Yemen), and ports in the Maldives as potential industrial hubs to support PLA 
military operations�112
While the facilities at Hambantota, Gwadar, and Kyaukpyu are not being used 
yet by the PLA, Beijing’s militarization of its man-made South China Sea facilities 
and the sudden prospect of a base in Vanuatu demonstrate how quickly dual-use 
infrastructure could be turned to military logistic support� The vulnerability of 
countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Vanuatu to Chinese debt traps associ-
ated with these infrastructure projects was highlighted recently by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund director, who suggested how easily Beijing might tighten 
the financial screws to obtain strategic access�113
Also of great concern, the Maldivian political crisis of 2013 exposed the PRC’s 
willingness to deploy the PLAN to the Indian Ocean in support of China’s inter-
ests, as described by Vivek Mishra:
Even as the crisis was unfolding, Chinese ships sailed to the East Indian Ocean com-
prising a fleet of destroyers and at least one frigate, a 30,000-ton amphibious trans-
port dock and three support tankers� The Chinese ships later returned to the South 
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China Sea on the back of heavy Indian naval scrambling� The incident, however, 
underscored the future importance of the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait, used 
for entry to and departure from the Indian Ocean, for the Chinese Navy (PLAN) in 
the event of a future maritime crisis in the Indian Ocean�114
Expanding Naval Interests in Africa
China has made naval and commercial shipping advances throughout Africa� 
These advances accelerated after Xi Jinping’s high-profile 2015 announcement of 
plans to invest sixty billion dollars in the continent� China has built or obtained 
leases for ports in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti), East Africa (Tanzania), and 
southern Africa on the Atlantic Ocean (Namibia)�
Most widely reported was China’s July 2017 establishment of a military 
logistics base in Djibouti� Here, China began its compromise of U�S� national 
security by softening up the government of Djibouti by providing a six-hundred-
million-dollar port terminal for multipurpose use, a four-billion-dollar terminal 
for liquefied natural gas exports, a six-hundred-million-dollar deal for two new 
airports, and a four-billion-dollar railroad� Chinese officials claimed not to be 
planning a military base for Djibouti—similar to the claims they have made 
in Vanuatu� But then, in July 2017, China used the influence its commerce had 
bought to open the Djibouti Logistics Support Base of the People’s Liberation 
Army near Doraleh, Djibouti� Officials then claimed that “the Djibouti base has 
nothing to do with an arms race or military expansion�”115
But the same month they opened the base, they were conducting live-fire 
exercises using armor, including wheeled tank destroyers and fighting vehicles, 
accompanied by infantry assault teams� These exercises had nothing to do with 
logistics, antipiracy, or the United Nations; rather, they established a land fight-
ing force in the Horn of Africa� The day after the exercises’ conclusion, Premier 
Li Keqiang met the Djiboutian president “to foster economic cooperation and to 
build a regional hub of trade and logistics,” according to China’s state media�116
Less than a year after the base opening in Djibouti, by early May 2018, there 
had been several incidents involving high-power military laser attacks against 
U�S� Air Force (USAF) pilots, a violation of U�S� federal law�117 Two pilots suffered 
minor eye injuries from the lasers that emanated from either the Chinese base 
at Djibouti or a Chinese naval vessel nearby� This is a tactic resurrected from 
the Cold War, when the Soviet Union conducted similar attacks against USAF 
pilots�118
In February 2018, the government of Djibouti also alienated the United States 
and its allies by terminating the port leases of Dubai’s DP World for the Doraleh 
Container Terminal (DCT)� China already controlled two of five terminals at Dji-
bouti’s seaport� The U�S� Africa Command (AFRICOM) chief since has expressed 
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concern that the DCT, which supplies U�S�, Japanese, Saudi, and French troops 
in Djibouti, could be turned over to China, putting at risk naval supply chains 
for the United States and its allies in the region, and possibly threatening USN 
access and commercial FON in the Red Sea and Suez Canal� Camp Lemonnier in 
Djibouti is the only USN base in Africa� Half the world’s containerized cargo and 
four million barrels of oil a day pass by Djibouti�119
The same year—and in stark contrast to the lasing events—the PLAN’s hospi-
tal ship, Anwei (Peace Ark), made port calls throughout the entire rim of Africa, 
which established important 
local contacts and provided 
logistic experience and public 
relations benefits to China� 
The PLAN mission lasted ap-
proximately a hundred days 
and covered 13,000 nm� The 
ship made port stops in Dji-
bouti, Sierra Leone, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, 
and Tanzania�120
China’s naval presence already is progressing southward in East Africa� Tan-
zania is another illustration of China’s incremental insertion of its navy abroad� 
In 2011, the PLAN and Tanzania showed an increasingly close relationship by 
conducting joint naval training�121 China used World Bank funding to deepen 
and strengthen the port of Dar es Salaam in June 2017, which was a double win 
for China, as the PLAN’s largest warships then would be able to berth there and 
a Chinese company won a $154 million contract for the rebuild�122
A three-ship PLAN surface action group (a destroyer, a guided-missile frig-
ate, and a supply ship) visited Tanzania in August 2017�123 In November 2017, 
China used its growing influence in Tanzania to agree to a new $10 billion port 
contract for megaships (those carrying eight thousand twenty-foot equivalent 
units [TEUs]) in Bagamoyo, about seventy-five miles from Dar es Salaam�124 The 
high cost of the port relative to Tanzania’s small economy threatens to overwhelm 
its ability to repay debt to China incurred from port-construction costs� The 
port alone could add approximately 20 percent to Tanzania’s debt-to-GDP ratio, 
putting it at risk of debilitating concessions in an insolvency crisis, as Sri Lanka 
experienced�
In the 1960s, nationalist forces from Namibia visited Beijing to ask for guns 
and money in their fight against apartheid� In 1990, when Namibia claimed 
independence, China was one of the first to recognize the country diplomati-
cally� With that military, economic, and diplomatic investment flowed a hundred 
thousand Chinese immigrants into Namibia by 2016� Chinese corruption of local 
Beijing has demonstrated that it has the 
shipbuilding capacity, capabilities, untapped 
productivity gains, and global requirements to 
sustain the transformational growth in Chi-
nese naval construction and combat capability 
through 2030.
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Namibian politicians has led to international suspicion about plans for a potential 
PLA base on the Atlantic Ocean�125
In 2014, China Harbor Engineering Company began developing a $344 mil-
lion shipping terminal in Walvis Bay, Namibia, on the South Atlantic Ocean� 
Slated for completion in mid-2019, the terminal will have an artificial pen-
insula the size of forty baseball fields and two six-hundred-meter berths that 
each can accommodate containerized cargo vessels of eight thousand TEUs, 
for a total of 750,000 TEUs per year� The plan also includes a $400 million fuel 
depot—and rumors of a naval base� At a ceremony for delivery of four ship-to-
shore cranes in February 2018, China’s ambassador to Namibia stated that with 
their delivery, “Namibia’s port in the coastal town of Walvis Bay will become the 
most brilliant pearl on the Atlantic Coast of southwest Africa�” He added, “It 
can be said that this is the benchmark project for China-Namibia friendly and 
pragmatic cooperation, which symbolizes the great attention of our leaders to our 
relations and the brotherhood between our people�”126
This port is part of a larger Chinese presence in Namibia� Just forty-three 
kilometers (km) north of Walvis Bay is Swakopmund, Namibia, which hosts a 
Chinese telemetry station for tracking satellites and space missions� Chinese 
construction companies are building a new military academy 324 km northeast 
of Walvis Bay� China supplies weapons and training to the Namibian military, 
including from Poly Technologies, which also supplies Iran, Syria, and North 
Korea�127
About a hundred kilometers northeast of Walvis Bay is the Husab Uranium 
Mine, the world’s second largest� China General Nuclear (CGN) owns 90 percent 
of the mine, into which it has invested $4�6 billion since construction started in 
2013; the Namibian government owns only 10 percent� The mine and a process-
ing plant produce triuranium octoxide (U3O8), a yellowcake for both production 
of nuclear energy and weapons manufacture� The mine alone is economically, 
and therefore politically, important to the country, as it will increase Namibia’s 
GDP by 5 percent, according to its own estimates� Almost all Husab’s yellowcake 
production is planned for export to China out of the Walvis Bay port� CGN also 
builds nuclear reactors in China for export, and has proposed one for Namibia� 
CGN is trying to accelerate the manufacture and design of its nuclear reactor 
components� Notably, one of its American consultants was convicted in 2017 for 
conspiring to recruit U�S� nuclear engineers�128
By all accounts and indications, the PRC has selected Namibia as a strategic 
location, so U�S� national security policy makers should expect the PLAN to 
establish a naval base there in support of China’s global aspirations in the South 
Atlantic� The next logical area for expansion after Africa and the South Atlantic 
is in Europe and the North Atlantic�
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In 2017, China and Mauritius announced “a new strategic partnership” that 
included port access and much more� Mauritius is a small island nation to the east 
of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean� Judging by its own description, the Mauri-
tian government offered itself as a virtual shell country to China�
Minister Lutchmeenaraidoo emphasized that Chinese companies will be able to use 
the free port facilities in Mauritius as a basis for adding value to their products and 
re-export them under favorable conditions to [African] countries and can rely on 
Mauritius’ membership of organisations such as COMESA [Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa], SADC [Southern African Development Community], 
IOC [Indian Ocean Commission], and possibly the Tripartite Trade Zone (COMESA, 
SADC, East African Community) to reach markets [in the] countries of Southern 
Africa and East Africa, a huge market of some 650 million consumers�129
Mauritius is targeting countries such as Ghana, Senegal, and Madagascar for 
special economic zones, which they are offering as a sweetener to Chinese inves-
tors for government-to-government agreements “as a very attractive possibility 
to mobilise investments in these new economic poles�” In exchange, China appar-
ently dangled the opportunity to use Mauritius as an all-Africa hub of investment 
and for clearing Chinese currency�130 This dangling of “hub status” to countries 
throughout the world is a common tactic of China’s negotiators�
China Approaching American Coasts
This article has noted China’s naval and maritime expansion in terms of both 
ports and military basing in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian 
Ocean�131 The examples illustrate that China’s ports are not really commercial 
ports, as Americans understand the term, because they are unprofitable; their real 
purpose is geopolitical and naval expansion�
Similarly, China’s merchant marine is not only a merchant marine but also an 
arm of state power on the seas� China used its merchant marine in coordinated 
fashion to evacuate Chinese citizens fleeing violence in Libya in 2011 and to 
threaten Vietnamese boats in their own EEZ in the 2014 China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation oil rig incident� This state coordination of commercial 
and military assets is a hallmark of China’s BRI—which is creeping ever closer to 
American shores�
With the Terminal Link purchase of 2013, Chinese companies purchased 49 
percent stakes in Houston Terminal Link, Texas, and South Florida Container 
Terminal in Miami, Florida� But China’s maritime tendrils are not limited to 
commercial ports�
China already has dispatched warships as far as Alaska� In 2015, the PLAN 
made its first trip there, with five ships, apparently seeking to intimidate Presi-
dent Obama when he made the first visit of a sitting president to Arctic Alaska� 
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The PLAN’s unexpected rendezvous with him should be seen as strategic mes-
saging, as well as a probable (if spurious) basis for a potential claim on Arctic 
resources in the future.132 In 2017, the PLAN again sailed to Alaska, on an ap-
parently uninvited intelligence-gathering mission to monitor U.S. testing of the 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense system.
In both instances, PLAN warships operated well within the U.S. EEZ and report-
edly near or within U.S. territorial waters. Ironically, as Chinese ships have begun 
to operate routinely inside the U.S. and other nations’ EEZs, the PRC vociferously 
complains whenever U.S. military ships operate within the South China Sea. As 
outlined in figure 3, since October 2015 the PLAN has shadowed nearly every USN 
warship that has entered and operated within the South China Sea, shifting from 
a “zone” coverage to a “man-to-man” strategy. This shift provides more empiri-
cal proof of the PRC’s intent to use its military forces to achieve its strategic goals 
through bullying and intimidation, despite assertions of peaceful development. 
Figure 3. PLAN Shift from “Zone” to “Man-to-Man” Coverage in South China Sea 
 
Source: Independent research by author, compiled from press reporting 
  
Notes: CSG = Carrier Strike Group, FONOP = freedom of navigation operation; SBL = straight baselines; SCS = South China Sea.
Source: Independent research by author, compiled from press reporting.
FIGURE 3
PLAN SHIFT FROM “ZONE” TO “MAN-TO-MAN” COVERAGE IN SOUTH CHINA SEA
 1. USS Lassen (Oct. 2015)—FONOP Subi Reef
 2. Stennis Carrier Strike Group (Mar. 2016)—CSG 
Ops SCS
 3. USS Curtis Wilbur (Jan. 2016)—FONOPs Triton 
Island
 4. USS William P. Lawrence (May 2016)—FONOPs 
Fiery Cross
 5. Stennis/Reagan CSGs (June/July 2016)—Dual 
CSG Ops SCS
 6. USS Decatur (Oct. 2016)—FONOPs Triton Island
 7. Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (Feb. 2017)—
CSG Ops SCS
 8. USS Stethem (Apr. 2017)—Routine Operations in 
the SCS
 9. USS Dewey (May 2017)—FONOP Mischief Reef
 10. USS Stethem (July 2017)—FONOP Triton Island
 11. USS John S. McCain (Aug. 2017)—FONOP  
Mischief Reef
 12. USS Chafee (Oct. 2017)—SBL FONOP Paracel 
Island
 13. USS Hopper (Jan. 2018)—FONOP Scarborough 
Shoal
 14. USS Mustin (Mar. 2018)—FONOP Mischief Reef
Locations of each event are approximations based on press reporting.
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Regarding the PRC’s Arctic interests that portend impacts on U�S� territory and 
interests, in July 2017 the PRC and Russia agreed to “develop their cooperation on 
arctic shipping routes, jointly building a silk road on ice�” And less than a year later 
China’s State Council issued the country’s first Arctic white paper and continues 
to negotiate the outlines of potential cooperation and collaboration with Russia�133
China is pushing its military well into the Pacific, including to Guam and 
Hawaii, and into the Atlantic islands of the Azores� In 2017, the PLAN used 
intelligence-gathering ships to shadow joint U�S�-Australia naval exercises off 
the coast of Guam�134 China also has employed uninvited intelligence-gathering 
ships to spy on the U�S�-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises off Hawaii 
in 2012 and 2014�
In Brazil, China Merchant Port Holdings purchased a 90 percent stake in Bra-
zil’s most profitable port, TCP Participações SA, for $924 million in 2017�135 In 
Brazil’s state of Maranhão, Chinese companies laid foundation stones at the Port 
of São Luís in March 2018� A Chinese company holds a 51 percent stake in the 
$244 million port� The port will handle ten million tons of cargo, plus 1�8 million 
cubic meters of oil products� China’s ambassador to Brazil and the governor of 
Maranhão attended the ceremony for the BRI project�136
The PLAN is operating hydrographic research ships in the South Atlantic—a 
harbinger of future PLAN submarine operations in the North Atlantic, which 
could begin by 2025� While the U�S� air base in the Azores was home to the USAF 
65th Air Base Wing and was critical to fighting World War II, the Cold War, and 
the Iraq war, by 2015 U�S� personnel there had been reduced to only two hundred, 
causing a cash crunch for locals—and providing a major strategic opportunity 
for China’s military�137 China made moves to scout berthing in the Azores that 
year� A Chinese naval and air base in the Azores would be a third of the way to 
the U�S� East Coast from Portugal, providing PLAN ships and submarines and 
PLAAF planes a strategic basing location to cover the East Coast of the continen-
tal United States�
FUTURE PRC NAVAL FORCE ESTIMATE
What, then, does this vast PLAN maritime mission mean for Chinese naval 
construction over the next fifteen years? It means that in twelve years the PLAN 
most likely will have twice as many warships and submarines as the U�S� Navy� 
It means the PRC will be able to conduct successful naval missions on a scale 
that, until recently, was deemed implausible by the most senior leaders of the 
Intelligence Community� Beijing has demonstrated that it has the shipbuilding 
capacity, capabilities, untapped productivity gains, and global requirements to 
sustain the transformational growth in Chinese naval construction and combat 
capability through 2030�
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The ONI’s most recent study (exhibit 1) reports that the PLAN consists of 
over 330 surface vessels and sixty-six submarines�138 Given the increasing PRC 
shipbuilding capacity and capabilities outlined above, it is likely that by 2030 the 
PLAN surface force could approach 450 hulls and ninety-nine total submarines 
(exhibit 2), a growth rate of 30 percent and 50 percent, respectively, compared 
with approximately 15 percent for overall 2000–15 PLAN growth�139 This ex-
pected force would satisfy the requirements for fleet expansion to meet Beijing’s 
“goal of rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation�”140 
To achieve the China Dream, the PLAN of 2030 will not resemble the PLAN 
of 2015� Rather, it will enjoy a global presence characterized by multiple strike 
groups, a credible SLBM capability, and an ever-present network of ships at sea� 
Thanks to the strength of its naval shipbuilding capacity and its commitment 
to national rejuvenation, the PLAN will present an expansive and formidable 
challenge—one the United States can ill afford to underestimate or ignore�
THE COMING DECADE OF CONCERN
In his March 2018 speech to the National People’s Congress, President Xi Jinping 
stated as follows:
Platform Inventory
Destroyers  26 (21 modern)
Frigates  52 (35 modern)
Corvettes  20 (all modern)
Missile patrol craft 85 (60 modern)
Amphibious ships  56
Mine-warfare ships  42 (30 modern)
Major auxiliaries  50+




Total submarines  66
Notes: SS = attack submarine, conventionally powered; SSBN = ballistic-
missile submarine, nuclear-powered; SSN = attack submarine, nuclear-
powered.
Source: Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy.
EXHIBIT 1






Missile patrol craft  111
Amphibious ships  73
Mine-warfare ships  55
Major auxiliaries  65+





Notes: SS = attack submarine, conventionally powered; SSBN = ballistic-
missile submarine, nuclear-powered; SSN = attack submarine, nuclear-
powered.
Source: Author’s calculations based on multiple sources.
EXHIBIT 2
PLAN 2030—FORECAST PLATFORM  
INVENTORY
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Since modern times began, to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation has 
become the greatest dream of the Chinese nation� � � � With the spirit of fighting the 
enemy to the last minute, the resolve of recovering the lost on the basis of self- 
reliance � � � the Chinese people have made continuous efforts for more than 170 years 
to fulfill the great dreams� Today, we are closer, more confident, and more capable 
than ever before in making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality�141
As it relates to the restoration of China’s perceived territory President Xi made 
this statement:
It is the shared aspiration of all Chinese people and in the fundamental interests of 
the Chinese nation to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and real-
ize China’s complete reunification� In front of the great national interests and the tide 
of history, any actions and tricks to split China are doomed to fail� They are certain 
to meet with the people’s condemnation and the punishment by the history [sic]� The 
Chinese people have the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to defeat secessionist 
attempts in any form! The Chinese people and the Chinese nation share a common 
belief that it is never allowed and it is absolutely impossible to separate any inch of 
territory of our great country from China!142
It is clear that President Xi and the CCP firmly believe that the PRC has not 
yet reached national rejuvenation, and therefore they are on a timeline to achieve 
this goal� President Xi stated that the CCP “has drawn up a splendid blueprint” 
to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation�”143 And, as with most 
blueprints, there is an element of time, which President Xi specifically references 
in the following statement: “[A]lthough we have a long way to go, we are left with 
limited time and not allowed to be slack� We must not be satisfied with the status 
quo, indulge ourselves in ease and comfort, or let delight dispel worries�”144
Given Xi’s clearly articulated goal for the PRC’s great rejuvenation, which in-
cludes the restoration of its perceived territory, the obvious question is: How long 
will the PRC wait? It is my assertion, on the basis of all available evidence, that 
China desires to celebrate the complete restoration of the PRC by the hundredth 
anniversary of its establishment, in 2049�
If so, the next logical question is: What will happen if Beijing is unable to 
achieve complete restoration via nonviolent means? Or, to put it another way, 
regarding such regional disputes as those over the Senkakus and the sovereignty 
of Taiwan, what if Japan or Taiwan resists? How long will it be before the PRC’s 
rulers believe they have to use military force to achieve their ultimate goal of 
national restoration?
The answers to these questions also will help drive the PRC’s timelines for 
establishing its global hegemony� The CCP will seek to ensure its uncontested 
ability to dominate political, diplomatic, and military discourse globally, not only 
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in support of its BRI, but also prior to using military force to settle the Senkakus 
and Taiwan issues on its terms.
In my estimation, the answer is as early as 2020, but likely no later than 2030—
a period that I have labeled “the decade of concern” (see figure 4). 
China very likely has calculated a timeline for when it could use military 
force at the latest possible moment and still be able to conduct a grand ceremony 
celebrating its national restoration in 2049. A likely template for calculating that 
date would be the period from Tiananmen Square to the 2008 Olympics. China’s 
leaders remember well that in 1989 the international community largely con-
demned Beijing’s brutal slaughtering of its own citizens at Tiananmen Square, 
yet just nineteen years later the world’s leaders—including the president of the 
United States—eagerly flocked to Beijing to attend the opening ceremony of the 
2008 Olympic Games. That president later described the event as being “spec-
tacular and successful.”145
What was the strategic message from this event? It reinforced a belief among 
China’s leadership that the United States has a short attention span regarding the 
use of force. In short, Beijing believes the West can be counted on to forget even 
Figure 4: The Decade of Concern, 2020–30 
 
Source: Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.) 
  
FIGURE 4
THE DECADE OF CONCERN, 2020–30
Source: Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.).
We cannot wait forever for a political solution  
to Taiwan. – PRC President Xi Jinping, October  
2013, at APEC Forum
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the most barbarous actions after a roughly twenty-year time span� Given that 
logic, the latest Beijing could use military force to restore China’s perceived ter-
ritory physically would be around 2030� This would then allow for twenty years 
of “peace” before Beijing would conduct a grand ceremony to memorialize the 
“second 100”—the hundredth anniversary of the PRC� This again leads to the 
question: When is the earliest China could use military power?
Given the current environment and readiness of the PLA, such use could start 
at any time� However, as referenced earlier, intelligence analysis strongly indicates 
that during the past decade the PLA has been given the strategic task of taking 
Taiwan by force by 2020� If it is able to do that, it stands to reason that the lesser 
task of seizing the Senkaku Islands also would be achievable�
With the decade of concern beginning in 2020, it is my estimation that there 
will be mounting pressure within China to use military force to achieve the China 
Dream of national restoration by 2049� There will be a loud chorus for the use of 
force, which will grow each year and will crescendo in the late 2020s, ending in 
a violent clash to seize Taiwan, the Senkakus, and any other area Beijing deems 
to be a core interest�
In this decade of concern, an increasingly capable PLAN, as directed by a CCP 
greatly emboldened by its power and the lack of resistance to its expansionist 
global aspirations, will engage in operations in all the oceans of the world� It is 
entirely foreseeable that these PLAN operations will include activities designed to 
coerce, intimidate, and ultimately even defeat at sea the United States, our allies, 
and our friends�
RECOMMENDATIONS
First and foremost, I believe there must be, as James Holmes recently wrote, a 
fundamental transformation in the “culture” of how we deal with China, to one 
that recognizes that country as the main threat to U�S� national security, princi-
pally because of the strategic trend line that will grant the PLAN the ability to 
control the oceans of the world�146
Achieving this cultural change is a national issue, and the effort to do so is 
being driven from the top� The new National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Na-
tional Defense Strategy call out the PRC for being a “revisionist power�” Standing 
up to Beijing is not irresponsible or irrational, especially given that China’s ac-
tions are targeting the United States (and our fleet) despite President Xi’s pledge 
that the PRC is devoted to a “community with a shared future for mankind” and 
“mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation�”147
Second, the administration should declare unambiguously that U�S�-China 
relations have entered a new period of competition, as stated in the NSS, and then 
take the steps needed to compete� We must, of course, walk our talk� To this end, 
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our strategic communications need to be strengthened greatly and organizations 
need to be given specific authority and direction to fight and win on the informa-
tion battlefield�
America must deal with the PRC now from a position of strength, one from 
which we can assert our core interests and principles just as firmly as, if not more 
firmly than, the PRC asserts its core interests and principles� This means no more 
acquiescing to PRC demands; no more being quiet when the Chinese ignore the 
rule of law, as they have done with regard to the July 12, 2016, PCA ruling; and 
no more subordinating U�S� national interests to worries about whether we are 
provoking China�
Beijing is using incremental strategies and political warfare very effectively to 
gain maritime territory, and in the process to destroy the trust of our allies� Wash-
ington must be willing to confront Beijing’s bullying even at the risk of military 
conflict, especially since Beijing purposefully fosters fear among the Western 
academic China-watching community as a tool to manipulate us in our military, 
economic, and diplomatic strategies� For instance, as part of our messaging, we 
regularly—whenever we wish—should conduct carrier operations anywhere 
within the first island chain� In fact, we should increase our presence, with the 
adoption of a permanent 2�0 presence in the western Pacific�
Third, this new relationship also means recalibrating our one-China policy, 
and very publicly highlighting the U�S� interpretation of the term—what it means 
and what it does not mean� To this end, we have to refute, visibly and verbally, 
the PRC’s constraints on our relationship with Taiwan� This means discarding 
years of constraints our own bureaucrats have imposed� For example, the no-
tion that U�S� warships cannot make the occasional port call in Taiwan needs to 
be scrapped; nowhere is this self-defeating prohibition enshrined in any treaty, 
agreement, or law� Therefore—after discussion with our friends in Taiwan— 
we should make a port call, and we should do it without fanfare or advance 
notification�
To disrupt Beijing’s strategic schedule, the United States must keep China 
on its back foot, and that requires strategic unpredictability on our part� The 
message to China is that freedom of navigation and free access to ports is a core 
interest of the United States of America, and we are not going to be constrained 
by Beijing’s threats�
Also to this end, we must end the practice of “unconstrained engagement” 
by the Department of Defense� Encouragingly, the fiscal year 2019 National 
Defense Authorization Act, signed on August 13, 2018, includes a specific policy 
barring the PLAN from participating in any future RIMPAC exercises unless the 
Secretary of Defense grants a waiver� This constitutes a direct response to China’s 
decades of aggressive and expansionistic behavior in the South China Sea� The 
Winter2019Review.indb   47 12/4/18   11:13 AM
53
Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 4 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
United States is making a clear statement that China’s bad behavior no longer will 
be rewarded with such privileges; to do otherwise simply makes a mockery of our 
foreign policy positions in Asia, if not around the globe�
Fourth, and closely aligned with the preceding, the administration must pro-
claim its commitment to a forward-deployed presence, especially for our naval 
forces� Not only is this necessary for bolstering the flagging confidence of our 
allies; it also sends a clear and unambiguous statement to China� Options can 
range from homeporting a second carrier in the western Pacific (i�e�, Guam) to 
homeporting ships in South Korea�
This visible commitment 
to for ward presence also 
means halting any further re-
duction of U�S� Marine Corps 
forces in Asia� Every time we 
vacillate in defense of our for-
ward presence we succumb to 
the PRC’s PW strategy; in essence, we hand China a victory and perpetuate its 
myth that China is in ascension and America in decline�
Fifth, the United States must commit to conducting more-robust and more-
public maritime intelligence operations� While much progress has been made in 
improving our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the 
Indo-Pacific region, as reflected by the introduction of the P-8 aircraft, we con-
currently have displayed a lack of will to expose the PRC’s aggressive actions in 
the maritime domain� This requires the United States to get serious about its stra-
tegic communications, in terms of mission, organization, policy, and doctrine�
Why, for instance, during the inaugural deployment of China’s aircraft carrier 
Liaoning, did the U�S� Indo-Pacific Command, which conducted intelligence re-
connaissance flights, fail to provide unclassified pictures of China’s inaugural car-
rier flight operations in the deep blue sea? This same reluctance characterized our 
approach to China’s building of the seven new artificial islands� Why?
The sharing of facts about Chinese activities at sea is not only good for trans-
parency in a democracy but is also smart military strategy, as it imposes repu-
tational costs on the PRC for its military adventurism� Moreover, making such 
information widely available would help to counter spurious Chinese narratives 
of American actions as being the root cause of instability in the western Pacific� 
Both outcomes are in our national interest�
However, we have no unified national policy to develop and execute strategic 
communications in this era of competition, and there is no unity of effort� For 
example, the funding allotted to the State Department for counter-PW opera-
tions has been diverted almost exclusively to countering Russian propaganda, 
America must deal with the PRC now from a 
position of strength, one from which we can 
assert our core interests and principles just as 
firmly as, if not more firmly than, the PRC as-
serts its core interests and principles.
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with the seemingly conscious exclusion of countering PRC influence operations� 
Further, as a rule, neither Department of Defense nor Department of State public 
affairs practitioners study PRC influence operations and political warfare at the 
Defense Information School or the Foreign Service Institute, as the leadership in 
those organizations does not seem to understand the urgency of including such 
training in the curriculum�
Sixth, we must return to naval nuclear-deterrence operations� The harsh real-
ity is that China’s nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs, also known as 
boomers) now can range all of the United States, including the capital� Given the 
presumption that the PRC already has begun SSBN patrols and to mitigate the 
risk of a sea-launched nuclear ballistic-missile attack against the United States, 
the U�S� Navy must be able to hold at risk all adversarial nations’ patrolling 
SSBNs, at all times� To hold at risk means that every time PLAN SSBNs depart 
on strategic nuclear patrols, the U�S� Navy must follow them closely enough to be 
ready to sink them if they ever attempt to launch nuclear-tipped intercontinental 
ballistic missiles toward our shores� Chinese boomers are not so loud that if a 
crisis began we would, with high certainty, be able to find them�
This leads to the seventh recommendation—and the proverbial elephant in 
the room� All the above recommendations make it obvious that the U�S� Navy 
must increase in size� Roger Wicker and Jerry Hendrix’s recent article entitled 
“How to Make the U�S� Navy Great Again” states as follows:
From a naval perspective, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is 
pursuing a mix of high-end and low-end ships and submarines� This strategy would 
allow the PLAN to spread out across the vast Pacific Ocean in sufficient numbers to 
locate and interdict U�S� ships� At the high end, China is investing in aircraft carriers, 
nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines and large surface combatants equipped  
with advanced radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and surface-to-surface  
missiles� � � � Backed by a growing arsenal of longer-range and more sophisticated air 
and missile weapons, the Chinese navy will have a highly capable and numerically 
larger maritime force by the middle of the next decade� If this situation comes to frui-
tion, it could make the projection of U�S� naval power cost prohibitive in the western 
Pacific, undermining the credibility of our alliance commitments�148 
Given my estimate that the future size of the PLAN will be about 550 warships 
and submarines by 2030—twice the size of today’s U�S� Navy—it is clear the U�S� 
Navy is at great risk of not being adequately sized or outfitted to meet American 
national security commitments in the Indo-Pacific, let alone around the globe� 
Therefore, to accomplish all the above missions, to provide a credible deterrent 
against PRC hegemony, and to be able to fight and win wars at sea, the U�S� 
Navy must get bigger� The evidence that a strategic gap between the U�S� Navy 
and the PLAN is on the verge of exploding over the next decade and a half is 
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overwhelming� Because of this gap, it seems clear to me that to keep even a modi-
cum of parity with the Chinese the U�S� Navy will require more than 355 ships�
The bottom line is that America needs to get back to being a maritime power 
supported militarily by strong allies—something that has been sorely neglected 
since the fall of the Soviet Union� Without that accomplishment, expect China 
to push us ever farther from Asia� Expect to lose more allies and influence across 
the Indo-Pacific� And, ultimately, expect to be seen as globally irrelevant, with 
all the negative consequences for our national security interests and the defense 
of our values�
We already have slipped� If we fall any further, we may not recover�
N O T E S
 1� The “first island chain” is a chain of archipela-
goes near the coast of the East Asian conti-
nental mainland� It includes the Kuril Islands, 
the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, 
Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and  
Borneo� 
 2� South China Sea Arbitration (Phil� v� China), 
Case No� 2013-19, Award (Perm� Ct� Arb� 
2016), pca-cpa�org/�
 3� The concept of the “China Dream” was first 
articulated by PRC president Xi Jinping in 
2012 and refers to the PRC’s goal for the great 
rejuvenation and restoration of China to its 
“rightful” place as the most dominant nation 
on the earth� The China Dream is designed 
to provide common Chinese citizens with 
the assurance that their lives will continue to 
improve because of the wise guidance of the 
Chinese Communist Party�
 4� “Status of the Navy,” Navy�mil, May 4, 2018�
 5� James E� Fanell and Scott Cheney Peters, 
“Maximal Scenario: Expansive Naval Trajec-
tory to ‘China’s Naval Dream,’” in Chinese Na-
val Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain 
Course, ed� Andrew S� Erickson (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017)�
 6� Xinhua, “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at the 
18th Party Congress,” China Embassy, No-
vember 17, 2012, www�china-embassy�org/�
 7� The “second island chain” is formed by the 
Ogasawara Islands and Volcano Islands of 
Japan, in addition to the U�S� territory of the 
Mariana Islands�
 8� Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 
19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, 
November 4, 2017, www�chinadaily�com�cn/�
 9� Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: 
New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st 
Century (Washington, DC: 2015), p� 5, avail-
able at www�oni�navy�mil/�
 10� Gabe Collins and Andrew S� Erickson, “U�S� 
Navy Take Notice: China Is Becoming a 
World-Class Military Shipbuilder,” The Diplo-
mat, November 1, 2012, thediplomat�com/�
 11� The “Scarborough Shoal incident” refers to 
the events from April to June 2012, when the 
PRC gained de facto sovereign control over 
Scarborough Shoal, which lies well within 
the Republic of the Philippines EEZ, just 140 
nm from Manila� In April 2012, the PRC 
dispatched a large number of maritime law-
enforcement ships to the shoal to threaten 
the Philippines’ presence, and then deftly 
exploited the third-party arbitration crafted 
by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell�
 12� Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 
19th CPC National Congress�”
 13� Ibid�
 14� Michael S� Chase and Jeffrey Engstrom, 
“China’s Military Reforms: An Optimistic 




Winter2019Review.indb   50 12/4/18   11:13 AM
56
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1
 FA N E L L  5 1
 17� David Tweed, “China’s Military Handed Con-
trol of the Country’s Coast Guard,” Bloom-
berg, March 26, 2018, www�bloomberg�com/�
 18� Fanell and Peters, “Maximal Scenario�”
 19� Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, “Harbored 
Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments 
Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific,” 
C4ADS, c4ads�org/; Brook Larmer, “Is China 
the World’s New Colonial Power?,” New York 
Times Magazine, May 2, 2017, www�nytimes 
�com/�
 20� Thorne and Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions”; 
Larmer, “Is China the World’s New Colonial 
Power?”
 21� “By the Numbers: China’s Global Develop-
ment Footprint,” AidData, aiddata�org/china�
 22� Fanell and Peters, “Maximal Scenario�”
 23� Interior lines occur when the lines of move-
ment and communication within an enclosed 
area are shorter than those of the opponent 
outside the area�
 24� Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy,  
p� 13�
 25� Ibid�, pp� 10–11�
 26� Ibid�
 27� James R� Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, 
“Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The 
Death and Life of Surface Fleets,” Orbis 61, 
no� 2 (Spring 2017), pp� 269–85, available at 
doi�org/10�1016/j�orbis�2017�02�010�
 28� Ibid�, p� 277�
 29� Ibid�, p� 280�
 30� Japan Ministry of Defense, “Situations in 
East/South China Seas, West Pacific Ocean 
and Sea of Japan” (briefing, February 2017), 
slide 5�
 31� Zhang Zhihao, “Beijing Warns Taiwan of 
Further Action,” China Daily, April 27, 2018, 
www�chinadaily�com�cn/; Matthew Carney, 
“China to Start Live-Fire Military Drills off 
Taiwan amid Rising Tensions over Relation-
ship with US,” ABC News Australia, April 17, 
2018, www�abc�net�au/�
 32� “China’s Aircraft Carrier Drills near Taiwan,” 
Maritime Executive, April 23, 2018, www 
�maritime-executive�com/�
 33� Thorne and Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions�”
 34� Keith Johnson and Dan De Luce, “One Belt, 
One Road, One Happy Chinese Navy,” Foreign 
Policy, April 17, 2018, foreignpolicy�com/�
 35� “Air Cushioned Landing Craft Participate in 
Beach Landing Exercise,” PLA Daily, March 
28, 2017, english�chinamil�com�cn/�
 36� “China Poised to Expand Its Marine Corps,” 
People’s Daily, March 14, 2017, en�people�cn/�
 37� Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, 
pp� 13, 18�
 38� Ibid�, p� 18�
 39� Minnie Chan, “China Building Navy’s Biggest 
Amphibious Assault Vessel, Sources Say,” 




 42� As derived from Fanell and Peters, “Maximal 
Scenario�” 
 43� “Announcement of the Aircraft Identifica-
tion Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone of the P�R�C�,” Xinhua, 
November 23, 2013, www�xinhuanet�com/�
 44� Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Scrambles Jets in 
Islands Dispute with China,” New York Times, 
December 13, 2012, www�nytimes�com/�
 45� Japan Ministry of Defense, “Situations,”  
slide 4�
 46� Ibid�
 47� Franz Stefan-Gady, “Japan Doubles Number 
of Fighter Jets Used for Intercepting Chinese 
Warplanes,” The Diplomat, February 28, 2017, 
thediplomat�com/�
 48� Japan Ministry of Defense, “Situations,”  
slide 8�
 49� “China Air Force in West Pacific Drill,” Xin-
hua, May 21, 2015, www�xinhuanet�com/�
 50� Ibid�
 51� Jesse Johnson, “ASDF Scrambles Jets as China 
Sends More Fighters and Bombers through 
Miyako Strait as Part of Large Drill,” Japan 
Times, March 3, 2017, www�japantimes�co�jp/�
 52� Ibid�
 53� Ibid�
 54� “Chinese Air Force Conducts High-Sea Train-
ing,” China Daily, March 25, 2018, www 
�chinadaily�com�cn/; “Chinese Air Force Holds 
Winter2019Review.indb   51 12/4/18   11:13 AM
57
Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 5 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Drills over South China Sea, Western Pacific 
in ‘Preparation for War,’” South China Morn-
ing Post, March 25, 2018, www�scmp�com/�
 55� “China Sends Su-35 Fighter Jets for Island Pa-
trol,” Xinhua, May 11, 2018, www�xinhuanet 
�com/�
 56� “Japan Doubles Fighter Jets Deployed for 
Scrambles against China,” Japan Times, Feb-
ruary 26, 2017, www�japantimes�co�jp/�
 57� Zhang Tao, “Rear Admiral: China’s Develop-
ment of H-20 Bomber Just in Time,” PLA 
Daily, December 7, 2016, english�chinamil 
�com�cn/�
 58� Deng Xiaoci, “China’s Homegrown Transport 
Plane Y-20 Conducts 1st Airdrop Drills,” 
Global Times, May 8, 2018, www�globaltimes 
�cn/�
 59� Thomas Shugart, “Has China Been Practic-
ing Preemptive Missile Strikes against U�S� 
Bases?,” War on the Rocks, February 6, 2017, 
warontherocks�com/�
 60� Zhao Lei, “PLA Deploys Latest Ballistic Mis-
sile to Newest Brigade,” China Daily, April 18, 
2018, www�chinadaily�com�cn/�
 61� Amanda Macias, “China Quietly Installed 
Defensive Missile Systems on Strategic Spratly 
Islands in Hotly Contested South China Sea,” 
CNBC, May 2, 2018, www�cnbc�com/�
 62� Elsa Kania and John Costello, “China’s Quest 
for Informatization Drives PLA Reforms,” 





 66� Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s 
Liberation Army General Political Depart-
ment: Political Warfare with Chinese Charac-
teristics,” Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 
2013, www�project2049�net/�
 67� Kania and Costello, “China’s Quest for Infor-
matization Drives PLA Reforms�”
 68� June Teufel Dreyer, “A Weapon without War: 
China’s United Front Strategy,” Foreign Policy 
Institute, February 6, 2018, www�fpri�org/; 
Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle, “The Unit-
ed Front Work Department: ‘Magic Weapon’ 
at Home and Abroad,” Jamestown Foundation 
China Brief 17, no� 9 (July 2017)�
 69� Kania and Costello, “China’s Quest for Infor-
matization Drives PLA Reforms�”
 70� Tuan N� Pham, “A Sign of the Times: China’s 
Recent Actions and the Undermining of 
Global Rules,” Center for International Mari-
time Security (CIMSEC), March 6, 2018,  
cimsec�org/; Tuan N� Pham, “A Sign of the 
Times: China’s Recent Actions and the Un-
dermining of Global Rules, Pt� 2,” Center for 
International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 
April 24, 2018, cimsec�org/�
 71� “Chinese Military Set Up Joint Operations 
Command Center: Sources,” Japan Times, 
August 7, 2014, www�japantimes�co�jp/�
 72� Thorne and Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions”; 
David Tweed and Adrian Leung, “China Is 
Making a Bold Military Power Play,” Bloom-
berg, March 6, 2018, www�bloomberg 
�com/� For a comprehensive review of China’s 
investment in foreign ports, see Thorne and 
Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions�”
 73� Michelle Labrut, “Panama-China Maritime 
Treaty to Enter into Force,” Seatrade Maritime 
News, May 7, 2018, www�seatrade-maritime 
�com/�
 74� John Grady, “SOUTHCOM Tidd: China 
Making Aggressive Investments in South, 
Central America,” USNI News, March 5, 2018, 
news�usni�org/�
 75� Adam Minter, “Malaysia Is Fed Up with Chi-
nese Cash,” Bloomberg, May 7, 2018, www 
�bloomberg�com/�
 76� Benjamin Zawacki, “America’s Biggest South-
east Asian Ally Is Drifting toward China,” 
Foreign Policy, September 29, 2017, foreign 
 policy�com/; Thorne and Spevack, “Harbored 
Ambitions�”
 77� The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also 
known as the Quad) is an informal strategic 
dialogue among the United States, Japan, 
Australia, and India that is maintained by 
talks between member countries�
 78� “Odd That China Has Submarines in Indian 
Ocean for Anti-piracy Ops: Navy Chief,” 
Hindustan Times, December 1, 2017, www 
�hindustantimes�com/�
 79� Steven Stashwick, “New Chinese Ocean Net-
work Collecting Data to Target Submarines,” 
The Diplomat, January 2, 2018, thediplomat 
�com/�
Winter2019Review.indb   52 12/4/18   11:13 AM
58
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1
 FA N E L L  5 3
 80� Missy Ryan and Dan Lamothe, “Pentagon: 
Chinese Naval Ship Seized an Unmanned 
U�S� Underwater Vehicle in South China Sea,” 
Washington Post, December 17, 2016, www 
�washingtonpost�com/�
 81� Andrew Higgins, “China and Russia Hold 
First Joint Naval Drill in the Baltic Sea,” New 
York Times, July 25, 2017, www�nytimes�com/�
 82� Nga Pham, “Shift as Vietnam Marks South 
China Sea Battle,” BBC, January 15, 2014, 
www�bbc�com/�
 83� “China Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Trans-
parency Initiative, amti�csis�org/�
 84� Dako Xiaweiyi, “Chigua1988 35s U,” YouTube, 
October 27, 2017, video, www�youtube�com/�
 85� “China Island Tracker�”
 86� South China Sea Arbitration.
 87� Ibid�
 88� Richard Javad Heydarian, “Short of War, 
China Now Controls South China Sea,” Asia 
Times, May 8, 2018, www�atimes�com/�
 89� “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea,” Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), October 17, 2012, 
asean�org/�
 90� Alastair Jamieson, “U�S� Warns China of 
‘Consequences’ over Reported Missiles in 
South China Sea,” NBC News, May 4, 2018, 
www�nbcnews�com/�
 91� Zawacki, “America’s Biggest Southeast Asian 
Ally�”
 92� Joshua Berlinger, “Malaysia Reaches ‘Signifi-
cant’ Defense Deal with China, Takes Shot at 
West,” CNN, November 2, 2016, edition�cnn 
�com/�
 93� Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s behind the 
New China-Malaysia Defense Committee?,” 
The Diplomat, April 25, 2017, thediplomat 
�com/�
 94� “Russian Warships Dock in Philippines as 
Manila Cultivates New Ties,” Reuters, October 
20, 2017, www�reuters�com/�
 95� Xu Liping, “Submarine Docking Sign of Chi-
na Promoting Peace and Stability in Southeast 
Asia,” Global Times, January 11, 2017, www 
�globaltimes�cn/�
 96� “Chinese Sub Docks at Malaysian Port for 
Second Time This Year,” Reuters, September 
17, 2017, www�reuters�com/�
 97� The “third island chain” begins at the Aleu-
tian Islands and ends in Oceania� The key 
part of the third island chain is Hawaii�
 98� Alyssa Betts, “Darwin Port Lease: Australia 
Has ‘Nothing to Fear’ Says Chinese Govern-
ment,” ABC News Australia, March 10, 2016, 
www�abc�net�au/�
 99� Angus Grigg, “How Landbridge’s Purchase of 
the Darwin Port Killed Perceived Wisdom on 
China,” Australian Financial Review, July 7, 
2017, www�afr�com/�
 100� Thorne and Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions�”
 101� Ibid�
 102� Ben Bohane, “Ben Bohane: China? No, Let’s 
Face the Elephant in the Pacific Room,” Asia 
Pacific Report, April 23, 2018, asiapacificreport 
�nz/�
 103� Reuters, “Vanuatu and China Deny Holding 
Military Base Talks,” Reuters Africa, April 10, 
2018, af�reuters�com/�
 104� David Wroe, “The Great Wharf from China, 
Raising Eyebrows across the Pacific,” Sydney 
Morning Herald, April 11, 2018, www�smh 
�com�au/�
 105� Ben Bohane (communications director, Pa-
cific Institute of Public Policy), interview by 
author, May 11, 2018; Cleo Paskal (associate 
fellow, Chatham House), interview by author, 
May 12, 2018�
 106� Cleo Paskal, interview by author, May 13, 
2018�
 107� Bertil Linter, “China Advances, West Frets 
in South Pacific,” Asia Times, April 25, 2018, 
www�atimes�com/�
 108� Grant Newsham, “Mariana Islands—U�S� 
Military Strategy ‘on Hold,’” Asia Pacific Bul-
letin 415, East-West Center, March 26, 2018, 
www�eastwestcenter�org/�
 109� Thorne and Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions�”
 110� Ibid�
 111� Vivek Mishra, “China Is Moving into the In-
dian Ocean,” National Interest, April 14, 2018, 
nationalinterest�org/�
 112� Thorne and Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions�”
 113� Michael J� Green and Andrew Shearer, 
“Countering China’s Militarization of the 
Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, April 23, 
2018, warontherocks�com/�
Winter2019Review.indb   53 12/4/18   11:13 AM
59
Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 114� Mishra, “China Is Moving into the Indian 
Ocean�”
 115� “Commentary: China’s Djibouti Base Not for 
Military Expansion,” Xinhua, July 13, 2017, 
www�xinhuanet�com/�
 116� Zhao Lei and Zhou Jin, “Live-Fire Exercises 
Conducted by PLA Base in Djibouti,” China 
Daily, November 25, 2017, www�chinadaily 
�com�cn/�
 117� On February 14, 2012, the president signed 
Public Law 112-95, the FAA Moderniza-
tion and Reform Act of 2012� Section 311 
amended Title 18 of the U�S� Code, chap� 2, § 
39, by adding § 39A, which makes it a federal 
crime to aim a laser pointer at an aircraft�
 118� Paul Sonne, “U�S� Accuses China of Directing 
Blinding Lasers at American Military Aircraft 
in Djibouti,” Washington Post, May 4, 2018, 
www�washingtonpost�com/�
 119� “AFRICOM Chief Warns of Chinese Control 
at Port of Djibouti,” Maritime Executive, 
March 15, 2018, www�maritime-executive 
�com/; “China Expands Its Influence at Dji-
bouti’s Ports,” Maritime Executive, November 
16, 2017, www�maritime-executive�com/�
 120� Li Shengjiang, “Spotlight: China’s Experience 
and Africa’s Revitalization,” Xinhua, Decem-
ber 25, 2017, www�xinhuanet�com/�
 121� Wang Hanlu, “China, Tanzania Conduct 
Naval Joint Military Training,” People’s Daily, 
March 2011, en�people�cn/�
 122� “Tanzania Signs $154 Million Contract with 
Chinese Firm to Expand Main Port,” Reuters, 
June 10, 2017, www�reuters�com/�
 123� “Chinese Naval Fleet Arrives in Tanzania for 
Friendly Visit,” China Daily, August 18, 2017, 
www�chinadaily�com�cn/�
 124� Alex Malanga and Janeth Muhizi, “Bagamoyo 
Port Project Now Revived,” The Citizen, 
November 24, 2017, www�thecitizen�co�tz/�
 125� Larmer, “Is China the World’s New Colonial 
Power?”
 126� Ibid�; “China’s Cranes to Promote Namibia’s 
Port Construction,” Xinhua, February 10, 
2018, www�xinhuanet�com/�
 127� Larmer, “Is China the World’s New Colonial 
Power?”
 128� Ibid�
 129� “Mauritius: China-Mauritius to Explore New 
Strategic Partnership,” Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation, April 23, 2017, www�focac�org/�
 130� Ibid�
 131� The original version of this testimony also 
included a section on Chinese expansion in 
Europe entitled “Beachhead in Europe: A 
Terminal Chokehold?”
 132� Helene Cooper, “In a First, Chinese Navy 
Sails off Alaska,” New York Times, September 
2, 2015, www�nytimes�com/�
 133� Matt Schrader, “Is China Changing the 
Game in Trans-polar Shipping?,” Jamestown 
Foundation China Brief 18, no� 7 (April 2018)� 
Also see State Council Information Office of 
the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic 
Policy, 1st ed� (January 2018), available at 
english�gov�cn/�
 134� Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr, “Chinese Spy 
Ship Lurks off Coast of Alaska during Missile 
Defense Test,” CNN, July 14, 2017, edition 
�cnn�com/�
 135� Donny Kwok and Guillermo Parra-Bernal, 
“China Merchants Buys Control of Brazil’s 
Most Profitable Port,” Reuters, September 4, 
2017, www�reuters�com/�
 136� Xinhua, “Construction of Chinese-Led Port 
Kicks Off, Aims to Boost Logistics Capacity 
in NE Brazil,” March 17, 2018, People’s Daily, 
en�people�cn/�
 137� Michael Rubin, “China May Be Trying to 
Take Over a Critical US Air Base in the Atlan-
tic,” Business Insider, November 30, 2015, 
www�businessinsider�com/�
 138� Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, 
pp� 15, 19�
 139� Craig Murray, Andrew Berglund, and 
Kimberly Hsu, “China’s Naval Moderniza-
tion and Implications for the United States,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, August 26, 2013, p� 7, available 
at www�uscc�gov/�
 140� Xi Jinping, “Achieving Rejuvenation Is the 
Dream of Chinese People,” in Xi Jinping, the 
Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Lan-
guages Press, 2014), p� 38�
 141� Xi Jinping, “Speech Delivered by President 
Xi at the NPC Closing Meeting,” China Daily, 
March 22, 2018, www�chinadaily�com�cn/�
Winter2019Review.indb   54 12/4/18   11:13 AM
60
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1




 145� “News Feature: Bush Blends Sports, Politics at 
Beijing Olympics,” Xinhua, August 11, 2008, 
www�xinhuanet�com/�
 146� James R� Holmes, “Break and Remake the 
U�S� Navy Surface Fleet,” RealClearDefense, 
April 2, 2018, www�realcleardefense�com/�
 147� Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 
19th CPC National Congress�”
 148� Roger Wicker and Jerry Hendrix, “How to 
Make the U�S� Navy Great Again,” National 
Interest, April 18, 2018, nationalinterest 
�org/�
Winter2019Review.indb   55 12/4/18   11:13 AM
61
Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
SHIPS OF STATE?
Christopher R. O’Dea
Our Ship of State, which recent storms have threatened to destroy, has 
come safely to harbor at last.
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 Backed by substantial financing and political support, China COSCO Ship-ping Corporation Limited (COSCO) emerged from the container shipping 
industry’s recent turmoil with one of the largest fleets of commercial vessels in 
the world and control of a rapidly expanding network of ports and terminals. 
This article argues that this expansion is a new and distinctly Chinese approach 
to maritime development and asks whether the state-owned shipping company 
has become the flagship of China’s ambition to become a global maritime power.
Chinese maritime and logistics firms, supported by state-subsidized capi-
tal deployed overseas, quickly are becoming a leading edge of China’s global 
influence. In recent years, Chinese state-owned 
companies have built a global network of shipping 
and port assets that suggests the country is using 
maritime commercial investments to advance 
its geostrategic priorities by establishing eco-
nomic influence over countries in which Chinese- 
controlled port facilities are located.
These Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
are creating one of the most extensive maritime 
networks in the world by acquiring strategically 
located port assets in the European Union (EU), 
Latin America, the Middle East, and the Indian 
Ocean. They provide the capital to build or up-
grade commercial terminals; then they direct con-
tainer traffic to those ports through shipping lines 
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SHIPS OF STATE?
that are controlled directly by the port’s parent company or indirectly through 
companies associated with China’s strategic port owners through formal ship-
ping alliances�
This commercial drive complements a well-documented naval expansion by 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) since at least the 1980s�1 The frame-
work for Chinese naval policy in what China calls the “far seas”—the waters 
beyond the “first island chain”—has been examined comprehensively�2 Models 
of China’s potential basing requirements to support overseas naval operations 
also have been assessed, as have the use and organization of Chinese maritime 
law-enforcement resources�3
This article argues that the port and shipping transactions of the People’s 
Republic of China are a major vector of a government policy to achieve global 
maritime power and commensurate political influence without resorting to, or at 
least while mitigating the risk of, a direct confrontation with the United States or 
other nations with global maritime interests� The commercial-strategic linkages 
and state support for Chinese port and shipping ventures resemble a twenty-first-
century version of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) (Dutch East 
India Company)� Chinese SOEs are today, as the VOC was in its time, notionally 
commercial enterprises that operate globally with the full financial and military 
backing of their home state� In this view, the vessels that connect these ports into 
an integrated network of commercial power are “ships of state,” functioning as 
instruments of Chinese national strategy while they sail as commercial carriers 
of manufactured goods and commodities�
China’s unique and assertive approach to maritime development has been de-
scribed as the construction of military-relevant facilities rather than overtly mili-
tary bases� As implemented in the “near seas,” the rapid construction of airfields 
and harbors on reefs in the South China Sea has enabled China to assert effective 
control over contested areas, in accordance with its idiosyncratic maritime-rights 
doctrine� As Chinese strategists turn their attention to the far seas, Chinese state-
owned companies are developing ports around the world that can accommodate 
the very large containerships designed to create economies of scale in seaborne 
transportation� These facilities offer China a larger, more reliable logistics net-
work with potential military applications related to the protection of overseas 
Chinese citizens and economic interests�4
The first part of this article examines the recent rapid increase in Chinese 
port and shipping investments, focusing on transactions that COSCO has un-
dertaken, in particular its acquisition of a controlling stake in a privatized port 
entity in Piraeus, Greece� Achieved through a series of investments and privatiza-
tion transactions carried out over nearly a decade, this has resulted in a Chinese 
state-owned company—one that is viewed as the primary logistical supporter of 
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the Chinese navy—having the ability to exercise maritime-development powers 
granted by the national government of an EU member state� This section also 
includes a review of how China exercises state control or influence through the 
agency of state-owned companies carrying out transactions and forming com-
mercial alliances, as well as an assessment of the strategic implications of China’s 
approach to building a maritime commercial network that appears to be aligned 
with Chinese national security aims�
The second section of the article discusses key trends in the global shipping 
and logistics business and how stresses in those sectors have given rise to condi-
tions conducive to China’s acquisition campaign� The primary focus is on the 
consolidation of global container shipping lines into the COSCO-dominated 
Ocean Alliance and two competing container shipping alliances; this encom-
passes an examination of how Chinese regulators used the country’s antitrust law 
to block a proposed alliance of Western shipping lines that could have challenged 
China’s efforts to acquire and consolidate maritime power� This section contin-
ues with a look at how Chinese state financial entities fund the development of 
China’s maritime network through strategic investments in non-Chinese compa-
nies and how Chinese state regulatory support of key transactions helps expand 
the network and formalize links between Chinese state companies engaged in 
the expansion campaign� A detailed analysis of the port, terminal, and shipping 
activities of CMA CGM, a French shipping and terminal company based in Mar-
seille, illustrates how Chinese state regulatory action and state financial support 
played a role in CMA CGM becoming a member of the Ocean Alliance�
The global logistics industry is moving toward an integrated system in which 
land-based terminals hold increased importance as exchange points between 
ships and rail and road networks� In the emerging commercial shipping regime, 
marked by excess capacity in container shipping and increasing competition 
among ports for business from ever-larger containerships, it is essential for sur-
vival that companies control both shipping lines and well-equipped land termi-
nals at suitably located port sites� This shift toward an integrated system favors 
concentration of maritime commerce at certain large hub ports; automation at 
every stage of the global supply chain; and, most importantly, control of the port 
territory and port authorities that decide how to develop ports� Ports themselves 
are potentially valuable, but the sector has become increasingly competitive 
since the financial crisis, largely owing to the high cost of modernizing facilities 
or building new terminals, and both institutional investors that own port assets 
and port operators have sold numerous assets to Chinese entities, with a notable 
acceleration of Chinese purchases around the world during 2017�
The third section raises several considerations arising from China’s prog-
ress so far and offers a perspective on the emerging risks to the open maritime 
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domain posed by China’s state-backed investments in ports and shipping assets� 
While there are clear signs of unease about Chinese expansion—magnified by 
recent overt military action near one port—most resistance so far has been ex-
pressed through civil administrative channels; examples include allegations of tax 
law violations and the raising of diplomatic concerns about the transparency of 
Chinese purchases� The limited nature of these protests—focused as they are on 
narrow, if important, topics—has left China able to pursue its maritime expan-
sion without sustained opposition on a global basis�
CHINESE PORT AND SHIPPING INVESTMENTS
COSCO Spearheads Chinese Port-Investment Activity
While several Chinese SOEs are involved with overseas port and shipping de-
velopment, COSCO has developed the most extensive involvement across the 
industrial sectors that make up the modern supply chain, and thus it commands 
all the building blocks of commercial maritime power� COSCO’s economic and 
technological capabilities are commercial, but as an SOE it acts under the su-
pervision and, to some degree, the direction of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC)� COSCO has been at the forefront of state-led efforts to expand the geo-
graphic range of China’s outbound investments in overseas ports and related 
infrastructure, first under the Go Out policy, beginning early in the twenty-first 
century, then continuing as China adopted economic policies that have become 
more strategic and assertive in terms of implementation and more expansive in 
terms of geographic scope� The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative was an-
nounced in a series of speeches in September and October 2013 in which Chinese 
president Xi Jinping described the initiative’s Silk Road Economic Belt across 
Central Asia and the Maritime Silk Road across the Indian Ocean� The Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) superseded OBOR during 2016 as China steered away from 
using the word “one” to describe an international economic policy that it claimed 
was intended to generate benefits not only for China but also for the countries 
that received funding from Chinese state entities or the lending institutions 
and investment funds that were established to finance BRI projects�5 There is 
no agreed-upon definition of what qualifies as a BRI project�6 While this article 
will use the BRI moniker to refer to China’s approach to international economic, 
regulatory, and financial matters, its primary focus is to describe the pattern of 
Chinese investment in commercial seaports and related logistics, transportation, 
and electric-power assets, and to assess the practical diplomatic and security 
implications of China’s development of a global port network�
While COSCO has received increasing Western media coverage since it gained 
formal control of the Greek port of Piraeus in 2016, one of the predecessor com-
panies that was merged to form COSCO began to operate a terminal in Piraeus in 
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2009, far predating China’s adoption of the BRI� The company enjoys significant 
direct financial support from Chinese state financial institutions, including the 
China Development Bank�
COSCO’s current competitive strength in the global shipping and port business 
stems in part from Chinese antitrust regulators’ actions that prevented competing 
shipping lines from forming an alliance during the depths of the container ship-
ping crisis of the past several years, a prohibition that underscored the unique 
nature of merger review in China and the importance of national industrial policy 
in decisions pertaining to the competitive position of Chinese SOEs�7 That inter-
vention into the structure of the global container-shipping industry—ostensibly 
justified by the desire to maintain competition on the ocean trade routes between 
Southeast Asia and Europe—contributed significantly to creating the conditions 
in which COSCO has been able to emerge as the leading company in a commer-
cial shipping alliance that now controls the majority of those routes�
Excess capacity and long-term declining revenue in the container-shipping 
and terminal industries have created market conditions in which Chinese firms 
or Chinese-backed entities, supported by centrally allocated credit from China’s 
state financial institutions, can acquire assets from owners unwilling or unable 
to make the substantial capital investments required to modernize port facilities� 
During the last ten years, capacity growth in container shipping has outstripped 
demand growth except for 2010–11 and 2016, when low net-capacity growth 
resulted from the scrapping of older ships and delayed deliveries; in addition, 
the proportion of the global container fleet that was idle was high, at 7 percent 
at the end of 2016� The resulting shift toward larger vessels to gain economies of 
scale has created financial pressure on ports to upgrade facilities to accommodate 
megaships so as to remain viable as stops on primary shipping routes� While 
container transport volume is forecast to grow in line with global gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rates in the short to medium term, container volume grew 
at twice the rate of GDP from 2007 to 2016, so excess capacity is likely to remain a 
negative factor for port and shipping revenue�8 This has presented Chinese SOEs 
with an opportunity to create one of the most extensive maritime networks in 
the world, by acquiring strategically located port assets, providing the capital to 
build or upgrade commercial terminals, and then directing container traffic to 
those ports through shipping lines that are controlled directly by the port’s parent 
company or indirectly through companies associated with Chinese port owners 
through formal shipping alliances�
During the past three years, Chinese firms and Chinese-financed entities have 
increased dramatically the amount of capital deployed to acquire or invest in port 
assets� One investment bank that tracks Chinese state investments found that 
during the year that ended in June 2017 Chinese companies announced plans to 
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expend $20�1 billion buying or investing in nine overseas ports, representing a 
steep increase from the estimated $9�97 billion that Chinese entities invested in 
foreign port projects during the year that ended in June 2016� These assets have 
included port-operating concessions, actual seaports, and container and other 
cargo terminals� The importance of the maritime route from China across the 
Indian Ocean and on to the Mediterranean shows clearly in the newly announced 
investments�9 Among several Chinese SOEs involved in this activity, the primary 
actor is COSCO, which has undertaken some of the most strategically impor-
tant acquisitions of port authorities, shipping lines, and related assets along the 
Asia–EU route, including transactions that have transformed the port of Piraeus 
in Greece from a struggling cruise port into a major containerport now serving 
as the western terminus of China’s Maritime Silk Road�
The purpose of each of these transactions is couched in the optimistic nomen-
clature of win-win economic development and bilateral friendship typically em-
ployed to describe projects under the BRI� However, the speed and scope of the 
acquisition campaign, combined with the centralization of control in a handful 
of SOEs and allied non-Chinese companies, raise fundamental questions about 
the nature and purpose of the network China is building�
It is important to note at the outset that the commercial maritime campaign 
that COSCO and other Chinese SOEs are undertaking is distinguishable from the 
BRI� While announcements of Chinese overseas investments now routinely re-
cite how any given project will advance the aims of the BRI, the funding of SOEs 
involved in the establishment of the global port and shipping network increas-
ingly is coming from China’s main long-term development banks rather than the 
institutions that have been set up to evaluate and finance infrastructure projects 
under the BRI� While pricing information about most transactions is opaque, in 
some cases shipping consultants have questioned the high valuations at which 
COSCO has acquired certain assets, suggesting that obtaining those assets is a 
matter of achieving strategic national security goals rather than a financial invest-
ment that will be required to deliver market-based returns� The sustained nature 
of the port-buying campaign, coupled with extensive cooperation agreements 
between COSCO and other Chinese SOEs in port and rail construction, auto 
manufacturing, and port operation, suggests that the initial objective of building 
a global port network under Chinese control is to secure commercial sites that 
will afford China a reliable system for transporting Chinese imports and exports� 
However, the simultaneous investment in power-generation and -transmission 
assets, inland transportation routes, and telecommunications infrastructure 
in port host countries—the financing of which creates economic influence for 
China—suggests that the expanding Chinese commercial maritime network is 
the foundation for future deployment of the country’s naval forces�
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Since the National Development and Reform Commission formalized the BRI 
in an action plan in March 2015, the policy has evolved� It has been stretched 
to accommodate new geographic regions beyond the original Indo-Pacific and 
Central Asian areas, as well as projects that were initiated under other devel-
opment programs�10 Most importantly, the Nineteenth National Congress of 
the CPC in October 2017 amended the party’s constitution to make the BRI 
a national objective, a move that constitutes a “Chinese state strategy” in the 
making, in which top-down directives of the CPC would exert more pressure 
on Chinese banks, state-owned companies, private companies, and business op-
erators to make investments abroad in a manner that reflects Beijing’s strategic 
objectives�11 Official Chinese policy documents and analyses of China’s maritime 
infrastructure investments in the Indo-Pacific region from state- and CPC-
affiliated publications indicate that Chinese analysts routinely prioritize China’s 
national security interests over the objective of mutually beneficial economic 
development—contradicting ostensible Chinese policy� Chinese analysts argue 
that the BRI’s Maritime Silk Road component can help ensure Beijing’s access 
to vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and they view port investments 
as vehicles by which China can cultivate political influence to constrain recipi-
ent countries and build dual-use infrastructure to facilitate Beijing’s long-range 
naval operations� Similarly, the behavior of Chinese companies involved in port 
projects indicates that these investments are not driven principally by the concept 
of win-win development—as Beijing claims—but rather that the investments 
appear to be calibrated to generate political influence, stealthily expand China’s 
capability to project and sustain military presence, and create advantageous 
strategic environments for China in the various regions where port and logistics 
investments are undertaken�12
This article does not attempt to evaluate whether any given project meets the 
elastic criteria of the BRI, but instead will look at the actual pattern of transac-
tions globally that Chinese SOEs have undertaken to acquire assets in the port, 
shipping, terminal, and related businesses and the current available evidence of 
how those assets are being managed, then pose the following practical strategic 
question: What kind of network do these assets constitute?
Strategic Considerations with Respect to Chinese Shipping and  
Port Investments
Available evidence suggests that the network China is building could form the ba-
sis for a pattern of commercial maritime influence—and potentially a global trad-
ing system—very different from the one that has prevailed since the end of World 
War II, and from which China benefited as it industrialized over that time� These 
transactions, collectively, reflect a distinct Chinese model of acquiring power 
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through maritime commercial investment centered on ports—a model that seeks 
to mitigate China’s historic strategic transportation vulnerabilities, project Chi-
nese influence into economic and maritime realms now almost exclusively under 
U�S� control, and influence host countries to support Chinese interests� Already, 
one port host country has blocked EU criticism of China’s human rights record at 
a United Nations body, suggesting that China can influence the position of a na-
tion in which COSCO, China’s primary state-owned shipping company, has made 
major investments�13 COSCO also has taken steps to move to China some board 
meetings and decision-making for recently acquired assets domiciled in the EU�
These developments illustrate the strategic nature of China’s campaign of 
investment in ports and shipping� As detailed below, this has included gaining 
meaningful quasi-governmental power over port development in other nations� 
This campaign seems designed not only to help Chinese state-owned companies 
survive the ongoing stress in the global shipping and construction industries 
by managing excess shipping capacity but also to disadvantage competitors� In 
critical cases, China has increased pressure on companies that compete with its 
state-owned shipping and port entities by using Chinese regulatory power to pre-
vent competitors from taking actions to rationalize their cargo-carrying capacity� 
Chinese government lenders also have provided capital to certain competitors to 
finance major purchases from Chinese shipyards� In effect, China is extending 
commercial influence from its factory regions, where products are made, out-
ward through the global supply chain that delivers those products� In terms of 
building influence in a world highly dependent on global trade, having control 
or significant influence over the facilities required for the distribution of goods 
produced in China affords Chinese companies more leverage than they would 
obtain if they controlled only ocean transport and shipping costs�
The use of alliances as a method of achieving influence in the shipping indus-
try is notable� Since being formed from two predecessor state-owned shipping 
companies, COSCO has become the dominant line in one of the three container-
shipping alliances that have formed to cope with the decline in container volume 
since the financial crisis of 2008� Alliances are a hallmark of a maritime approach 
to grand strategy, typically being one part of a multilateral approach in which 
trade is conducted among voluntary members under a uniform set of rules that 
apply to relations among all members�14 While most of China’s agreements to 
acquire or develop ports are concluded on a bilateral basis rather than under 
general rule sets, China has adopted an alliance approach in the port sector—for 
example, with the organization in 2016 of the China-Malaysia Port Alliance, an 
effort to consolidate Malaysian logistics capabilities into a regional hub� The al-
liance, which encompasses twenty-one ports, includes Malacca, where China is 
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investing ten billion dollars to build a deep-sea port that is expected to surpass 
Singapore and become the largest in the region when it is completed in 2025�15
For China, the SOE-led port-expansion campaign provides strategic capabili-
ties that help mitigate the dependence of the country’s economy on global ship-
ping that transports manufactured export goods and raw-material and energy 
imports through a few narrow maritime passages such as the Strait of Malacca, 
the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Suez Canal� Given that most 
sea-lanes ultimately remain largely under U�S� control, the sea has become an 
important realm of global competition between the United States and China, yet 
China lacks the capacity to ensure the security of its essential interests, such as 
oil-shipping routes across the Indian Ocean� This means that China’s overseas 
supply chain long has been exposed to security threats, in particular strategic 
threats from Western countries, a situation that poses a threat to the Chinese 
national economy and constitutes a strategic weakness that cannot be ignored�16 
China’s navy is expected to defend major SLOCs against disruption at critical 
choke points, but SLOC protection requires the ability to sustain maritime pres-
ence in strategic locations in hostile conditions for extended periods� China’s 
concern about SLOC protection has expanded in step with the expansion of the 
country’s economic connections, generating increased discussion of the potential 
for overseas naval bases�17 The need for a port network under Chinese control to 
mitigate these risks has been recognized� It recently was linked to the concept of 
a Maritime Silk Road by Liu Cigui, former director of the State Oceanic Adminis-
tration� Liu has written that port facilities are the foundation of sea-lane security, 
requiring China to establish sea posts to support and resupply ships traveling and 
securing ocean routes, by either building or leasing facilities�18
An Emerging Chinese Model of Twenty-First-Century  
Port Development and Control
The pattern of investments constitutes a new and distinctly Chinese approach to 
maritime development� The emerging Chinese model encompasses developing 
dock and terminal facilities, securing control of port-investment and -development 
decisions, integrating terminals with shipping assets under direct or allied Chi-
nese control, enhancing or constructing land-based transportation routes, and 
achieving economic and political influence within host countries� The decision 
to pursue this model never was declared or announced; instead, awareness of 
it emerged after a series of transactions occurred� While each transaction at-
tracted routine coverage by shipping and financial media, the progression of 
COSCO’s involvement with Piraeus Port—from terminal operator to controlling 
shareholder of the publicly traded port-operating company—only recently has 
engendered detailed academic and policy analysis� A recent analysis of COSCO’s 
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situation in Piraeus concludes that it constitutes a new “Greek prototype” of port 
governance that “implies the losing of any public sector power to intervene in 
what is the institution responsible for the oversight of strategy and the develop-
ment of modern ports”—that is, a port authority�19
COSCO itself was formed by the $8�7 billion merger of two state-owned 
Chinese shipping conglomerates, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 
(COSCO), and China Shipping (Group) Company� Chinese regulators approved 
the merger in December 2015 and it became effective in February 2016� The deal 
spanned almost every aspect of the shipping and maritime industries, including 
containerships, dry-bulk ships, tankers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships, and 
other specialized vessels; shipyards and ports; and leasing, finance, insurance, 
and other shipping services� Requiring seventy-four transactions to combine 
subsidiaries of the two companies, the merger was one of the most complex in the 
recent history of China’s capital markets�20 Postmerger, the overall group is known 
as China COSCO Shipping Corporation Ltd� It is headed by Xu Lirong, chairman 
of the board and party secretary of China COSCO Shipping, who previously was 
chairman of the board and party secretary of China Shipping (Group) Company� 
Wan Min, previously managing director of COSCO Container Lines Ltd� and 
president of COSCO Americas Inc�, led the merger transaction and then served 
as a director of the board, president, and deputy party secretary of the combined 
company, referred to herein as COSCO�21
In summary, the principal direct transactions of COSCO or its predecessor 
companies since 2008 include the following:
• Establishment of the Piraeus container terminal at Piraeus Port in 2009
• Acquisition of a controlling stake in Piraeus Port Authority SA in 2016
• Acquisition of a 40 percent stake in a joint venture with AMT Terminals to 
build and manage a new terminal at Vado Port in Vado, Italy, in 2016
• Acquisition of a 35 percent stake in the Port of Rotterdam’s Euromax termi-
nal, an automated container terminal that began operating in 2010, for $143 
million
• Acquisition of a 15 percent stake in Shanghai International Port Group 
(SIPG), which is controlled by its majority owner, the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), 
in 2017
• Acquisition of a 51 percent stake in Noatum Port Holdings SLU (NPH) in 
Valencia, Spain, from a fund managed by JP Morgan Asset Management in 
2017
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• Acquisition of the entire equity capital stock of Orient Overseas Interna-
tional Ltd� (OOIL) of Hong Kong, in a joint purchase undertaken with SIPG 
in 2017
• Acquisition in September 2017, for $42 million, of the 76 percent it did not 
own already of the APM Terminals Zeebrugge container terminal, with a 
capacity of one million twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs), in Belgium’s 
second-busiest port; it previously was owned by a unit of Maersk Group, a 
COSCO competitor 
While these are not the only transactions COSCO has undertaken recently, 
they are the investments that, taken together, embody COSCO’s expansion strat-
egy in the Mediterranean region, which is the most advanced in terms of the 
scope of assets acquired and the control of decision-making achieved� Chinese 
SOEs or allied entities have made similar investments elsewhere, including the 
following: in Brazil, a hydroelectric plant, and elsewhere in Latin America, a key 
terminal and a shipping line; in Singapore, a major shipping line and container 
terminal operator; in Sri Lanka, a major port; and in the United Arab Emirates, 
terminal facilities�
This type of expansion has progressed furthest in Greece� In 2014, Chinese 
premier Li Keqiang visited Piraeus, home of the country’s largest port� He stated 
that China would be a “long term” investor to build the port into “a gateway of 
China to Europe�” By June 2016, COSCO had gained control of the Piraeus Port 
Authority SA (PPA), the publicly listed company that the Greek state created 
to oversee the Port of Piraeus� Although Greece is an Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development country, COSCO achieved this objective 
through the use of techniques typically employed in port transactions in develop-
ing countries� The success of this approach reflects the weak state of the Greek 
economy and the disarray and lack of clarity in the governance of Greek port as-
sets, despite the Greek government’s twenty-year effort to improve the efficiency 
of the country’s ports�22
In 2016, COSCO was the only one of six parties to submit a bid in the final 
stage to acquire 67 percent of the shares of PPA; the Greek parliament approved 
the purchase in July 2016� This gave COSCO control of a public company listed 
on the Athens stock exchange in 2003 as part of Greece’s decades-long effort 
to revitalize its seaports� (The Greek state retained 74�14 percent of the shares 
of PPA at the time of the stock exchange listing�) The most valuable asset from 
PPA is a contract from the Greek state to operate Piraeus Port for forty years in 
exchange for an annual concession fee of 2 percent of the port’s gross revenue� 
Greece granted the contract to PPA in 2001 when it created corporatized, state-
owned port companies to develop Piraeus and Thessaloníki�23
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The 2016 sale constituted a “master concession” form of privatization of the 
state-owned port company; it enabled the private investor, COSCO, to act as 
owner, regulator, manager, and operator of the entire port� Although in this 
model ownership of the land is not transferred and the state retains the right to 
terminate the concession (under certain conditions), the private concessionaire’s 
discretion effectively supplants public control over the port� Master-concession 
privatizations usually are found only in developing countries, and thus are rare 
for European ports�24 Greece opted to grant a master concession because of the 
severity of the economic problems facing the country in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis� COSCO offered €368�5 million, with €280�5 million payable im-
mediately for a controlling 51 percent stake in PPA, and another €88 million for 
the remaining 16 percent of the shares, to be deposited in an escrow account� The 
additional shares are to be transferred when COSCO completes the €350 million 
in investments it has committed to make within a decade, with the majority to 
be spent on improving infrastructure for cruise ships and passengers and €55 
million on upgrading ship-repair facilities at the port�25 On completion of the 
transaction, the Greek state will retain approximately 8 percent of the equity in 
PPA, with private investors composing the remaining shareholders�26
The acquisition of the stake in PPA consolidated COSCO’s control over a port 
in which it had been investing since 2009� In 2009, Piraeus Container Terminal 
SA (PCT), a subsidiary of a COSCO predecessor company, won a contract to 
operate PCT Pier II and to build and operate a new section of the port, Pier III� 
Volume at the Piraeus container terminals under COSCO’s management has 
increased significantly� Even as Greek GDP fell by 25 percent from 2010 to 2015, 
Piraeus Port overall became the eighth-largest containerport in the EU, whereas 
previously it had not been among the EU’s fifteen largest� The increase stemmed 
almost entirely from COSCO’s PCT operations� In 2010, PCT held a market 
share of 45�3 percent of Greek container volume; PPA, the remaining publicly 
operated terminal pier at Piraeus, held a 34 percent share; and Thessaloníki Port 
held an 18�1 percent share� Five years later, in 2015, the PCT market share had 
nearly doubled, to 81�5 percent, while the PPA and Thessaloníki shares decreased 
to single digits (7�9 and 9�4 percent, respectively)� The increase was attributable 
mainly to transshipment traffic—that is, movement of goods through the port 
terminals on the way to destinations in the EU via state-owned rail systems that 
were completed subsequent to COSCO’s assumption of operating the PCT as-
sets� This transshipment traffic represented business from multinationals such 
as Hewlett-Packard that signed contracts with PCT to transfer containerized 
intermediate products to distribution and assembly centers in the EU�27
Subsequent to the approval of its acquisition of the PPA stake, COSCO has 
continued to assert control over Piraeus Port, leading in one instance to a conflict 
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between COSCO and the Greek state over governance of the port company� At 
the annual meeting of PPA in July 2017, the Greek state fund holding a 23�14 
percent stake in the company opposed COSCO’s proposal to amend an article 
of the company’s charter so as to include continental China and Hong Kong 
among permitted locations for PPA board meetings� According to Greek busi-
ness media reports, the Greek state requested the meeting be extended to allow 
Greek state legal counsel to examine concerns that holding board meetings in 
China might constitute a de facto change of the company’s domicile� The Greek 
state ultimately voted against the amendment, but the change was made; COSCO 
controls a majority of the company, and major Greek and foreign institutional 
investors with stakes in PPA voted in favor of the change� A total of 82�8 percent 
of shares were represented at the meeting, and of those represented, 62 percent— 
including those held by shareholders such as Lansdowne Partners and Black-
Rock, and Greek fund-management companies Delos and Alpha Trust—voted to 
include China and Hong Kong among possible board meeting locations� Greek 
media reports indicate that the state is continuing to study the matter to clarify 
which country’s legal system would prevail over decisions made in China or 
Hong Kong�28
The conflict over governance of Piraeus Port came shortly after other actions 
suggesting that COSCO plans to exert strong control over key assets in its ex-
panding maritime network� Shortly after acquiring a shareholding stake in SIPG, 
COSCO in June 2017 announced two agreements involving COSCO, PPA, and 
the Port of Shanghai, intended to increase the volume of container traffic from 
China to the EU� COSCO chairman Xu and SIPG chairman Chen Xuyuan trav-
eled to Piraeus to execute the agreements� The shipping and port executives were 
accompanied by a CPC delegation led by Han Zheng, a member of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Shanghai Mu-
nicipal Committee� Politically, the framework agreement and memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) between COSCO and SIPG underscore the significance of 
Piraeus in China’s strategic maritime network and the willingness of China’s top 
leadership to develop the Greek location� In COSCO’s announcement of the new 
arrangements, Han said the pact was responsive to the instructions of President 
Xi Jinping to make Piraeus a key component of the BRI by building the port into 
the largest site in the Mediterranean for the integrated shipping of containers 
through land and sea transport routes� The announcement pledged that the CPC 
Shanghai Municipal Committee and the Shanghai municipal government would 
support the development of COSCO “so that this SOE can make full use of its 
advantages and better serve and implement national strategies�”29 Illustrating the 
importance of the commercial maritime network to China’s national strategy, 
Han was named one of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee 
Winter2019Review.indb   68 12/4/18   11:13 AM
74
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1
 O’ D E A  6 9
of the CPC at the Nineteenth National Congress of the CPC in October 2017, and 
in March 2018 was appointed executive vice-premier of the State Council, a role 
that is likely to include oversight of the National Development and Reform Com-
mission, the agency responsible for China’s long-term economic-development 
strategy and industrial policy�30 The economic aspects of the agreement between 
PPA and SIPG concentrate on cooperation on funding, port building, training, 
and technical assistance; this agreement also contemplates consolidation of joint 
planning for promotion campaigns aimed at increasing the use of the two ports 
to raise use of their cargo-handling facilities, including by jointly negotiating with 
shipping companies to increase traffic on regular routes between Piraeus and 
Shanghai�31 Also in June, COSCO signed separate agreements with the Shanghai 
municipal government aimed at increasing COSCO’s involvement in building 
out Shanghai’s shipping and logistics capabilities, expanding construction of 
ports and logistics terminals in foreign countries targeted for connection to the 
Yangtze River Economic Belt, and continuing the reform of SOEs and assets by 
encouraging linkages among port and shipping companies� Demonstrating one 
aspect of the connectivity for which the BRI calls, the PLAN’s Naval Task Group 
150, consisting of the missile destroyer Changchun, missile frigate Jingzhou, and 
supply vessel Chaohu, made a four-day visit to Piraeus in July, just weeks before 
the deployment of PLAN sailors to China’s port in Djibouti removed any doubt 
about whether China intended to use the African facility as a military base�32
TRENDS IN GLOBAL SHIPPING
Foundations of Global Container-Shipping Alliances
COSCO’s announcements have made increasingly clear the company’s intent to 
exercise control over its investments in port properties by using the economic 
leverage that the company’s alliances provide� In announcing its controlling 
investment in the Spanish port company NPH, COSCO cited the now-standard 
claim that the acquisition was partly a measure to implement the BRI, but added 
that the transaction marked significant progress toward the group’s further im-
proving its overseas port network; strengthening the control and management of 
its ports and terminals; and, more importantly, bringing into full play the syner-
gies between the group’s port assets and the container fleet of China COSCO 
Shipping Corporation, which it identified as “the ultimate controlling” entity of 
COSCO Shipping Ports Limited, and the Ocean Alliance�33 As COSCO Shipping 
Ports became the controlling shareholder of NPH, the company announced that 
it would “further optimize its presence in Europe and rest of the world,” and 
after completion of the transaction, COSCO stated, Noatum’s ports in Valencia 
and Bilbao would “enjoy business support from the Ocean Alliance, including 
COSCO Shipping Lines�”34
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The Ocean Alliance is one of three consortia that major shipping lines formed 
in 2016 in response to the decline in container traffic and shipping rates follow-
ing the 2008 financial crisis� The alliances became operational in April 2017�35 
The Ocean Alliance is made up of COSCO; CMA CGM SA of France; Evergreen 
Line of Taiwan; and Orient Overseas Container Line, based in Hong Kong� The 
other two alliances are the 2M Alliance, made up of the Danish Maersk Line and 
Switzerland-based MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co� SA; and THE Alliance, 
made up of the German line Hapag-Lloyd, the Taiwanese line Yang Ming, and 
three Japanese companies—Mitsui O�S�K� Lines, Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, and 
the K Line� THE Alliance was to have included Hanjin Shipping before the bank-
ruptcy and demise of that South Korean carrier�
An analysis of the new alliances by shipping industry consultancy Drewry 
shows that the Ocean Alliance emerged as the winner of the industry reshuffling, 
with its members having a total of forty loops spread across seven east–west trade 
routes; THE Alliance has thirty-two services and 2M has twenty-five� Each alli-
ance also has a standing lineup of port calls, voyage frequency, and speed� The 
primary basis of the Ocean Alliance’s commanding position is its seven services 
offered from Asia to the Middle East and the Red Sea; THE Alliance offers only 
one and 2M offers none on that route� A similar situation holds for service from 
Asia to the west coast of North America: the Ocean Alliance offers thirteen, 
THE Alliance eleven, and 2M just five� In the eastern Mediterranean, the three 
alliances make forty-two port calls across nineteen ports, with most receiving 
just one or two; Piraeus is the busiest, with seven calls� Valencia, in Spain, where 
COSCO recently acquired control of the port authority, is served most frequently 
of the thirteen ports receiving alliance ships in the western Mediterranean, re-
ceiving ten weekly calls from alliance ships� In total, the Ocean Alliance plans to 
deploy about 350 container vessels, with an estimated total capacity of 3�5 million 
TEUs�36
The business and maritime media portray the process that gave rise to these 
three configurations of the world’s largest shipping companies as an organic one, 
but this elides the significant part that Chinese antitrust regulators played in 
determining which shipping lines could cooperate with each other, and thereby 
the memberships of the shipping alliances that went into effect in 2017� The Chi-
nese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in 2014 applied the Anti-Monopoly 
Law (AML) adopted in 2008 to block the proposed formation of an alliance 
(known as P3) of Maersk Line, MSC Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA CGM, 
on the grounds that by going beyond the scope of vessel-sharing arrangements 
common in the industry the proposed alliance would enhance significantly the 
market power of the members and have an anticompetitive effect on shipping 
routes from Asia to Europe�37 The MOFCOM action spawned intensive analysis 
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of Chinese competition law and the allocation of powers among MOFCOM, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the State Admin-
istration for Industry and Commerce� The Chinese AML requires MOFCOM 
to take industrial policy concerns into account when exercising supervision of 
mergers and business combinations, and, although industrial policy alone was 
not the motivation for MOFCOM’s decision, legal experts view MOFCOM’s pro-
hibition as a striking example of China’s application of the law, meriting a place 
on the top-ten list of major events in the global shipping industry; it was one of 
only two proposed transactions that the agency had blocked as of September 
2016, underscoring that national economic concerns played an important role 
in the decision�38 China’s attention to the potential competitive impact of the 
proposed shipping alliance on Chinese entities reflects the country’s policy of 
“industrial capacity cooperation�” The NDRC has held press briefings to promote 
the export of Chinese industrial capacity, equipment, technology, and standards 
as an element of BRI agreements, extending a diplomatic concept that Premier Li 
introduced in 2015 as an element of SOE reforms�39
A French Connection Bolsters COSCO’s Shipping Alliance
China’s prohibition of the P3 alliance surprised the participants and the shipping 
industry�40 But the decision only delayed the consolidation of the container- 
shipping industry; the latest major step in that process came with the formation 
late in 2016 of three shipping alliances aimed at better managing excess container 
capacity, a problem exacerbated by the bankruptcy of the South Korean line 
Hanjin� China COSCO Shipping became the dominant company in the Ocean 
Alliance, which notably includes France’s CMA CGM, previously a proposed 
member of the scuttled P3 group�
The current CMA CGM was formed from Compagnie Maritime d’Affrètement 
(CMA), founded in 1978 by French shipping entrepreneur Jacques Saadé, and 
Compagnie Générale Maritime (CGM), a French state-owned company that the 
French state privatized in 1996 by awarding operation of CGM to CMA� The two 
companies formally merged in 1999�
CMA CGM has operated in China since it opened an office in Shanghai in 
1992�41 The company’s ties to China have broadened and deepened over the past 
several years� In 2013, as part of an effort to restructure its debt, CMA CGM sold 
49 percent of its container terminal subsidiary Terminal Link to China Merchants 
Holdings International for €400 million�42 Competitive pressures on global ship-
pers increased, as reflected in the unsuccessful attempt to form the P3 alliance in 
2014� The linkage between China and CMA CGM deepened in 2015 when the 
Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) agreed to provide CMA CGM with up 
to a billion dollars in loans or export credit insurance to finance the company’s 
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future purchases of vessels and containers from Chinese suppliers� Historically, 
CMA CGM had ordered most of its containers from the Chinese group CIMC, 
and in 2015 it began to take delivery from Chinese shipyards of some of the 
world’s largest containerships, starting with three 18,000-TEU vessels, which at 
the time were the largest ever built by Chinese shipyards� Simultaneously with 
receiving the CEXIM financing, CMA CGM entered into a strategic partnership 
agreement with China Merchants Holdings to evaluate infrastructure and port-
related logistics projects jointly� A public event to mark the agreements, held 
at CMA CGM’s headquarters in the French port city of Marseille, included the 
attendance of Chinese premier Li Keqiang in an official capacity to meet with 
France’s then–foreign minister Laurent Fabius� At the time, CMA CGM claimed 
to be the first company to sign an agreement with a Chinese company to pursue 
investments under the BRI�43
The collaboration between CMA CGM and Chinese companies has increased 
and broadened since 2015, in shipbuilding, terminal operations, and port in-
vestment� In the third quarter of 2017, CMA CGM signed a letter of intent with 
two Chinese shipyards (Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard and Shanghai Waigaoqiao 
Shipbuilding) to build nine 22,000-TEU containerships, the largest vessels to 
date� South Korea’s three large shipbuilders—Hyundai Heavy Industries, Sam-
sung Heavy Industries, and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering—also 
bid for the $1�44 billion contract� The decision evoked considerable surprise in 
the shipbuilding industry because South Korean companies previously had built 
most large containerships, and CMA CGM’s awarding of the order indicated that 
China was making substantial progress at building ultralarge container vessels 
with the latest navigation, communication, and environmental- and energy-
management capabilities� Shipbuilders are suffering a prolonged decline in new 
orders, leading to the closure of many yards� Shipping analysts consider the new 
ships that CMA CGM has ordered to be high value–added vessels� They will have 
dual-propulsion systems that can operate on either LNG or fuel oil and will meet 
stricter international regulations on emissions, indicating to sources in the ship-
building industry that Chinese shipyards’ technology and price competitiveness 
have caught up to or surpassed those of South Korean shipyards�44
In January 2017, CMA CGM’s terminal unit, CMA Terminals Holdings, 
signed an MOU with COSCO Shipping Ports in which each company committed 
to increase businesses and services at ports and terminals where Ocean Alliance 
vessels make port calls� The French company issued a statement that both entities 
wished to create more opportunities in global port investment and operations, 
but did not provide further details on the agreement� Nonetheless, the agree-
ment builds on CMA CGM’s international expansion of its terminal operations, 
an effort that is supportive of COSCO’s strategy� In 2016, CMA CGM paid $2�4 
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billion to acquire Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), a Singapore-based shipping and 
terminal operator that was the largest shipping company listed on the Singapore 
Exchange� Acquiring NOL gave CMA CGM market leadership on transpacific 
routes to the west coast of North America, a competitive advantage now enjoyed 
by the Ocean Alliance, in which it is a member�45 With the NOL transaction, 
CMA CGM relocated its Asian headquarters from Hong Kong to Singapore, 
where the PSA Singapore Terminal is the world’s second-largest containerport 
(after Shanghai), handling nearly thirty-one million TEUs in 2016� PSA Singa-
pore is the largest terminal operation of PSA International Pte� Ltd�, a subsidiary 
of Temasek Holdings, the Singapore state sovereign wealth fund� The relocation 
highlighted the increasing strategic importance of Singapore as the commercial 
shipping industry consolidates into a few large groups seeking to maximize ef-
ficiency by running ever-larger vessels between a declining number of ports with 
automated terminals and logistics connections� In early 2017, five major shipping 
lines relocated their operations to Singapore from Port Kelang in Malaysia; with 
large container vessels already berthed in Singapore, customers could eliminate 
the added time and cost of shipping goods for ocean transit the additional six 
hundred kilometers to Port Kelang�46 Subsequently, CMA CGM declared its in-
tent to make Singapore its primary Asian hub, and it initiated a joint venture with 
PSA that uses container yard automation technology to serve the megavessels of 
CMA CGM with some of the fastest container-moving rates in the industry�47
COSCO is closely involved in the development and deployment of port- and 
terminal-automation technologies� Qingdao New Qianwan Container Terminal 
at Qingdao International Port (QIP) in northern China became Asia’s first fully 
automated container terminal—using automation for both crane-ship operations 
and the movement of containers from dock to yard—with its servicing of the 
13,386-TEU COSCO France on May 11, 2017� COSCO in January had increased 
its shareholding in QIP to 18�4 percent by acquiring a 16�8 percent stake as part 
of a strategic accord to develop the port into a major hub in northeastern China� 
According to shipping publications, QIP officials have claimed in broadcasts for 
the China Global Television Network that the automated terminal reduces labor 
costs by 70 percent and increases efficiency by 30 percent, because automated 
cranes and driverless trucks operate day and night�48 Shanghai International Port 
in December 2017 began operation of what would be the world’s largest auto-
mated terminal, the Yangshan Deep-Water Port, designed ultimately to handle 
6�5 million standard containers per year�49
Perhaps the most significant role of CMA CGM in China’s maritime expan-
sion is the company’s position as a member of the consortium that won the bid 
to acquire a 67 percent controlling stake in the publicly listed port company that 
holds the concession from the Greek state to operate the port of Thessaloníki� The 
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CMA CGM subsidiary Terminal Link has a 33 percent stake in the consortium, 
with 47 percent being held by German investment firms Deutsche Invest Equity 
Partners GmbH and the remaining 20 percent by Belterra Investments Ltd�50 
Although Greek media reported concerns over Belterra’s possible Russian ties, 
the consortium completed the purchase in March 2018 and has garnered local 
support, with the Foundation for Economic & Industrial Research, a nonprofit 
research organization established in 1975, reporting that business from Piraeus 
and Thessaloníki could increase Greek GDP by up to €5�6 billion annually�51
CHINA’S PROGRESS—SO FAR
China’s Maritime Expansion: Unprecedented Aggressiveness
Chinese expansion in the shipping and port sectors not only is accelerating in 
pace; it also is occurring with an unprecedented aggressiveness� The primary en-
tities engaging in the expansion operate under a radically different set of assump-
tions from their non-Chinese competitors, and are able to act more decisively and 
take on greater financial risks than can firms operating without the full credit 
and political support of their home state� In the view of Neil Davidson, the senior 
analyst for ports and terminals at Drewry, “Chinese players are more comfortable 
with risk than the established international operators right now, and have a geo-
political strategy rather than a purely financial one� They are snapping up assets 
and opportunities and have the appetite and financial clout to take many more in 
the coming years�” COSCO, which already has enhanced its competitive position 
significantly, is projected to add more port terminal-operating capacity than any 
other global terminal operator over the next five years, in large part because of its 
acquisitions of Noatum and the container terminals owned by recently acquired 
Orient Overseas�52
While its activities are the most extensive—covering shipping, ports, termi-
nals, and transport network development—COSCO is not the only Chinese 
state-owned company actively acquiring ports and related assets� Chinese enti-
ties made more than half of all acquisitions by global/international terminal op-
erators in the year ending in mid-2017�53 While COSCO was the primary actor, 
other transactions were undertaken by China Overseas Port Holdings and China 
Merchants Port Holdings (CMPH); the latter added “Port” to its name in 2016 
to reflect the company’s reorientation toward acquiring and developing ports 
around the world�54 CMPH is the largest publicly listed port operator in China 
in terms of container throughput, with a market share of roughly 33 percent in 
2016; like COSCO, CMPH owns part of Shanghai International Port Group, with 
a 25�15 percent stake as of June 2017�55 Last September, CMPH agreed to buy 90 
percent of TCP Participações SA, which operates the container terminal conces-
sion in Paranaguá, Brazil’s second-largest containerport, for approximately $924 
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million� Financial news media reported that the purchase price valued TCP at 
14�3 times the company’s annual earnings before accounting for interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), higher than the estimated value of 
thirteen times EBITDA that had been expected�56
In instances such as the TCP case, Chinese port and shipping SOEs have 
acquired assets from Western institutional investors that typically do not own 
shipping lines that can be rerouted to improve the economic prospects of the 
port assets� For example, as noted previously, COSCO Shipping Ports acquired 
51 percent of Noatum Port Holdings, a Spanish-incorporated company, from 
Truria Port Investment Holdings, a Spanish-incorporated holding company for 
assets principally engaged in terminal operations and owned by institutional 
investors; a 67 percent share is advised by JP Morgan Global Alternatives, and 
33 percent by APG Asset Management NV� COSCO Shipping appears to have 
made a direct investment of equity capital in Noatum and to have provided the 
company with additional funding to strengthen its balance sheet, leaving the 
pension fund investors with an undisclosed share of the company’s equity�57 APG 
is an asset-management entity headquartered in the Netherlands that primarily 
advises one of the largest pension funds in the world, Stichting Pensioenfonds 
ABP, which invests the pension assets of Dutch public-sector employees� The two 
investors acquired the Spanish port assets in 2010 as part of their infrastructure-
investment programs, but financial results were constrained by labor and cost 
issues with Spanish stevedores� The assets of NPH include container terminals in 
Valencia and Bilbao, Spain, and two associated rail lines that required substantial 
investment to change the gauge of their tracks to correspond to EU standards 
so they could connect the port terminals to the EU distribution network� One 
of the top three containerports in the Mediterranean region, the Port of Valen-
cia serves a hinterland with a 350-kilometer radius that accounts for nearly 50 
percent of Spanish GDP and acts as the main gateway for the Iberian Peninsula; 
owing to that location, COSCO Shipping Ports believes Valencia is well situated 
to serve as a transshipment hub for western Mediterranean markets, and in April 
2017 Ocean Alliance ships began to switch from other terminals in the area to 
Noatum’s Valencia terminal�58
Financial Considerations of Chinese State-Backed Acquisitions
Some analysts have questioned whether Chinese port and shipping players paid 
so much for some of the assets they acquired that those ports or terminals will not 
generate market-rate returns� But traditional investment concerns may not carry 
as much weight with Chinese state-backed companies when they acquire assets 
with capital supplied by China as they do for non-Chinese, non-state-owned 
companies, which must deliver competitive financial returns on assets if they are 
to obtain capital from private investors�
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Drewry has suggested that COSCO Shipping Ports, COSCO’s port entity, may 
have to write down the value of NPH, the Spanish port operator acquired in June 
2017� The consultancy’s concern stems from the difference between the cost of 
equity capital and the cost of debt� While the acquisition of the 51 percent stake in 
Noatum appears to have taken place at a favorable valuation in comparison with 
COSCO Shipping’s terminal acquisitions over the past two years, Drewry notes, 
the value of Noatum includes a significant amount of goodwill—the difference 
between the value the buyer assigns to the acquired assets and the price paid to 
acquire those assets� As a result of COSCO Shipping’s purchase, the amount of 
equity in Noatum’s capital structure will increase, resulting in a lower value for 
the goodwill portion of Noatum’s total value� In effect, the modest valuation of 
the port would appear to provide a cushion against adverse business conditions, 
but that cushion could be eaten up if the total value of the port must be written 
down� According to Drewry, COSCO Shipping Ports targeted a return of 10 per-
cent for its investment in Noatum, assuming the concession for the key terminal 
that NPH owns in Valencia is renewed beyond 2031�59
China’s allocations of capital to its port and shipping SOEs illustrate a material 
difference in scale between funding for an SOE engaged in a country’s geostra-
tegic expansion and the investment capital for purely financial purposes that is 
available to shipping lines and port operators with a purely commercial founda-
tion� In January 2017, the Chinese state provided major financial support to 
COSCO to aid the development of its shipping and port network when the China 
Development Bank, the country’s main provider of long-term loans, pledged to 
extend twenty-six billion dollars in funding through various unspecified finan-
cial products for OBOR projects that COSCO has undertaken through 2021, 
the period of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan�60 COSCO previously received 
other funding from Chinese state financial institutions, including an eighteen-
billion-dollar strategic-cooperation agreement announced in 2016 with CEXIM 
to support Chinese shipbuilding yards and accelerate optimization of the fleet 
structure to international standards� The agreement encompassed a commitment 
to finance construction of fifty ships, as well as to provide financing for mergers, 
acquisitions, and equity investments in other companies�61
To put the China Development Bank funding commitment in perspective, 
twenty-six billion dollars is nearly two-thirds the amount of money China allot-
ted from its national foreign exchange reserves to fund the Silk Road Fund, and 
more than one-quarter of the entire capital of the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank� For additional perspective on the difference between geostrategic 
national funding and the funding available to financial investors in ports or ship-
ping assets, consider that the largest infrastructure funds available to institutional 
investors such as pension funds raise between eighteen and forty billion dollars, 
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which must be deployed across many different sectors to comply with the diver-
sification requirements of such investors—and therefore cannot be concentrated 
in one or two sectors that constitute a strategic national priority�
The 2016 merger of two Chinese shipping companies to create COSCO 
amounted to the commissioning of an SOE to carry out China’s ambition to 
become a maritime power� The announcement of the equity transfers required 
among the several entities to form COSCO affirmed that the sole owner and 
controlling entity of the new China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited was 
SASAC, an entity created in 2003 to supervise directly China’s largest industrial 
concerns� CMPH, which holds the concession to operate Chinese port facilities in 
Djibouti, is 62 percent controlled by China Merchants Group, which, like COSCO, 
is wholly owned by SASAC�62 State control was reinforced further during 2017, 
with the chairman of SASAC emphasizing the importance of SOEs as a mecha-
nism for the government to direct the economy and achieve political objectives�63
Implications of China’s Emerging Maritime Network
There is little doubt from the observable transaction record that a top priority for 
Chinese SOEs operating in the port, terminal, and shipping sectors is to acquire 
these assets aggressively and consolidate them into an integrated network that 
not only benefits Chinese commercial interests but advances Chinese maritime 
influence, in accordance with CPC priorities� The presentation of the 2016 results 
of CMPH confirmed three primary goals: to consolidate Asia, consummate Af-
rica, break through Europe, and acquire new exposure in America; to capitalize 
on state-directed credit and political cover provided under OBOR to expand the 
ports network further; and, finally, to develop the Djibouti free-trade zone and 
enhance the company’s “Port-Zone-City” integrated development model�64 The 
aggressive expansion since 2016 reflects the objective stated in the official an-
nouncement of the creation of China COSCO Shipping, which declared that the 
merger was a “measure to materialize the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s 
commitment to building a maritime power�”65
Chinese investment in Greece’s Port of Piraeus since 2009 has transformed 
the port into one of the most active in the Mediterranean, and has served as 
the leading edge of a sustained campaign to acquire port assets in southern EU 
countries� Shipping industry analysts warn that, given the importance of ports to 
host-country economies, the transactions are not only transport investments but 
sources of political leverage and influence that mark the emergence of China as 
a global maritime power, and that from this vantage point Chinese port invest-
ments must be viewed in the context of geopolitics�66 COSCO’s operations in the 
Mediterranean, for example, create the possibility of serving the U�S� East Coast 
via the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal instead of the Panama Canal or West Coast 
ports that must ship goods east by rail or road�67
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China is supporting its overseas port network with additional investments in 
critical infrastructure, as well as communications efforts targeted at promoting 
favorable opinions of Chinese involvement� In Brazil, China is contributing fif-
teen billion dollars of a twenty-billion-dollar fund for infrastructure investment 
in the country, which is expected to help finance construction of railroads linking 
soy- and corn-producing areas in Brazil’s interior to its ports; although Brazil has 
noted that companies receiving financing from the fund will not be required to 
buy materials from China, China will maintain a 3 : 1 share of the fund’s capital�68 
In Greece, the China Development Bank agreed to an MOU with the Greek Pub-
lic Power Corporation, the largest power producer and electricity-supply com-
pany in Greece, which is seeking to modernize the sector and build geothermal 
power plants; the agreement was reached shortly after State Grid Corporation, 
China’s largest utility, acquired 24 percent of Greece’s power grid operator for 
$356 million, bringing total Chinese investment in Greek port, telecommuni-
cations, and photovoltaic assets to $1�3 billion, according to MOFCOM�69 In 
summer 2017, Athens News Agency, the Greek state’s media arm, organized a 
New Silk Road Forum that characterized Chinese investment in Europe as an 
opportunity instead of a threat; the event was attended by twenty-five state news 
agencies from countries mostly in southern and central Europe, including Spain, 
Italy, Bulgaria, and Greece, where Chinese entities have invested in maritime as-
sets and supporting infrastructure�70
This article has attempted to document that China has made significant 
progress in establishing and supporting the development of a maritime network 
consisting of ports, terminals, and commercial-shipping capabilities under the 
control of a handful of Chinese SOEs� At a time of stress in the container ship-
ping industry, COSCO and CMA CGM—key companies in China’s maritime 
network—display some of the best financial metrics in the sector, with both 
having reported positive earnings in the first half of 2017 and unit costs below 
average freight rates, and COSCO having the most cash on its balance sheet 
and the lowest share of debt among its competitors�71 Perhaps the article’s most 
significant contribution is to propose that the collective transactions of Chinese 
port and shipping SOEs now constitute an integrated network for Chinese mari-
time power expansion through commercial channels� In addition to fulfilling its 
explicit commercial purposes, certain key nodes of this network offer capabilities 
that could support noncommercial maritime operations, such as ship repair, spe-
cialized terminals to handle vehicles, deepwater berths, and terminals designed 
for distribution and refrigeration� COSCO in January 2017 announced a $620 
million development plan for Piraeus that prioritizes the creation of the largest 
ship-repair yard in the eastern Mediterranean and construction of hotels and 
cruise ship berths to cater to Chinese tourists�72 Such Chinese-controlled facilities 
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increasingly are being reinforced by electrical, rail, and road infrastructure that is 
being built with Chinese funding, in both developing and developed countries�
This combination of ambitious investment in maritime logistics, generous 
financial support from state development banks, and powerful political cover 
from Beijing has secured China extraordinary public support from port host 
countries� Of particular importance is that Chinese entities have shown the 
ability to gain control of port assets that include quasi-governmental grants of 
power by Western countries over investment decisions in and around strategic 
port facilities in those countries� Using techniques more often employed with 
developing countries, China has taken advantage of lingering economic stress 
in developed countries and overcapacity in container shipping to gain control 
of privatized state agencies originally set up to bolster local economic develop-
ment� The capabilities of the assets China has acquired, and their relationships to 
one another and other Chinese initiatives, afford decision makers in Beijing an 
unusual amount of control over a fundamental sector of the global economy and 
raise questions about the implications for all countries and firms that rely on the 
maritime domain� This conclusion suggests that further research into how China 
might use this power would be productive�
Any doubt about China’s intent to use the military capabilities of its maritime 
network dissolved with the report that the United States had lodged a formal pro-
test with China after an incident in which the Pentagon said Chinese personnel 
at the country’s new military base in Djibouti had directed a military-grade laser 
beam at U�S� military aircraft flying near the American base in Djibouti�73 Earlier 
in 2018, reports emerged that China plans to convert the port it is building in 
Gwadar, Pakistan, into a second naval base�74
The military aspect of Chinese maritime expansion now overshadows the de-
velopment of Djibouti’s commercial port� Concerns about continued access to the 
U�S� base increased in early 2018 after Djibouti’s president terminated the con-
tract of DP World to manage a container terminal that the United Arab Emirates– 
based company had built at Djibouti Port in 2006� The abrupt move sparked re-
ports that Djibouti intended to grant a contract for a new terminal to CMA CGM, 
while buying DP World’s 33 percent share of the terminal and turning operation 
of the older facility over to a struggling midsize Singaporean shipping line that 
entered a capacity-management alliance with COSCO late in 2017; DP World 
claimed it had not received an offer from Djibouti�75
New Headwinds
The tensions in Djibouti demonstrate that China’s commercial maritime ambi-
tions are starting to encounter headwinds as the expansion drive encroaches on 
the commercial—and military—interests of other nations� China faces several 
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potential challenges, not least whether it will be able to continue to finance the 
enormous cost of acquiring, building, and operating a global port network� While 
ports in Europe and Latin America have viable commercial operations that help 
fund development being undertaken by Chinese companies, few of China’s new-
build ports in the Indian Ocean appear economically viable in light of low port 
traffic at sites that are not on existing sea-trade routes, and even in cases such as the 
port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, where a Chinese SOE took a ninety-nine-year 
port lease in exchange for canceling loans Sri Lanka had taken from China, China 
faces the prospect of funding a major maritime installation for decades to come�76
Other signs of resistance to China’s port expansion are emerging� In January 
2018, a Swedish town rejected a Chinese SOE’s proposal to build a deepwater 
harbor owing to concerns about the environmental and security implications� In 
April, the EU and Italy alleged that Chinese criminal gangs are committing tax 
fraud by not reporting imports through Piraeus� Also in April, a German busi-
ness newspaper reported that EU diplomats in Beijing had prepared a briefing 
for an EU-China summit that sharply criticized China’s investments in ports and 
other strategic assets as a program intended to further Chinese interests, aid Chi-
nese companies, and divide political consensus in the EU by investing in politi-
cally unstable countries� The EU had first raised such concerns at the BRI summit 
China staged in Beijing in May 2017; China rejected proposed EU amendments 
to a draft Sino-EU agreement on Silk Road cooperation, which reportedly was 
presented to EU delegates without advance consultation�77
Perhaps the single largest hurdle to China’s port expansion is the linked 
questions of whether host countries—most of which are emerging market 
economies—will be able to repay Chinese loans and whether Chinese firms, 
which are mainly SOEs, can handle the high levels of debt they incurred to ac-
quire port assets�78 Pakistan—the single largest recipient of BRI funding, with 
$62 billion invested in projects, including a deepwater port at Gwadar—said in 
September 2018 that its new government, which faced a balance-of-payments 
crisis on taking office in July, plans to review or renegotiate agreements with 
China� Governments in other countries, including Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and 
Myanmar, also have expressed reservations about the terms of Chinese financing 
for ports and other projects that China is undertaking in their countries�79 These 
challenges to Chinese infrastructure investment, while high profile, mainly have 
occurred in countries where elections have resulted in a change of government� 
While analysts expect such challenges to continue, China’s role in infrastructure 
such as ports, roads, and power plants is unlikely to diminish in countries such as 
Pakistan, which has close diplomatic ties with China� Chinese state-backed lend-
ers are likely to remain a primary source of funding for other emerging-market 
nations that may be unable to attract enough private-sector capital to undertake 
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such projects or to meet the stipulations for transparency and project viability 
that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund require�80
Despite concerns about debt burdens, the leaders of most African countries 
attended the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in early September in Beijing, 
where President Xi pledged an additional $60 billion in financing for African 
countries and promoted China’s efforts to build ports and related infrastructure 
in Africa to enhance “common prosperity�”81 The meeting with these leaders pro-
duced numerous new investment agreements, but—perhaps more importantly—
a Chinese state media campaign in the run-up to the event featured Chinese Af-
rica experts extolling the benefit of economic ties with Africa, helping Xi counter 
blunt criticism of BRI spending by Chinese scholars who last summer questioned 
the cost of the global program�82
Even as some emerging-market countries are raising concerns about how they 
will shoulder their share of the cost of Chinese projects, developed countries are 
building investment ties with China� The EU’s concerns about transparency ap-
pear to have been more formal than substantive, and despite the absence of an 
MOU meeting its stated conditions, the EU has deepened the cooperation of its 
official financial agencies with Chinese counterparts since the 2017 BRI Sum-
mit� At the twentieth EU-China Summit in Beijing, in July 2018, the European 
Investment Fund (EIF), part of the European Investment Bank Group, signed an 
MOU with China’s Silk Road Fund—one of the financing vehicles established to 
advance the BRI—to facilitate joint investments through a program called the 
China-EU Co-investment Fund� According to the EIF, the coinvestment fund 
aims to develop “synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Invest-
ment Plan for Europe,” an EU economic-growth program commonly known 
as the Juncker Plan�83 The EIF announced the first coinvestment in August: an 
undisclosed stake in a new fund managed by Cathay Capital, a private equity 
investment firm that counts as “cornerstone investors” the China Development 
Bank, which is directed by China’s State Council, and Bpifrance, the French pub-
lic investment bank�84 Cathay invests in a wide range of health-care and technol-
ogy companies, including JD Logistics, which provides logistics and e-commerce 
services to its parent company, JD�com Inc�—China’s largest retailer�
There also are signs that the United States is beginning to recognize that 
China’s commercial maritime expansion carries strategic implications that war-
rant a serious response� In late April, the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS) raised national security concerns about COSCO’s 
planned acquisition of shipping line Orient Overseas International� In addition 
to making COSCO the world’s third-largest shipping company and increasing 
its influence within the Ocean Alliance—OOIL is also a member of the group—
the acquisition would result in COSCO taking control of a highly automated 
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container terminal that OOIL operates under a forty-year lease from Long Beach, 
California—the largest port in the United States, in combination with the nearby 
port of Los Angeles�85 I argued in 2018 that the transaction presents CFIUS with 
an opportunity to slow COSCO’s expansion by requiring COSCO to sell the 
Long Beach terminal to a company that neither is financed by Chinese sources 
nor is allied with any Chinese shipping or port SOEs, nor to any entity, such as 
CMA CGM, that is allied with COSCO through the opaque network of holding-
company structures and strategic alliances that China is using to build its com-
mercial maritime network�86 In July 2018 it was reported that COSCO had signed 
a national security agreement with the U�S� Departments of Homeland Security 
and Justice that calls for ownership of the terminal to be placed in a trust whose 
principal trustee must be a U�S� citizen and not a shareholder of OOIL, and must 
be independent of COSCO�87 The ultimate resolution of the situation could turn 
on how the United States determines whether a prospective buyer of the terminal 
is “independent” of COSCO�
Presuming that the terminal is sold to an entity independent from Chinese 
influence, COSCO’s agreement to sell the Long Beach terminal prevents—for 
now—the Chinese SOE that is leading the development of China’s commercial 
maritime network from establishing a beachhead on the U�S� mainland� But the 
situation illustrates that China’s commercial maritime expansion poses new secu-
rity challenges� In both developed and emerging nations, China has established 
a physical presence in strategically meaningful locations—ports—that provide 
a platform for establishing influence over host countries in the economic and 
political domains, as well as the capability to support Chinese far-seas operations 
in the security domain� Chinese companies, mainly SOEs, have moved inland 
from these coastal nodes, gaining control of ground-transportation networks, 
power-generation assets, and information-technology systems� In their capacity 
of serving commercial as well as military purposes, SOEs play a distinctive role 
in ensuring the security of China’s expanding economic and strategic interests, 
developing port and basing infrastructure, and providing logistics and mainte-
nance support to military forces deployed abroad; and, potentially, in carrying 
out peacetime naval missions, such as intelligence gathering and the replenish-
ment of PLAN warships� In terms of logistics support abroad, COSCO has been 
the PLAN’s leading supplier, providing Beijing with built-in shore-based support 
for the PLAN through a commercial enterprise structured to align with Chinese 
naval strategy, to an extent that leads some naval analysts to refer to COSCO as 
the fifth arm of the PLAN�88
China’s commercial maritime expansion already is posing practical risks to 
the naval operations of the United States and its allies� At a recent conference 
in Haifa, Israel, on the future of maritime warfare in the Mediterranean, former 
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USN Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead said that U�S� naval 
vessels might not be able to call regularly at ports under Chinese management 
because of the risk that commercial port information-technology (IT) systems 
could be used to monitor or interfere with military systems and jeopardize U�S� 
information and cybersecurity�89
Such concerns have substantial foundation: the Piraeus Port Authority, which 
COSCO controls, in early 2018 assigned Huawei Technologies SA to redesign and 
replace the port’s IT network and communications infrastructure�90 A new port 
at Haifa is expected to open in 2021 under the management of Shanghai Interna-
tional Port Group, which has a strategic alliance with COSCO and PPA�91 Under a 
2017 agreement, Huawei is providing SIPG with hardware and software services, 
including storage, network hardware and integration servers, and cloud operat-
ing systems, for a global IT platform designed by Accenture�92 Huawei, along with 
ZTE, was singled out as a U�S� national security threat in a congressional report in 
2012, and the 2018 Defense Authorization Act bars U�S� government agencies and 
contractors to the U�S� government from using certain Huawei components and 
systems, and provided funding to U�S� agencies that need to replace IT equipment 
as a result of the restrictions�93
Concerns that port-management technology poses a cybersecurity threat 
illustrate how the maritime commercial realm—where the world’s two largest 
economies and their naval forces increasingly are coming into close contact—is 
becoming a theater for protracted economic conflict� Both the United States 
and China are taking steps to organize their state regulatory, financial, and cy-
ber resources to pursue their respective interests� In one of the most significant 
changes to the Chinese regulatory structure in the past decade, China elevated 
the power of its antitrust and market-competition regulators in March 2018 
when it consolidated review and enforcement responsibilities that had been 
dispersed across three agencies and consigned them to a single new entity, the 
State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR)� Under the new structure, 
SAMR will be supervised directly by the State Council, placing the power to 
direct market structure and competition through antitrust matters at the same 
level as the MOFCOM and the NDRC� With its newly consolidated powers and 
a reported track record of intervening on China’s behalf to “tip the scales in an 
economic dogfight,” according to one major Western law firm, SAMR could 
prove a formidable asset for protecting China’s national economic development 
going forward�94
The elevation of antitrust enforcement power to the ministerial level reflects 
China’s view that counting on free markets to provide sufficient access to re-
quired resources is not a reliable strategy for ensuring the country’s economic 
or national security�95 To reduce exposure to market forces, Chinese leaders are 
Winter2019Review.indb   83 12/4/18   11:13 AM
89
Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 8 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
aligning military and commercial resources—along the lines that led to creation 
of the Dutch East India Company, when sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
European monarchies began to pursue overseas trade and territorial conquest as 
a more rapid path to building the economic strength required to ensure national 
security than relying on domestic economic growth alone�96
The latest expansionary move by China’s version of the VOC, COSCO, trig-
gered a national security response from U�S� competition regulators� Whether 
China’s commercial maritime expansion triggers other responses by U�S� civil or 
security agencies remains to be seen� But in the long term, most of China’s port 
and shipping acquisitions will continue to occur outside the United States, and 
thus will not be subject to CFIUS review� By creating a global port network for 
ostensibly commercial purposes, China has gained the ability to project power 
through the increased physical presence of its naval vessels—turning the oceans 
that historically have protected the United States from foreign threats into a ven-
ue in which China can challenge U�S� interests� Domestic economic challenges 
and resistance from disgruntled host countries could slow China’s port-buying 
spree and diminish the political influence that comes with economic power� But, 
for the moment, China’s maritime expansion is continuing despite headwinds� 
With China’s ships of state, both commercial and military, calling at Chinese-
controlled ports around the world, the United States no longer can assume that 
its maritime supremacy will remain unquestioned forever�
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 The pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941 constituted one of the largest fleet-versus-fleet operations in European wa-
ters during World War II� Between May 24 and 27, 1941, the British used five 
battleships, two battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, four heavy and seven light 
cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, eight submarines, and fifty aircraft to hunt the 
Bismarck combat group�1
The Bismarck combat group’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to attack Brit-
ish convoys in the northern Atlantic—Unternehmen RHEINÜBUNG (Operation 
RHINE EXERCISE)—was, for the Germans, an operation; in U�S� terms, a major 
operation� Although the main German forces 
consisted of only one battleship and one heavy 
cruiser, planning for the operation was conducted 
from the operational-strategic to the tactical level 
of command�
STRATEGIC SETTING
For most of the interwar years, the Germans con-
sidered France and Poland, and possibly Soviet 
Russia, to be their most likely opponents in a fu-
ture war; they did not consider war with Britain a 
serious possibility� In April 1933, the new chancel-
lor, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, stated that Britain’s 
Royal Navy never again would be considered a 
potential adversary of the German navy� In line 
with this, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), 
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commander in chief (CINC) of the Kriegsmarine (German navy) from 1928 to 
1943, built a fleet that was not intended to challenge Britain again unilaterally, but 
instead to complement Germany’s policies on the continent�2
By 1937, however, German naval strategy had shifted toward the offensive� 
Raeder envisaged energetic employment of German naval forces to exert strate-
gic pressure on the enemy’s superior forces; a more favorable balance of forces 
was to result� This became the basis for the Kriegsmarine’s operational thinking�3 
On February 3, 1937, in his meeting with Hitler and Field Marshal Werner von 
Blomberg (1878–1946), the then minister of war and CINC of the armed forces, 
Raeder explained the Kriegsmarine’s strategy in the case of a war� He stated that 
what he called Atlantikkriegführung (Atlantic warfare) and war in distant ocean 
areas would be part of the larger war effort� The objective would be to secure con-
trol of sea communications by hitting the enemy decisively, thereby contributing 
to the overall strategic objective�4
A major change in German foreign and military policy came on May 24, 1938, 
when Hitler reversed his earlier, more benign views on Great Britain�5 He issued 
instructions to consider the country a possible enemy, in addition to France and 
Soviet Russia�6 In June 1938, Raeder directed his staff to explore the implications 
of a war with Britain�7 This staff study on German naval warfare then served as 
the basis for combat instructions issued later in 1938�8 In the summer of 1938, 
the Seekriegsleitung (Naval Warfare Directorate) (SKL) produced a memo-
randum that concluded that, in a future war with Britain, owing to Germany’s 
unfavorable geographic position and the likelihood of British naval superiority, 
Germany should focus only on commerce warfare on the high seas� Such a war 
would be conducted with Panzerschiffe (armored ships popularly referred to 
as “pocket” battleships), cruisers, and U-boats� The Germans harbored some 
doubts that a successful outcome was even possible�9 High naval officials also 
studied the employment of battleships, with contradictory results: all participants 
agreed that battleships were necessary, but reached no consensus regarding their 
employment�10
Admiral Raeder believed that if a major war broke out, Germany should 
concentrate all its forces against Britain� The construction of U-boats and the 
production of aircraft must receive unconditional priority� In his concept, the 
Luftwaffe would mine the approaches to British ports and destroy transporta-
tion facilities, so the Kriegsmarine could conduct trade warfare using U-boats 
and surface ships, supported by naval aircraft� Raeder also believed that trade 
warfare could not be limited to belligerents but must include attacks on neutral 
shipping�11
The Germans were aware that, as things stood, in the case of a war at sea with 
Britain their position would be inferior� But Hitler wanted Germany to have 
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a much larger navy, one that could be used as a global instrument of power� 
So early in 1938, Hitler directed that a formidable force of battleships be built� 
Raeder therefore revised the existing naval construction program� The result was 
the so-called Plan Z, which envisaged a Kriegsmarine that was numerically and 
qualitatively much larger� Hitler formally approved Plan Z in January 1939� The 
projection was that by 1946 the Kriegsmarine would have in service six new-class 
fifty-thousand-ton battleships (with diesel engines and 406 mm guns), three new-
class ten-thousand-ton pocket battleships, four twenty-thousand-ton aircraft 
carriers, five ten-thousand-ton heavy cruisers, sixteen eight-thousand-ton light 
cruisers, twenty-two five-thousand-ton scouting cruisers, sixty-eight destroyers, 
and ninety torpedo boats� Initially, Plan Z envisaged construction of around 250 
U-boats (twenty-seven of two thousand tons, sixty-two 750-ton Type IXs, one 
hundred five-hundred-ton Type VIIs, and sixty 250-ton Type IIs)�12 In the sum-
mer of 1939, the number of U-boats planned was increased to three hundred�13
On August 4, 1939, the SKL directed that in the case of a war the Kriegsmarine 
was to cut off enemy sea communications by using all available forces� Enemy 
naval forces were to be attacked only if that would contribute to the war on enemy 
commerce�14 The day before Germany’s September 1 invasion of Poland, Hitler’s 
Directive Number 1 ordered that if Britain and France declared war the Kriegs-
marine was to concentrate on commerce destruction, especially against Britain�15 
The Luftwaffe was directed to prepare to conduct air attacks against shipping 
carrying imports to Britain�16
Yet when war began with Britain and France on September 3, 1939, the con-
struction for which Plan Z called barely had started, and the Kriegsmarine was 
unprepared to carry out a protracted war at sea, especially on the open ocean� 
Britain’s naval power was overwhelming compared with that of Germany� At that 
time the Kriegsmarine had in service six heavy surface combatants: two battle-
ships (which sometimes were referred to as battle cruisers), three pocket battle-
ships, and one heavy cruiser� These were the only units capable of conducting 
sustained operations on the open ocean� The remainder of the fleet consisted of 
six light cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, and twenty torpedo boats� Under con-
struction were four battleships, two aircraft carriers, four heavy cruisers, sixteen 
destroyers, and ten (destroyer-size) torpedo boats� Out of fifty-seven U-boats, 
only twenty-two were suitable for employment in the Atlantic�17 Raeder later 
wrote that the Kriegsmarine was, from the beginning of war, numerically inferior 
to the naval services of its enemies� The Kriegsmarine lacked aircraft carriers and 
sufficient escorts for its large surface combatants� It did not have an adequate 
number of long-range reconnaissance aircraft� Germany also lacked advanced 
naval bases overseas� In Raeder’s view, only unity in planning operations and 
decisiveness in their execution could neutralize the enemy’s advantages�18
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OPERATIONAL SITUATION
Initially, Germany conducted its war on Britain’s maritime commerce almost en-
tirely with U-boats� June 1940 brought great improvement to the U-boat situation 
owing to new bases obtained in Norway and France� Use of the French bases re-
duced the U-boats’ transit distance to their operating areas by some 450 nautical 
miles� At the same time, British antisubmarine (A/S) defenses were weak� But the 
Germans could not exploit these advantages, because the number of U-boats at 
sea was small� Between June 1, 1940, and March 1, 1941, seventy-two U-boats en-
tered into service, while only thirteen were lost� Yet between November 1940 and 
February 1941 only some twenty-four boats were operational, and only about ten 
were in the operating area at any time�19 At the end of February 1941 the number 
of frontline U-boats was only twenty-two; many of the remaining U-boats were 
undergoing training�20 However, despite their numerical weakness, the U-boats 
were highly successful in destroying enemy shipping� From June 1940 to March 
1941, U-boats sank 381 ships of over two million Bruttoregistertonnen (gross 
registered tons) (BRT)�21
In March 1940, the Germans started to employ auxiliary cruisers in distant 
ocean areas�22 By the end of March 1941, the seven auxiliary cruisers then in 
service had sunk or captured some eighty ships, of 494,291 BRT� Yet in contrast 
to the U-boats, the tonnage of enemy ships the auxiliary cruisers destroyed was 
of secondary importance; their principal purpose was to tie down enemy forces 
in distant areas, thereby relieving enemy pressure in home waters�23
Admiral Raeder’s views on employing heavy surface ships were influenced 
greatly by his personal experiences during World War I� The leaders of the former 
Imperial German Navy had been criticized heavily for their failure to employ the 
battle line actively during the war, and Raeder was determined that under no 
circumstance would an analogous situation develop in the employment of heavy 
surface ships during any new war� The German principal objective in employing 
heavy surface ships against enemy maritime traffic was to destroy enemy mer-
chant ships� This required that German heavy surface ships remain undamaged 
for as long as possible� Hence, they had to avoid encounters with equally strong 
or superior enemy forces�24
The Kriegsmarine was unable to begin using its heavy surface ships against 
British shipping during the spring and summer of 1940 because it was focusing 
all its attention on supporting the campaign in Norway and preparing to carry 
out Plan SEELÖWE (SEA LION), the invasion of England� In September 1940, 
the Germans attempted for the first time to employ one of their heavy surface 
ships, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, to attack British traffic in the Atlantic� 
However, that attempt failed when the ship developed engine problems�25 Engine 
Winter2019Review.indb   92 12/4/18   11:13 AM
98
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1
 V E G O  9 3
malfunctions also delayed the next attempt, a sortie by the pocket battleship 
Admiral Scheer� Finally, on October 29, 1940, Admiral Scheer left Gotenhafen 
(Gdynia today) in the Baltic Sea for the Atlantic� It operated in the Caribbean 
Sea and the Indian Ocean�26 When it returned to Kiel on April 1 after around 160 
days, it had cruised 46,000 nautical miles and sunk seventeen ships of 113,233 
BRT�27 Admiral Scheer also forced the enemy to assign large forces to protect his 
convoys� In the meantime, Admiral Hipper made a foray into the Atlantic from 
November 30 to December 27, 1940� It returned to Brest, France, because of re-
peated engine problems�28 In its second foray, Admiral Hipper left Brest on Febru-
ary 1 and returned to Kiel on March 28� During this cruise it sank seven ships of 
32,896 BRT and heavily damaged two other ships of 9,899 BRT�29
While Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper were at sea on January 22, 1941, the 
SKL sent battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau out into the Atlantic to attack 
enemy shipping (Operation BERLIN)� Their two-month cruise was highly suc-
cessful� Some twenty-two ships of 115,622 BRT were either sunk or captured�30 
This number included sixteen enemy ships, of eighty thousand BRT, that had 
been sailing independently� Both battleships returned to Brest on March 22�31
From July 1940 to March 1941, German heavy surface ships sank or captured 
forty-seven ships of over 250,000 BRT�32 During that same period, Luftwaffe 
bombers sank almost the same tonnage�33 Yet this put the performance of both 
categories far behind that of the auxiliary cruisers� However, by the spring of 
1941 Germany had battleships, heavy cruisers, and auxiliary cruisers operating 
in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans�34 Admiral Raeder believed that good 
opportunities existed in 1941 to destroy enemy shipping in the Atlantic by using 
surface ships in coordination with U-boats�35 And indeed, British shipping losses 
from enemy action rose steadily as 1941 unfolded: during February some 403,600 
tons of shipping were lost, 529,000 during March, and 687,000 during April� Most 
of these losses occurred in the Atlantic�36
To Admiral Raeder and the SKL, the results from employing heavy surface 
ships during the fall of 1940 and the winter and spring of 1941 confirmed that 
their concept was valid� They had high hopes for even greater future successes 
after the entry into service within a few months of Bismarck and Tirpitz, the 
strongest battleships in the world� At the same time, Raeder and the SKL had 
no illusions; a day would come when operations with heavy surface ships in the 
Atlantic would become prohibitively risky� For instance, they considered it only 
a matter of time before the United States entered the war�37 Hence, their intent 
was to intensify the employment of their heavy surface forces while it was still 
possible to do so�38
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Operating Area
The area in which the opposing forces operated encompassed rather a large part 
of the eastern North Atlantic� Prior to combat, the Bismarck group moved from 
Gotenhafen across the southeastern part of the Baltic, through the Danish straits, 
and along the Norwegian coast up to Trondheim� Almost all the combat actions 
took place in the area between latitudes 45 and 67 degrees N and between lon-
gitudes 10 and 40 degrees W� This area is bounded by Iceland and Greenland to 
the north, Ireland and Scotland to the east, and the Faeroe and Shetland Islands 
to the northeast�
The climate in the northeastern Atlantic, the British Isles, and Iceland is in-
fluenced greatly by the remnants of the Gulf Stream, the Icelandic Low in winter 
months, and the North Atlantic Subtropical High� These factors result in mild, 
rainy winters and relatively dry summers�39 The North Atlantic is well known for 
its bad weather; fair weather is rare�40 In general, clouds cover the area up to 70 
percent of the year, mostly with low-altitude formations�41
In the eastern Atlantic, winds generally blow from the west� While they de-
crease in the summer, winds higher than force 4 prevail at least 65 percent of the 
year�42
In the northeastern Atlantic, storms are fairly frequent, especially north of 
the British Isles� The most dangerous are large storms that stall over the central 
North Atlantic� They sweep the area with strong southwesterly winds, creat-
ing heavy seas for long periods� These extratropical cyclones (large-scale low- 
pressure weather systems that occur in midlatitudes) are most prevalent during 
the winter months� Off the west coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, winds 
are strongest from October through March, with December and January the 
roughest months�43
In the northern part of the North Atlantic, field ice appears in January and 
lasts until April�44 Harbor ice may occur from December to May; during the pe-
riod in question, it generally prevented the use of ports in Greenland, Labrador, 
Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia�45 Pack ice and icebergs are carried down the 
east coast of Greenland through the Denmark Strait� Between mid-August and 
November or December there is little ice in the Denmark Strait; navigation is 
more restricted during the rest of the year, especially from March to June, when 
ice covers most of the strait� However, ice seldom is found within the hundred-
fathom line, owing to a warm, northward-flowing current�46
The North Atlantic itself is too deep for laying mines; however, mines could 
be laid in the Denmark Strait, off the coasts of Iceland and Britain, and in the 
Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages�47 Iceland’s entire coast is fronted by an 
extensive 110-fathom shelf that extends forty to sixty miles offshore� In January 
1941, the British laid some two thousand mines between Iceland and the Faeroe 
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Islands, more mines in February, and 6,100 more in March� On April 26, mines 
were laid off the northwest tip of Iceland, with the minefield extending some fifty 
miles in a northwesterly direction�48 Reportedly, the Germans were aware of this 
minefield�49
The duration of the day in the operating area greatly affected the employment 
of guns, torpedoes, and aircraft� Among other things, long, bright nights in the 
summer made it difficult to conceal the movement of ships� For example, on 
May 24, 1941, sunrise at latitude 67 degrees N and longitude 27 degrees W was 
at 0710, sunset at 0419� Thus, the duration of daylight was twenty-one hours, 
nine minutes� On the same day, sunrise at latitude 48 degrees N and longitude 42 
degrees W occurred at 0258, sunset at 1830; the duration of the day was fifteen 
hours, thirty-two minutes� Conversely, long nights encompass a large part of the 
area from late fall to early spring� This heavily constrained the effectiveness of 
air reconnaissance� Long nights also limited the duration of aircraft contacts and 
the employment of torpedo aircraft and bombers from carriers and land bases� 
This greatly increased the likelihood of U-boats attacking successfully� At higher 
latitudes, long daylight during the summer months made it easy to observe and 
destroy supply ships� For the Germans, the most favorable time for breaking out 
into the northern Atlantic was from November through February; the most un-
favorable, from May through September�50
The area of operations for the German naval forces and the Luftwaffe stretched 
from the Polish and German coasts in the Baltic Sea to Denmark and Norway’s 
occupied southwestern and western coasts� The most important bases were at 
Gotenhafen and Danzig (Gdańsk today) and the Bergen area and Trondheim 
in Norway� The British Royal Navy used a relatively large number of naval/air 
bases in northern Scotland and the Orkneys� On Scotland’s eastern coast, the 
most important naval bases were at Cromarty, Invergordon, and Inverness� The 
Firth of Clyde (near Glasgow), Loch Ewe, Liverpool (in northwest England), and 
Pembroke (in southwest Wales) were the largest bases on Britain’s western coast�51
Scapa Flow was the main base for the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet� It is the best 
anchorage in the Orkneys, offering ships an almost landlocked shelter� Depths 
range up to 118 feet, while tidal currents within the harbor are almost negligi-
ble�52 The distance from Scapa Flow to Trondheim is 795 miles�
The British ships and aircraft based in northern Scotland operated from a cen-
tral position in relation to any hostile force trying to break out through the Den-
mark Strait and the Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages� Hence, they benefited 
from divergent and relatively short lines of operation� The distance between the 
Pentland Firth (a strait separating the Orkneys from Caithness, in northern Scot-
land) and Reykjavík is about 790 miles� Similarly, the British forces that patrolled 
the Denmark Strait or were based in Iceland were located in a central position 
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and hence also had short and diverging lines of operation� In contrast, the Ger-
man surface ships approaching the British blocking positions had to traverse long 
and converging lines of operation�
Operational Command and Control
One of the most critical elements in the planning and successful execution of any 
military action is command and control (C2)� Sound command organization or 
structure is one of the prerequisites for successful C2� Optimally, command orga-
nization should be centralized but at the same time allow for sufficient freedom 
of action by subordinate commanders� This combination can be accomplished 
by having intermediate levels of command and by applying faithfully, at all lev-
els of command, the German-style mission command� Command organization 
should delineate clearly the authority and responsibilities among commanders 
at all levels�
Germany’s Kriegsmarine was a highly centralized organization� Raeder argued 
(correctly) that high headquarters has all the information, the necessary com-
munications facilities, knowledge of enemy radio traffic, and full control of the 
supply organization�53
Raeder was CINC of the navy, head of the Oberkommando der Marine (Na-
val High Command), and chief of the SKL� The SKL was responsible for plan-
ning and conducting naval warfare beyond home waters� It consisted of several 
departments, with the 1st, or Operations, Department (1�/SKL) being the most 
important�54
The Flottenkommandant (fleet commander) was a four-star admiral� As in the 
Imperial German Navy, the fleet commander was the highest operational com-
mander for surface forces� He was embarked aboard a flagship�55 Subordinate to 
the fleet commander were various type-force commanders� The fleet command-
er’s position was weakened greatly when Marinegruppekommandos (naval group 
commands) were established, the first being Naval Group Command East, estab-
lished in Kiel, Germany, in November 1938� It was disbanded in August 1940 and 
merged into Naval Group Command North on August 8, with headquarters in 
Wilhelmshaven-Sengwarden�56 Naval Group Command North was responsible 
for all Kriegsmarine activity in the Baltic Sea, the German Bight, Denmark, and 
Norway�57 Naval Group Command West was established at Wilhelmshaven- 
Sengwarden in August 1939� Initially it was responsible for operations in the Ger-
man Bight, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean� Its headquarters was moved to Paris 
in August 1940� The responsibilities of Naval Group Command West for opera-
tions in the German Bight and the North Sea were transferred to Naval Group 
Command North� Naval Group Command West retained operational control in 
the Atlantic and became responsible for operations in the English Channel, Bay 
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of Biscay, and Southwest Approaches (to the British Isles)�58 The establishment 
of naval group commands transferred ashore the operational control of seagoing 
forces, in essence reducing the fleet commander to a tactical commander in com-
bat�59 During the Bismarck operation, the commander of Naval Group Command 
North was Admiral Rolf Carls (1885–1945), while Naval Group Command West 
was commanded by Admiral Alfred Saalwächter (1883–1945)�60
The German U-boat arm was established officially on September 27, 1935� 
After January 1936, U-boats were led by the Führer der Unterseeboote (leader of 
U-boats), with a rank of navy captain; on October 17, 1939, the position was el-
evated to Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (commander of U-boats) (B�d�U�), with 
a rank of rear admiral�61 At the time of the Bismarck foray, the B�d�U� was Admiral 
Karl Dönitz (1891–1980)� He was directly subordinate to the SKL�
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord of the 
Admiralty Albert V� Alexander (1885–1965)� (His position was the equivalent of 
today’s Secretary of the Navy in the United States�) The Admiralty itself consisted 
of five sea lords plus four other high officials� The First Sea Lord and Chief of 
Naval Staff was Admiral Dudley Pound (1877–1943)� He was the highest naval 
official responsible for naval operations� In contrast to the Air Ministry, the Ad-
miralty’s responsibilities included operational planning and execution� The most 
important Admiralty divisions were Plans, Operations, Trade, and Intelligence� 
The work of the Plans and Operations Divisions was coordinated closely with the 
Intelligence Division�62
The Naval Staff was created in 1917� The Plans Division was responsible for 
making strategic and operational decisions� The Operations Division controlled 
deployed naval forces in home waters and overseas� It was also responsible for 
worldwide naval dispositions and day-to-day, even hour-to-hour, movements� 
Naval area commands and overseas commands enjoyed almost total indepen-
dence� Yet the Admiralty remained a focal point for the direction of fleet opera-
tions� The principal maritime theater for the British was the northern Atlantic�63
The Home Fleet, created in 1902, represented the largest operational level of 
command in the Royal Navy� Its operating area was the waters around the Brit-
ish Isles� The Home Fleet was organized into a number of type-force commands, 
with a flag officer leading each one� In September 1939, the main components of 
the Home Fleet were the 2nd Battle Squadron; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron 
(BCS 1); the 18th Cruiser Squadron (CS 18); Rear Admiral, Submarines (2nd 
Submarine Flotilla, 6th Submarine Flotilla); Vice Admiral, Carriers; 6th and 
8th Destroyer Flotillas; and the Orkneys/Shetlands force� Another element that 
played a significant role in the operation in question was Force H, established 
in June 1940� It was based at Gibraltar and operated mainly in the western 
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Mediterranean� It consisted of one carrier (Ark Royal), one battle cruiser (Re-
nown), one light cruiser, and six destroyers�64
Another major element was Western Approaches Command, which was led 
by a CINC, a four-star admiral� It was established in Liverpool, England, on 
September 9, 1939� The Combined Operations Headquarters was moved from 
Plymouth, England, to Liverpool on February 17, 1941� The main responsibility 
of Western Approaches Command was the defense and protection of the trans-
atlantic convoys and coastal shipping in the Western Approaches�
The Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command was established in 1936� It 
became the RAF’s only maritime arm after the Fleet Air Arm was transferred to 
the Royal Navy in 1937� The main responsibility of the Coastal Command was to 
defend the British (and later Allied) convoys from U-boat and Luftwaffe attacks� 
In 1941, the principal subordinate commands of the Coastal Command deployed 
on the British Isles were Number 15 Group, with headquarters in Liverpool; 
Number 16 Group, at Chatham, in Kent, southeast England; and Number 18 
Group, at Pitreavie Castle, near Rosyth, Scotland�65
The Opposing Commanders
The two highest commanders of the opposing seagoing forces in the operation 
were the German fleet commander, Admiral Günther Lütjens (1889–1941), and 
the British CINC of the Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey (1885–1971)�
Lütjens was considered to be one of the ablest German admirals: highly intel-
ligent, deliberate, and levelheaded in his assessment of situations and people�66 He 
was dedicated, single-minded, stoical, and austere� There was no doubt that he 
was a man of great personal courage and integrity�67 He was not a Nazi believer�68
Lütjens entered the Imperial Navy in April 1907 and graduated from its naval 
academy� During World War I, he spent most of his time in torpedo boats, took 
part in a series of raids against Dunkirk, and by 1917–18 was a torpedo flotilla 
leader� During the 1920s, Lütjens commanded a battleship and a torpedo boat 
flotilla�69 He was promoted to captain in July 1933 and served in the Naval Per-
sonnel Office� Through the rest of the 1930s, Lütjens commanded a light training 
cruiser, served as chief of the Naval Personnel Office, and was Commander of 
Torpedo Boats (which included destroyers)�70 He was promoted to rear admiral 
in October 1937 and vice admiral in January 1940� He was Commander, Scout-
ing Forces and deputy to the fleet commander, Admiral Wilhelm Marschall 
(1886–1976)� In March 1940, Lütjens commanded the battleships Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau during the invasion of Norway in April–June 1940.71 He also was 
briefly acting fleet commander during the campaign in Norway, when Marschall 
fell sick�72 In July 1940, Lütjens became fleet commander� On September 1, 1940, 
he was promoted to four-star admiral�73 Lütjens led a highly successful foray with 
two battleships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) in January–March 1941 (Operation 
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BERLIN)� Admiral Raeder had high confidence and trust in Lütjens, greatly valu-
ing his broad and diverse professional experience�74
Admiral John Tovey entered the Royal Navy at the age of fifteen� He was com-
manding officer of the destroyer Onslow in the battle of Jutland in 1916, during 
which Onslow “single-handedly” attacked the German cruiser Wiesbaden; Tovey 
successfully brought his badly damaged ship back to port�75 He spent most of 
his subsequent career in destroyers� Tovey served as Rear Admiral, Destroyers, 
Mediterranean Fleet in 1938, and then as Vice Admiral, Light Forces in 1940� He 
was considered a natural leader�76 He was aggressive and acted with a great deal 
of initiative� Admiral Andrew Cunningham (1883–1963), CINC of the Mediter-
ranean Fleet—known as a strict disciplinarian—had a high opinion of Tovey’s 
professional abilities; however, Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, had 
a more ambiguous, if not a negative, view� Pound considered Tovey “difficult at 
times and not overburdened with brains�”77 Tovey did what he thought was right; 
he refused to kowtow to superiors; and he hated yes-men�78 Tovey had an awk-
ward initial interview with Prime Minister Winston S� Churchill (1874–1965) 
that almost cost him the job, but in the end he became CINC of the Home Fleet 
largely because of the support of First Lord Alexander and Admiral Pound�79 
Later Churchill found Tovey stubborn and wanted to get rid of him�80
Tovey took command of the Home Fleet on December 20, 1940� His appoint-
ment broke with tradition because he was a junior vice admiral; normally, the 
CINC of the Home Fleet was a senior four-star admiral or admiral of the fleet�81 
Tovey immediately began intensive training in night fighting, both in conducting 
air attacks and in defending against enemy air attacks�82
Vice Admiral Sir James F� Somerville (1882–1949) was in command of Force 
H� His naval career as a commissioned officer began with service in the armored 
cruiser Sutlej� He became a specialist in wireless telegraphy� During World War 
I, Somerville served in the battleship Marlborough, battleship Queen Elizabeth, 
battle cruiser Inflexible, and cruiser Chatham. He was promoted to captain in 
1921� Throughout the 1920s, he served as Deputy Director of Signals at the Ad-
miralty, next commanded the 4th Battle Squadron and the battleship Benbow, 
and then returned as Director of Signals� In 1931, Somerville commanded the 
cruiser Norfolk in the Home Fleet� Somerville was promoted to commodore in 
1932 and a year later to rear admiral� He served as Flag Officer, Destroyers in 
1936� After being promoted to vice admiral in September 1937, he became CINC, 
East Indies in July 1938� Because of illness Somerville retired in early 1939, but 
was recalled to active duty late in the year� He was deputy to Admiral Bertram 
Ramsay (1883–1945) during the Dunkirk evacuation� Somerville was appointed 
commander of the newly established Force H on June 22, 1940�
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Operational Intelligence
In 1941, British signal intelligence (SIGINT) was not yet fully developed, and 
the penetration of German codes was still in its infancy; in 1940, priority had 
been given to cracking the Luftwaffe’s codes because they were readily accessible� 
Also, the Battle of Britain, not war in the North Atlantic, was the most immediate 
threat� The Kriegsmarine was very careful in coding its radio messages, and used 
a very sophisticated, almost impenetrable version of the Enigma machine� The 
British did not achieve even isolated breakthroughs in Kriegsmarine radio traffic 
until 1940, and the most important breakthrough was achieved in June 1941— 
after the sinking of Bismarck� Until then, British SIGINT contributed only direc-
tion finding (DF) of German naval radio transmissions and some traffic analysis�83
This SIGINT was supplemented with air reconnaissance of German naval 
bases and shipyards� The Royal Navy did not have land-based reconnaissance 
aircraft to reconnoiter German naval bases in the Baltic such as Gotenhafen, so 
it depended on the RAF to perform that function� However, the RAF generally 
was reluctant to divert any resources from its strategic bombing efforts; it did not 
want to risk its aircraft on naval targets� Therefore photoreconnaissance contrib-
uted little to the operational intelligence available�84
The British Special Intelligence Service (SIS) had an extensive network 
of agents, mostly resistance fighters and Western sympathizers in German- 
occupied countries� SIS agent reports provided critically valuable information on 
enemy naval movements�85 The British apparently had many agents in Norway 
who reported on German military activities� They used shortwave transmitters 
to communicate with their contacts in London�86
The Germans’ principal sources of information on British forces and their 
movements were the Kriegsmarine’s naval intelligence radio-intercept service, 
known as B-Dienst, and the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance aircraft� B-Dienst teams 
also were deployed aboard major surface combatants, including those of the 
Bismarck group� By September 3, 1939, B-Dienst had broken the major British 
merchant and naval operational codes, and thus was able to track British naval 
movements� However, changes to the British codes in August 1940 reduced B-
Dienst’s effectiveness in this area� Still, by October 1940 B-Dienst could read 
some 30 percent of British signals, and by January 1941 it again had mastered the 
British code system�87
Photo and visual air reconnaissance was the responsibility of the Luftwaffe; 
however, it generally was not very receptive to Kriegsmarine requirements� Its 
aircraft lacked the endurance to conduct long-range missions—few Luftwaffe 
aircraft could fly over British bases� Luftwaffe personnel also lacked the training 
necessary to conduct visual recognition of naval targets�88
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THE GERMAN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The SKL and Naval Group Commands North and West prepared a number 
of studies on the employment of heavy forces in the conduct of Atlantikkrieg-
führung� These studies served as the basis on which the SKL and naval group 
commands drafted operative Weisungen (operational instructions); a fleet com-
mander issued Operationbefehle (operations orders)�
On April 2, 1941, Admiral Raeder issued operational instructions to the fleet 
commander, the commanders of Naval Group Commands North and West, and 
the Commander of U-boats on the conduct of war in the Atlantic� He pointed 
out how tactical successes in the North Atlantic could have strategic effects on 
the war in the Mediterranean and the southern Atlantic� The most decisive effect 
on the war in the Atlantic would come from cutting off traffic between North 
America and Britain across the North Atlantic�
Raeder recognized that the numerically inferior German forces could not 
achieve sea dominance over the North Atlantic readily; however, he hoped the 
Germans could obtain local and limited control, and thereby gain sea dominance 
gradually� Raeder believed the enemy would be forced to strengthen significantly 
the defenses of his convoys, at the price of weakening his position in home wa-
ters and the Mediterranean or reducing the frequency of convoys�89 Employing 
Germany’s heavy ships over a wide ocean area would force the enemy to fragment 
his naval strength� This, in turn, would allow the Germans to mass forces against 
enemy weak points�90
However, Raeder’s concept was deeply flawed� Even if the Germans were able 
gradually to obtain sea control in the North Atlantic, they could not maintain it 
for very long�
German Plans
In his operational instruction issued on April 2, Raeder envisaged the employ-
ment of four battleships against enemy shipping in the Atlantic: Bismarck and 
Tirpitz from Gotenhafen and Gneisenau and Scharnhorst from Brest�91 They 
would join up in the North Atlantic and operate against convoys� The assump-
tion was that the British would be forced to suspend convoys, and even might be 
forced to withdraw their battleships from the Mediterranean�92 These hopes were 
crushed when Gneisenau was torpedoed on April 6 and Scharnhorst experienced 
such serious machinery problems that it would not be available until the end 
of June� The British air raids on Kiel led to further delays in repairs to Admiral 
Scheer and Admiral Hipper; Admiral Scheer would not be available until the 
end of July, Admiral Hipper until August� The first German aircraft carrier, the 
33,550-ton Graf Zeppelin, was eight months away from completion�93 Tirpitz was 
undergoing sea trials and would not be operational by May 1941�
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Raeder made a difficult decision: to employ Bismarck and the heavy cruiser 
Prinz Eugen alone� As a result, instead of being a part of a much larger effort, 
Bismarck’s foray became an isolated operation� This, in turn, greatly increased the 
risk, because the enemy would be able to concentrate all available forces against 
the Bismarck group�94
The SKL issued the final operational instruction for RHEINÜBUNG on April 14, 
1941� At his meeting with Hitler on April 20, Admiral Raeder pointed out that 
the first, similar operation in the North Atlantic, conducted by the battleships 
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in January–March 1941, had been a significant tacti-
cal success� Moreover, it had considerable strategic effect in the Mediterranean 
and South Atlantic�95 He also claimed that commerce warfare was proceeding 
successfully�96 Raeder informed Hitler that the next battleship operation, by 
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, would be conducted in late April� The Pan-American 
Security Zone would be respected�97 Hitler, while not rejecting the plan, had great 
misgivings about it; yet he left it to Raeder to make the final decision�98 Raeder 
emphasized to Hitler that dangerous conditions existed at Kiel and Wilhelmsha-
ven, and at Brest as well, where German ships went for repairs after their forays 
into the Atlantic� Hence, Brest shipyard would be used only in exceptional cases; 
it was important to acquire use of the Spanish port of El Ferrol� Hitler promised 
to secure that port for German ships in the fall of 1941� He also asked Raeder to 
explore whether Organisation Todt could be used to build a large dry dock at 
Trondheim quickly�99
Admiral Lütjens issued his operations order on April 22, 1941� Four days 
later, Lütjens had a meeting with Raeder to discuss the timing of the operation� 
Lütjens argued that the operation should be delayed until the damages Prinz 
Eugen had suffered when it ran into a mine were repaired�100 He also suggested 
that Bismarck might sail out alone, to be followed by Prinz Eugen, or that both 
ships delay sortieing until the next new moon�101 Lütjens further believed that 
the operation’s chances of success would be much greater if the combat group’s 
sortie was delayed until either Scharnhorst was repaired or Tirpitz became fully 
operational; the latter had been commissioned in February but, as mentioned, 
was still undergoing sea trials� He presciently told Raeder that any employment 
of Bismarck alone would trigger a massive response from the enemy, reducing the 
chances of success� Lütjens and Raeder also discussed the use of Brest after the 
completion of the operation, with Raeder stating that any stay at the French port 
should be short, only to embark munitions and supplies� If Bismarck were heavily 
damaged, it should steer to Saint-Nazaire instead; for a longer pause or overhaul, 
Bismarck should head directly for home port� Lütjens stressed the importance of 
air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait to locate the ice boundary and any en-
emy patrols� He also requested that Raeder assign a larger number of aircraft and 
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U-boats, plus fishing steamers, to support the operation� Raeder concurred, and 
gave corresponding orders to his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Otto Schniewind 
(1887–1964)�102 Raeder later praised Lütjens for being so open with him, even 
though the fleet commander did not accept Raeder’s reasoning entirely�103 Lütjens 
had a premonition that Bismarck’s foray would end badly� After meeting with 
Raeder, he stopped briefly in the office of the future rear admiral Hans Voss and 
reportedly said, “I’d like to make my farewells� I’ll never come back�” He added, 
“Given the superiority of the British, survival is improbable�”104
Raeder’s operational instruction of April 14 stated that the aufgabe (task) of 
the fleet commander was to attack the enemy supply traffic in the Atlantic north 
of the equator�105 The situation would determine the duration of the operation�106 
The primary aim was to destroy the largest volume of enemy shipping, particu-
larly that destined for British ports�107
The operations order that Lütjens issued on April 22 stipulated that the group’s 
tasks were to sail through the Belts (the Danish straits) and the Arctic Ocean into 
the Atlantic, then attack shipping traffic in the northern Atlantic� Afterward, the 
group was to sail to a French port to replenish ammunition and supplies� If longer 
repairs or an overhaul were needed, the ships were to return to home port in Ger-
many�108 Originally, the operation was planned to start on April 28, to coincide 
with the new moon; however, it was delayed until May 18 because of the mine 
damages to Prinz Eugen and to conduct crane repairs on Bismarck.109
The forces initially assigned to support the operation consisted of several Luft-
waffe squadrons and several U-boats, plus a number of logistical support ships� 
The commander of the 5th Air Fleet, General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1889–1968), 
was informed about RHEINÜBUNG, and that all available aircraft in Denmark 
and Norway were to provide continuous fighter cover and a close A/S defense 
screen, as well as reconnaissance of the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean to the 
limits of the various aircrafts’ effective ranges� They also were to reconnoiter the 
British naval base at Scapa Flow� Air Leader Stavanger assigned the responsibil-
ity for reconnaissance to 1st Squadron, 120th Aufklärungsgruppe (Reconnais-
sance Group) (designated 1� / F 120), reinforced by one squadron of the 121st 
Reconnaissance Group (F 121), which flew Junkers (Ju) 88s� Also deployed in 
support of the Bismarck group were naval flying boat squadrons and Heinkel 
(He) 115 squadrons; these were based in Norway, concentrated in the Skagerrak– 
Trondheim area� Two reconnaissance squadrons of Ju-88s and 1� / F 120 moni-
tored Scapa Flow continuously� They also provided continuous coverage of the 
North Sea and the Arctic� Parts of the 30th Kampfgeschwader (Battle Wing) (KG 
30), flying Ju-88s, and the 26th Battle Wing (KG 26), flying He-111s and based in 
Denmark and Kristiansand and Gardermoen, Norway, were put in combat readi-
ness� Fighter protection was provided by Fighter Leader Norway�110
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GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE (PLANNED), APRIL 22, 1941
 (F = flagship)
MAIN FORCES
Fleet commander: Admiral Günther Lütjens
1 battleship: Bismarck (F)
1 heavy cruiser: Prinz Eugen
SUPPORTING FORCES
6 U-boats (2 operating on north–south route, 4 operating on HX route [Hali-
fax, Nova Scotia–U.K. ports])
2 reconnaissance ships (Gonzenheim, Kota Penang)
2 supply ships (Ermland, Spichern)
4 requisitioned tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, Esso-Hamburg, Friedrich Breme)
4 weather-observation fishing steamers (Freese, München, August Wriest, 
Lauenberg)
2 mine breakers (Sperrbrecher 13, Sperrbrecher 31)
5th Minesweeper Flotilla (M-4, M-23, M-31, M-201, M-202, M-205, M-251, 
M-252, M-253)
6th Destroyer Flotilla (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16])
5TH AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER STAVANGER
2 reconnaissance squadrons (1. / F 120 [Ju-88s] Stavanger, 1. / F 121 [Ju-88As])
2 battle wings (KG 30 [Ju-88As] Eindhoven, KG 26 [He-111Hs] Stavanger-Sola)
3RD AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER ATLANTIC
5 battle wings (II. / KG 1 [Ju-88As] Rosières-en-Santerre, I. / KG 28 [He-111s] 
Nantes, KG 40 [FW-200s/Ju-88As] Bordeaux-Mérignac, II. / KG 54 
[Ju-88As] Bretigny, I. / KG 77 [Ju-88As] Juvincourt)
1 combat group (KG 100 [He-111Hs], Vannes-Meucon)
2 coastal air groups (KG 406 [He-115s] Hourtin/Brest, KG 506 [Ju-88As]  
Westerland)
Sources: Operationsbefehl des Flottenchefs für die Atlantikoperation mit “Bismarck” 
und “Prinz Eugen” (Deckbezeihnung: “Rheinübung”), April 22, 1941, pp. 40–41; Jürgen 
Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945, 2nd ed. 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 63–64.
But air support of the Bismarck group during its movement from Bergen to the 
Denmark Strait turned out to be very inadequate� The Luftwaffe lacked sufficient 
numbers of reconnaissance aircraft to provide comprehensive coverage in an area 
as distant as the Denmark Strait or the Iceland–Faeroes passage� In contrast, the 
Luftwaffe provided gap-free reconnaissance of the central and northern parts 
of the North Sea� It also envisaged full air cover for the Bismarck group during 
its operational deployment from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord (an inlet in the 
Korsfjord, near Bergen)�111 The North Atlantic west of longitude 30 degrees W 
was free of German aircraft, except for sporadic reconnaissance aircraft; however, 
Luftwaffe aircraft covered the entire sea area east of longitude 30 degrees W�112 
Generally, on a daily basis one or more Focke-Wulf (FW) 200s from Bordeaux or 
Stavanger conducted reconnaissance of the sea area northwest of Ireland out to 
approximately longitude 20 degrees W�113 Coastal reconnaissance was conducted 
from bases at Brest and Hourtin, France (some thirty-two miles northwest of 
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Bordeaux), out to longitude 11 degrees W, or variously out to two hundred nauti-
cal miles, with He-111s; extension out to longitude 20 degrees W using He-111s 
and Blohm & Voss 138s was in preparation� Additionally, two reconnaissance 
ships (Gonzenheim and Kota Penang), plus some U-boats, were deployed some 
three hundred nautical miles south of Cape Farewell, Greenland, the southern 
entrance to the Denmark Strait�114
Initially, four U-boats were assigned to cooperate with the Bismarck group�115 
One was assigned to conduct weather observation in the area between latitudes 
55 and 60 degrees N and between longitudes 20 and 25 degrees W�116 Admiral 
Lütjens’s April 22 operations order stated that activity in the operating area 
would include some U-boats operating on the north–south convoy route and 
four others on the HX convoy route (which ran from Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
Canada, to U�K� ports) after the end of May, plus two reconnaissance ships and 
five tankers�117
Available to Naval Group Command West were one supply ship; three requisi-
tioned tankers carrying fuel, munitions, and food; and three tankers in reserve�118 
Assigned for logistical support of RHEINÜBUNG were two supply ships (Ermland 
and Spichern) and four (originally five) tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, Esso-
Hamburg, and Friedrich Breme).119 The support ships were deployed in waiting 
positions in the North Atlantic: one supply ship (Ermland) between the Azores 
and the Lesser Antilles, and the other (Spichern) four hundred nautical miles west 
of Faial, Azores; and the tankers Belchen and Lothringen some 120 and 200 nauti-
cal miles, respectively, south of Cape Farewell� One tanker (Esso-Hamburg) was 
deployed some 450 nautical miles (nm) northwest, and another (Breme) about 
seven hundred nautical miles southwest of Faial�120
Naval Group Command North would exercise control over the Bismarck 
group until it crossed a line running from the southern tip of Greenland to the 
northern tip of the Hebrides, when control would pass to Naval Group Com-
mand West�121 Thereafter Naval Group Command West would control the entire 
operation, with tactical control residing in the hands of Admiral Lütjens aboard 
Bismarck�122
Admiral Lütjens was responsible for the movement of reconnaissance ships, 
supply ships, and tankers during their presence in the operating area� If breakout 
into the Atlantic was detected too early, the operation was to be shortened or 
aborted, depending on the situation� In such a case, either Naval Group Com-
mand West or the fleet commander would issue the order� If a sudden change in 
the situation required withdrawal to the Arctic, Naval Group Command North 
would make preparations for the arrival of the Bismarck group�123
Several U-boats (two at a minimum) would be deployed off Freetown, Sierra 
Leone� Beginning in mid-June, up to four U-boats would be employed along 
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the eastern part of the HX route between longitudes 30 and 45 degrees W� Both 
groups would be subordinate to B�d�U�, but if an opportunity arose for direct 
cooperation, the fleet commander had authority to give orders directly to the 
U-boats�124
RHEINÜBUNG was to consist of five distinct phases: (1) movement from Go-
tenhafen to Grimstadfjord; (2) movement from Grimstadfjord to the Denmark 
Strait; (3) breakout into the North Atlantic; (4) attack on enemy shipping; and 
(5) return to home base� The SKL instruction issued on April 14 directed the 
Bismarck group to sortie from Gotenhafen in the afternoon of April 28� It would 
advance through the Belts/Skagerrak, then to the Arctic�125 During the transit of 
the Belts, defense against mines would be provided by Sperrbrecher (mine break-
ers) and the 5th Minesweeper Flotilla�126 During the group’s transit through the 
Skagerrak, several destroyers would provide A/S protection�127
Lütjens’s operations order provided a very precise timeline for transiting the 
Skagerrak and the Kattegat� This was necessary to coordinate properly the mine 
countermeasures, A/S support, and Luftwaffe air cover� During the transit of 
Arkona and the Skagen barrier, in addition to mine breakers / minesweepers, 
four destroyers (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], and Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16]) 
would provide the A/S screen for the Bismarck group�128 By 1900 on April 30, the 
Bismarck group was to reach Kristiansand; at 0230 on May 1 it would reach the 
latitude of Stavanger; at 0630 the same day, that of Korsfjord/Bergen; and on May 
2, that of Trondheim�129
In operational terms, the planned movement of the Bismarck group from 
Grimstadfjord to the Denmark Strait was an operational maneuver, followed by 
a tactical penetration into the North Atlantic� The breakout was considered the 
most difficult part of the entire operation� The aim was to enter the Atlantic un-
observed by enemy patrols, but if the Bismarck group were sighted the mission 
still was to be carried out to some extent, in accordance with the operational 
instructions�130
The German leadership incorrectly assumed that enemy patrol forces in the 
Denmark Strait would consist of auxiliary cruisers�131 However, it assumed cor-
rectly that enemy aircraft also would patrol the Denmark Strait� The Germans 
knew that a bright night would make unobserved breakout more difficult, 
whereas low visibility would facilitate breakout� They also assumed that the Luft-
waffe’s reconnaissance of the northern part of the North Sea would be sufficient 
to provide an overview of the enemy situation�132
The ice boundary also influenced planning� Naval Group Command North 
suggested to Lütjens that he execute the breakout between Iceland and the 
Faeroes because those waters were ice-free� In contrast, the Denmark Strait is 
narrow to begin with, and the width of the passage available varies with the 
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position of the ice boundary, which had the potential to make it easier for enemy 
ships to obtain and maintain contact with the Bismarck group� The enemy also 
could draw on more-southward-deployed units� Another advantage of transiting 
the gap was the shorter transit time, which saved fuel, whereas use of the strait 
would require refueling� Unfortunately, Lütjens was bound to follow SKL instruc-
tions, which stipulated an undetected breakout through the Denmark Strait into 
the Atlantic� Refueling would be provided by one tanker (Weissenberg), which 
would wait at latitude 70 degrees N, longitude 01 degree W�133
After the successful breakout, searching for and destroying the largest volume 
of enemy shipping would be the Bismarck group’s primary mission� In his opera-
tional instructions, Raeder directed that combat with an equally strong enemy 
should be avoided�134 The only exception was if such an engagement would con-
tribute to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective and the risk was low�135
The Gneisenau/Scharnhorst foray in January–March 1941 had shown that, 
even when B-Dienst provided the departure date and route of an enemy convoy, 
detecting those convoys in the broad spaces of the ocean depended on luck; 
if it happened, it might be only by accident� In his operations order, Lütjens 
explained that enemy convoys normally were escorted by one battleship, often 
with two cruisers and two destroyers in addition� Bismarck would tie up the 
battleship, while Prinz Eugen would deal with any other ships in the convoy’s 
screen�136
Sailing to a French port would be considered only if no significant repairs were 
required; if lengthier repairs were needed, each ship would return to its home 
port�137 If needed, the general alternate port of return would be Trondheim�138
German Execution
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen possessed an unmatched power compared with their 
respective enemy counterparts� However, the Home Fleet and Force H had an 
enormous numerical superiority, plus effective support from RAF Coastal Com-
mand� (For details, see sidebars and map 1�)
The majority of supply ships and tankers sortied about a week prior to the 
Bismarck group� The first to do so was the tanker Belchen from La Pallice on May 
10; two reconnaissance ships sortied from La Pallice on May 17�139 Four tankers 
and two supply ships would operate in the area between latitudes 45 and 46 de-
grees N and longitudes 32 and 35 degrees W� In the same area were deployed four 
weather-observation fishing steamers�140 Two tankers sailed into the Arctic�141 If 
bad weather delayed the Bismarck group breakout, one tanker was in a waiting 
position in the Norwegian Sea, while another tanker was at Trondheim�142
Prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens stopped at Kiel to see his predeces-
sor, Admiral Marschall� Marschall had been removed from his post because of 
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Map 1: BISMARCK COMBAT GROUP’S FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC,  MAY 18–27, 1941



























BISMARCK COMBAT GROUP’S FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC, MAY 18–27, 1941
(OPERATION RHEINÜBUNG [RHINE EXERCISE])
differences with Raeder and Naval Group Command West commander Admiral 
Saalwächter. During the meeting, Marschall advised Lütjens not to follow in-
structions received from the SKL too literally. Marschall believed the fleet com-
mander must have a certain freedom of action in case the situation changed.143 
Lütjens responded in a tragically resigned tone: “No! Two fleet commanders 
have already been relieved of their commands due to the displeasure of the Naval 
[High] Command. I do not wish to be the third. I know what the Naval Com-
mand desires and will carry out their orders.”144
About one week prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens also visited his 
friend and former “crew member” (classmate) Rear Admiral Conrad Patzig 
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(1888–1975), the chief of the Personnel Office� Patzig asked why Lütjens had to 
go on board as the fleet commander, because the operation was minor in scale, 
yet the risk of losing his life was acute� Lütjens agreed with Patzig, but believed 
there was no alternative�145 He did not want to question Raeder’s decision� As 
mentioned, Lütjens apparently had a premonition of what would happen to him� 
He told Patzig: “I shall have to sacrifice myself sooner or later� I have renounced 
my private life and I am determined to execute the task which has been entrusted 
to me in an honorable manner�”146
On May 12, Hitler met with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the Oberkom-
mando der Wehrmacht (chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht), 
and several high-ranking members of his staff visited Bismarck at Gotenhafen� 
Raeder was not present� Hitler inspected the ship and attended gunnery exercis-
es� He had a long talk with Lütjens. He asked the admiral about the Scharnhorst/
Gneisenau experience. Lütjens mentioned to Hitler the threat that enemy carrier-
borne torpedo aircraft posed to Bismarck.147
Phase I: Gotenhafen–Grimstadfjord (0000 May 18–0900 May 21). In operational 
terms, the movement of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord 
represented the operational deployment�148 At about 0600 on May 18, Admiral 
Lütjens received from naval intelligence the latest status of the enemy heavy 
ships� The Germans estimated that in home waters were deployed three battle-
ships (Prince of Wales, King George V, and Rodney), one battle cruiser (Hood), 
and only one carrier (Victorious)� One damaged carrier (Illustrious) was prob-
ably on the way to the United States� For a long time, there was no information 
on the whereabouts of another carrier (Argus). Force H was in Gibraltar� On the 
north–south convoy route were deployed one battleship (Repulse) and one carrier 
(Furious) (used for ferrying aircraft from Britain to Gibraltar and the Gulf of 
Guinea)� One battleship (Nelson) and one carrier (Eagle) had left Durban, South 
Africa, on May 10, but it was unclear whether they were organized as a group�149
During the forenoon of May 18, Admiral Lütjens issued his Absicht (intent) 
for the pending operation� He stated that if the weather situation were favorable 
for breaking out (i�e�, it was bad), his intent was not to stop at Korsfjord but to 
proceed directly to the Arctic, refuel from the waiting tanker Weissenberg, then 
break out into the northern Atlantic through the Denmark Strait at high speed� 
He hoped that if reduced visibility and fog prevailed, an encounter with the en-
emy cruisers or auxiliary cruisers in the Denmark Strait could be avoided� In the 
case of an encounter with light forces, Prinz Eugen might use its torpedoes, on 
order from Lütjens�150
At about 2130 on May 18, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed from Gotenhafen� 
They proceeded separately until they reached Arkona, where they joined up at 
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1100 on May 19�151 On the order of the Befehlshaber der Sicherung der Ostsee 
(Commander, Security Forces, Baltic), traffic in the Great Belt and Kattegat was 
stopped for the night of May 19/20 and the morning of May 20, to enhance the 
secrecy of the Bismarck group’s movement�152
During the morning of May 20, Luftwaffe photoreconnaissance ascertained 
the presence in Scapa Flow of two battleships (King George V and Rodney), one 
battle cruiser (Hood), one carrier (Victorious), six light cruisers, four destroyers, 
and two submarines� In the northern Scotland area were probably twelve cruisers 
that were nonoperational—under repair�153 No enemy forces were sighted in the 
North Sea or the Arctic� 
Around noon on May 20, the Bismarck group was in the vicinity of the Skager-
rak mine barrier, to be escorted by the minesweeper flotilla; around 1600 it was 
escorted through the mine-free area in the Kattegat� It then was mixed with 
commercial vessels waiting to pass through the mine-free area in the reverse 
direction�154 By evening, the Bismarck group was south of Kristiansand�155
At about 0620 on May 21, the 18th Air Group transmitted a message to the 
British Admiralty concerning the presence of two enemy battleships and three 
destroyers�156 B-Dienst decrypted this message almost immediately, and Naval 
Group Command North and the SKL agreed that enemy agents had observed the 
Bismarck group in the Great Belt�157
The original source of the information to the Admiralty about Bismarck’s tran-
sit was the Swedish cruiser Gotland�158 Major Törnberg (assistant to Major Carl 
Petersén [1883–1963], head of Sweden’s C-Bureau, a unit for secret-intelligence 
collection) passed the information to the British naval attaché in Stockholm, 
Captain Henry Denham (1897–1993)�159 In his message the naval attaché stated: 
“Kattegat today 20th May (a) This afternoon eleven German merchant ves-
sels passed Lenker North (b) at 1500 two large German warships escorted by 
three destroyers, five escort craft, and ten to twelve aircraft passing Marstrand 
[in the Bohuslän archipelago, in the northeastern Kattegat] course northwest 
2058/20�”160 Raeder knew from Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945), chief of 
the Abwehr (Military Intelligence), that the signal from Stockholm was sent to 
the Admiralty on the morning of May 21; Canaris had proof positive that British 
agents had reported the Bismarck group’s movement�161
German naval intelligence learned that the report on the sighting of the Bis-
marck group had prompted intensive reconnaissance by the 18th Air Group� This 
group, with headquarters near Rosyth, cooperated with CINC, Rosyth and the 
Orkneys/Shetlands Naval Command� The B-Dienst intercepts located enemy 
aircraft in the northern part of the North Sea, off the Norwegian coast, and in the 
Faeroes area� Yet at the same time, monitoring of the radio traffic of the Home 
Fleet revealed no sign of special activity�162
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At 0900 on May 21, the Bismarck group entered Korsfjord� Bismarck anchored 
at Grimstadfjord, at the entrance to the Fjøsanger fjord� Prinz Eugen refueled at 
Kalvanes Bay from a tanker�163 Surprisingly, Bismarck did not refuel, even though it 
had burned some two thousand tons of oil since Gotenhafen�164 From enemy radio 
transmissions, it was clear to the Germans that the enemy knew about the pres-
ence of the Bismarck group, although as noted no reaction had been detected�165
Coincidentally, the RAF planned to attack the Bismarck group during the night 
of May 21/22� It also intended to conduct reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast 
from Trondheim to Kristiansand on May 22�166 However, in both instances low 
clouds prevented aircraft from finding their targets�167 In the evening on May 21, 
British air reconnaissance ascertained that the Bismarck group had left Bergen�168
On May 21, Admiral Tovey decided to strengthen cruiser patrols in the 
Denmark Strait and between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands�169 When the heavy 
cruiser Suffolk arrived at Hvalfjord, Iceland, after being relieved by Norfolk in the 
Denmark Strait, it was directed to rejoin CS 1 after refueling�170 To save fuel, Suf-
folk would join the patrol just before the earliest arrival of the enemy� The cruiser 
Arethusa, due to arrive at Reykjavík, was directed to remain at Hvalfjord at the 
disposal of Commander, CS 1�171 BCS 1 (Hood and Prince of Wales), plus a screen 
of six destroyers (Electra, Anthony, Icarus, Echo, Achates, and Antelope), sailed 
from Scapa Flow to Hvalfjord�172 Vice Admiral Lancelot E� Holland (1887–1941), 
Commander, BCS 1, was instructed to cover patrols in the Denmark Strait and the 
Iceland–Faeroes passage, operating north of latitude 62 degrees N�173 Tovey issued 
orders recalling Repulse from the Clyde (where it was waiting to escort a convoy 
to the Middle East) to Scapa Flow�174 The cruisers Birmingham and Manchester, 
then patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, were directed to refuel at Skaalefjord 
in the Faeroe Islands, then resume patrol�175 Their assigned patrolling line was be-
tween latitude 61 degrees N, longitude 10° 30ʹ W and latitude 64 degrees N, longi-
tude 15 degrees W� Five fishing trawlers were on their routine patrols west of this 
line� Arethusa was directed to join Manchester in the Iceland–Faeroes passage�176
During the evening of May 21, Admiral Max K� Horton (1883–1951), Rear 
Admiral, Submarines, directed Minerve, then on patrol southwest of Norway, to 
move to a position at latitude 61° 53ʹ N, longitude 03° 15ʹ E, while P-31 sailed out 
from Scapa Flow to a position off Stadlandet (Selje, in the northwestern part of 
Sogne Fjord)�177
Phase II: Grimstadfjord–Denmark Strait (2200 May 21–2000 May 22). The 
Bismarck group left Grimstadfjord at 2200 on May 21� Several hours afterward, 
enemy aircraft searched for Bismarck in the skerries (small, rocky, uninhabited 
islands) off Bergen� On the basis of this enemy activity, the Germans concluded 
that the movement of the Bismarck group was known, but apparently the enemy 
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was uncertain about the group’s exact location� At 0510, after the Bismarck 
group reached the latitude of Kristiansund, Lütjens released the accompany-
ing destroyers, which would proceed to Trondheim� On the basis of reports he 
received, Lütjens believed that the major part of the Home Fleet was still at 
Scapa Flow at noon on May 22� Even if the Home Fleet sailed out on May 22, it 
would have to transit some 1,200 nautical miles to reach a position near Cape 
Farewell�178 
At 1200 on May 22, Lütjens directed the Bismarck group to increase its speed 
to twenty-four knots and steer for the Denmark Strait�179 The group was then 
some two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast�180 On the evening 
of May 22, the sky was covered with clouds and the atmosphere was misty� The 
meteorologist aboard Bismarck predicted that the weather would be favorable for 
a breakout� Lütjens intended to steer for Cape Farewell�181 Possibly he was influ-
enced by information he had received while at Korsfjord in the forenoon of May 
21, from a Luftwaffe officer who told him there was no sign that the Home Fleet 
had sailed from Scapa Flow� Lütjens probably believed that he must stay ahead of 
the enemy� He was aware that the enemy knew about his sortie from Gotenhafen 
and his stay in the skerries off Bergen�182
At 1939 on May 22, RAF aircraft reported that the enemy battleship and 
cruiser, but not the merchant ships, had left Bergen� Three destroyers and one 
catapult ship were sighted at Trondheim� Most of the Norwegian coast was then 
under fog�183 
After receiving a report at 2000 that the enemy warships had departed from 
Bergen, Tovey believed there were four possibilities regarding enemy activity� 
The first was that the convoy was carrying important military stores to northern 
Norway and would sail through the Leads; for some weeks there had been reports 
of movements of German troops to Kirkenes� The second possibility was that the 
convoy was carrying a raiding party, perhaps to capture an airfield to support an 
attack on Reykjavík or Hvalfjord� Third, the enemy battleship and cruiser might 
try to break out through the Denmark Strait to reach the trade routes, as German 
ships had done in the past� However, breaking out through the passage between 
Iceland and Scotland could not be ruled out, especially because the enemy had 
stopped at Bergen� The fourth possibility was that the enemy ships already had 
covered an important German convoy as far as the Inner Leads, and now might 
be returning to the Baltic� Tovey considered the third scenario to be the most 
likely, and made his dispositions accordingly�184
At 2043 on May 22, Tovey requested air reconnaissance of all passages between 
Greenland and the Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, as well as any enemy forces 
approaching Iceland� The aim was to detect enemy ships breaking out westward� 
The Admiralty responded to Tovey’s request by directing subordinate commands 
Winter2019Review.indb   112 12/4/18   11:13 AM
118
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1
 V E G O  1 1 3
to conduct reconnaissance of the Iceland–Faeroes gap, the Denmark Strait, the 
Faeroes–Shetland gap, and the Norwegian coast�185 An additional air-patrol line 
about 250 miles west of the Iceland–Faeroes passage also was established by 
CINC, Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Percy Noble (1880–1955)�186 The 15th 
Air Group units on Iceland were directed to provide A/S cover for Hood and 
Prince of Wales and to keep a close watch on the Denmark Strait�187 The Admi-
ralty canceled the sailing of the carrier Victorious and battleship Repulse, which 
had been assigned to protect pending Convoy WS8B, and put these warships at 
Admiral Tovey’s disposal� Victorious was then at Scapa Flow, while Repulse was 
directed to sail from the Clyde to Scapa Flow�188
Phase III: Breakout to the Northern Atlantic (2000 May 22‒1922 May 23). On 
May 23, the Bismarck group continued on a course to transit the Denmark Strait� 
The weather was favorable for penetration: an easterly wind, overcast skies, 
moderate-to-heavy rain, and moderate-to-bad visibility (650 feet or less)�189 
Overall, the situation for a breakout was considered favorable� However, that 
same bad weather prevented Luftwaffe aircraft from reconnoitering Scapa Flow 
on May 23�190 The Germans also did not have aircraft available to reconnoiter the 
area between Iceland and the Faeroes�191 Lütjens ordered an increase in speed to 
twenty-seven knots�192 In the meantime, Tovey’s Battle Force proceeded north-
ward to latitude 60 degrees N—far enough to be in a position to deal with either 
an attack on Iceland or a breakout�193
Also on May 23, Headquarters RAF Iceland received a message from CINC, 
Western Approaches via Flag Officer in Charge, Iceland to give priority to re-
connoitering the Denmark Strait, especially the Akureyri area of Eyja Fjord, in 
north-central Iceland� A crossover patrol of the Denmark Strait from Iceland to 
the limit of the ice already had been ordered�194 But only two air sorties of the 
Iceland–Faeroes gap were carried out, because of the bad weather, and there was 
no air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait; however, Admiral Tovey did not 
become aware of this until much later�195 Tovey directed Suffolk to patrol within 
RDF range of the ice-edge boundary in the Denmark Strait�196 When conditions 
were clear inshore, Norfolk would patrol about fifteen miles abeam of Suffolk; 
when thick inshore, Norfolk would patrol to cover the inshore passage�197
Repulse and three destroyers from Western Approaches Command joined the 
Battle Force northwest of the Butt of Lewis, Outer Hebrides, during the fore-
noon of May 23�198 Tovey intended to detach two cruisers to patrol the Faeroes– 
Shetlands passage; however, in the end he decided to keep all four cruisers with 
him�199
By noon, the Bismarck group reached the ice boundary�200 At 1427, the weather 
forecast for the area north of Iceland was for southeasterly-to-easterly winds, 
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wind force 6 to 8, mostly overcast, rain, and moderate-to-poor visibility; in the 
area south of Iceland, it was for winds of force 5 to 7; cloudy to overcast; a low-
pressure system east of Iceland; and warm air moving toward the Denmark Strait 
and the area south of Iceland�201
At 1700, the weather in the vicinity of the Bismarck group was snow showers, 
with visibility of around five thousand yards�202 The Bismarck group sailed near 
the ice boundary� On its starboard side there was good visibility, while to port 
there was fog�203 After entering the Denmark Strait shortly before 1900, the Bis-
marck group moved into an area of pack ice, with some floating icebergs, a few of 
which were of enormous size� Thus, on May 23, the width of the ice-free passage 
in the Denmark Strait was only about twenty nautical miles�204 Both Bismarck and 
Prinz Eugen were zigzagging�205
German knowledge of the situation in the Denmark Strait and its approaches 
was very spotty because of the lack of sufficient FW-200 aircraft� The last report 
that Lütjens received was provided on May 19 by a single FW-200� The aircraft re-
ported the ice boundary to be seventy to eighty nautical miles away from Iceland� 
The same day, at a distance of some fifty nautical miles northwest of North Cape, 
Iceland, another FW-200 had aborted its flight after encountering dense fog�206
At 1922, Suffolk sighted Bismarck and Prinz Eugen at a distance of 12,320 
yards and steering on a southwesterly course� The Bismarck group’s position was 
then some sixty miles northwest of North Cape�207 At the same time, Prinz Eugen 
sighted what it believed to be an auxiliary cruiser at a distance of 14,200 yards� 
Bismarck fired five salvos but scored no hits� The enemy ship disappeared�208 Suf-
folk used mist as a cover and maintained contact with Bismarck�209 At the time of 
initial contact, Tovey’s Battle Force was at latitude 60° 20ʹ N, longitude 13 degrees 
W� It turned to course 280 and increased speed to twenty-seven knots� Tovey’s 
intent was to reach a position from which he could intercept the enemy east of 
the Denmark Strait and at the same time support BCS 1� As more information 
was received, it became clear that the enemy intended to break out through the 
Denmark Strait�210
At 2028, Suffolk sighted Bismarck again near the ice boundary, at a distance of 
twelve thousand yards� Four minutes later, Norfolk also made contact with Bis-
marck at a distance of 10,560 yards�211 The Admiralty received Norfolk’s message 
at 2103, before it received Suffolk’s�212 Bismarck opened fire, but Norfolk retired 
safely behind a smoke screen�213 The Bismarck group’s repeated attempts to break 
off contact failed�214 The B-Dienst personnel aboard both Bismarck and Prinz 
Eugen deciphered Suffolk’s signal (“one battleship, one cruiser, bearing 330°, dis-
tance 6 nautical miles, course 240°”) within minutes�215 However, they mistook 
Norfolk’s call sign for that of King George V�216
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Lütjens was surprised at encountering enemy cruisers in the Denmark Strait� 
However, for some reason he did not draw the proper conclusion: that the enemy 
would try to block his foray into the Atlantic� He believed the British ships were 
not equipped with advanced search radars; however, Suffolk had been fitted with 
advanced artillery radar (Type 284/285)�217 Suffolk’s radar now had an effective 
range of 26,250 yards�218 In contrast, Norfolk had the older-model artillery radar 
(Type 286M)�219 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were fitted with search radar; how-
ever, they lacked the accurate gunfire director, and hence were unable to drive off 
shadowers using “blind” fire�220
At 2200 on May 23, the B-Dienst intercepted a message sent by a British unit, 
probably a heavy cruiser, reporting that it had detected in the Denmark Strait, at 
a distance of six nautical miles, one enemy battleship and one cruiser, both sailing 
in a southwesterly direction�221 The B-Dienst also learned that CINC, Western 
Approaches had issued a radio warning to three convoys about the possibility 
of encountering enemy ships�222 These German radio intercepts revealed urgent 
messages being sent to the enemy heavy units�223
Norfolk and Suffolk shadowed the Bismarck group throughout the night of May 
23/24� The weather was characterized by rain and mist and the visibility was as low 
as two miles� The ships “shadowed by sight and/or RDF according to visibility�” 
Norfolk kept farther south and east “to cover move of enemy away from ice�”224
Phase IV: Encounter in the Denmark Strait, 0538‒0613 May 24. BCS 1 (Hood 
and Prince of Wales) and its screen arrived at their assigned position at about 
0205—sooner than Tovey had anticipated� Both ships turned to a course parallel 
to that of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen�225 At 0200, Admiral Holland detached his 
destroyers because CS 1 had lost contact with Bismarck� This was a serious error, 
though, because he lost the opportunity to launch torpedo attacks on the German 
ships�226 During the rest of the night, Prince of Wales obtained positions by using 
RDF information from Norfolk and Suffolk�227
At 0538, Suffolk again regained contact with the Bismarck group�228 At 0545, 
the Bismarck group’s B-Dienst detachment identified two enemy units: Hood 
and a battleship of the King George V class (actually Prince of Wales)� The enemy 
ships were at a distance of 31,700 yards and sailing at high speed� At 0552, Hood 
opened fire at a range of 25,000 yards� Two minutes later both German ships 
responded�229 They concentrated their fire on Hood�230 The running combat dis-
tance varied from 19,650 to 22,750 yards�231 The fire of both Bismarck and Prinz 
Eugen was excellent� Hood was hit by the second or third salvo, which started 
fires aboard that spread rapidly�232 At 0600, Hood was straddled again� There was 
a huge explosion and Hood blew up�233 It sank in three to four minutes�234 Hood 
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had been able to fire only five or six salvos�235 Out of a ship’s company of ninety-
five officers and 1,324 men, only three survived�236
After the sinking of Hood, Prince of Wales engaged Bismarck. Both Prinz Eugen 
and Bismarck shifted their fire onto Prince of Wales� The firing range was reduced 
to eighteen thousand yards� Within two minutes, Prince of Wales was hit with 
four 15-inch shells and probably three 8-inch shells� Its salvos now were falling 
short and had a very large spread� Hence, Captain John Leach, the commanding 
officer of Prince of Wales, decided to break off the engagement�237 By then the 
range had been reduced to only 14,600 yards�238 At 0613, Prince of Wales turned 
away under a smoke screen�239 The ship had two guns out of action and consider-
able damage to its bridge�240 Yet it had performed well, even though its crew was 
only partly trained�241 Bismarck had received two heavy and one light hits� It left 
a trail of oil from one of its tanks�242
At 0632, Lütjens sent a signal to Naval Group Command North informing it 
that one battle cruiser, probably Hood, had been sunk, while one battleship, either 
King George or Renown, was damaged and had withdrawn� Two enemy heavy 
cruisers maintained contact with Bismarck. In the meantime, B-Dienst decrypted 
a series of messages sent by Suffolk and Norfolk�243
Lütjens’s Fateful Decision. Admiral Lütjens made the decision not to pursue the 
damaged Prince of Wales� Perhaps the main reason was that continuing the en-
gagement would have required sailing at higher speed, resulting in higher fuel 
consumption� This would have had an especially negative effect on Prinz Eugen, 
because of its shorter range� Lütjens also was probably unsure whether he could 
destroy Prince of Wales as quickly as he had Hood� Moreover, his principal mis-
sion was to destroy enemy shipping, not the enemy’s heavy surface ships�244
After sinking Hood, Lütjens could steer to Bergen, Trondheim, or Saint-
Nazaire to attend to the damages he had suffered in the Denmark Strait� The 
route to Bergen ran between the Faeroes and the Shetlands, with a transit dis-
tance of 1,150 nautical miles� This was the shortest route and the fastest way to 
reach an area where the Luftwaffe could provide effective cover� Its major draw-
back was that the Bismarck group would have to sail within the effective range 
of many enemy aircraft and naval bases� The possibility existed that the Home 
Fleet, based at Scapa Flow, might appear� These reasons made this route the most 
dangerous for the Bismarck group to take�
The route to Trondheim ran either south of Iceland (approximately 1,300 nm) or 
through the Denmark Strait (approximately 1,400 nm)�245 The major advantage of 
the route through the Denmark Strait was that the Bismarck group would sail into 
an area of extensive low visibility and close to the ice boundary, making the threat 
from enemy aircraft much smaller than on the other routes� However, the threat 
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of encountering enemy heavy ships could not be excluded entirely� The Bismarck 
group needed to make only seven hundred nautical miles good toward Trondheim 
for the Luftwaffe to protect it effectively� This route also offered the best chance 
of avoiding the main body of the Home Fleet if it made a foray into the Arctic�246
The route to Saint-Nazaire was about 1,700 nautical miles long—making it 
the longest route—and more than two thousand nautical miles if the Bismarck 
group made a temporary swing westward� A major disadvantage of this route was 
that Bismarck would run the risk of encountering a large concentration of enemy 
forces� But the advantage of this route was that the vast expanse of the North At-
lantic might make it possible to shake off the shadowers� Another advantage was 
that reaching Saint-Nazaire would offer Bismarck a much more favorable position 
for conducting war in the Atlantic�247 A major disadvantage of this route was that 
the enemy could use land-based and carrier-based aircraft to detect and attack 
the Bismarck group, then concentrate his heavy surface ships to prevent Bismarck 
from actually reaching Saint-Nazaire�
Lütjens chose to steer for Saint-Nazaire� We only can speculate about his 
reasons� In any case, it is clear that once the element of surprise was lost the best 
option was to cancel the entire operation and return home�248 Some SKL staffers 
and the commanders of Naval Group Command North and Naval Group Com-
mand West argued that Lütjens should have been directed to return home, but 
Raeder believed that such a decision should be left to Lütjens to make�249 A better 
option for Lütjens would have been to pursue Prince of Wales, destroy it, then sail 
for Trondheim via the Denmark Strait�
THE BRITISH OPERATIONAL REACTION
Operational Concentration, May 24‒25
The Admiralty broadcast CS 1 sightings of the Bismarck group on May 24� 
Among other things, it directed Admiral Somerville to sail from Gibraltar with 
Force H to join the convoy that Repulse was to have brought south of the Clyde, 
which now had only the cruiser Exeter as an escort� At the same time, the Ad-
miralty added that “should reconnaissance today (24th) indicate that one or 
both German battle cruisers have left Brest it will be necessary you alter these 
instructions�” The Admiralty also ordered CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and 
Arethusa), which had been patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, to join north-
east of Langanes, Iceland, “in readiness to form a patrol line in event of enemy 
breaking back�” It also arranged for air patrols with the same purpose�250
At 0800, the Battle Force was about three hundred miles away to the southeast-
ward of the Denmark Strait and sailing at twenty-seven knots�251 Tovey believed 
that the enemy, having sunk Hood, was unlikely to turn back� Hence, the best 
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hope was to intercept Bismarck with the Battle Force� Tovey ordered a course 
change to 260, then 240� The most unfavorable situation for the Home Fleet 
would be if the enemy hugged the eastern coast of Greenland, then sailed toward 
Norway’s western coast to take fuel from a waiting tanker� If that happened, Bis-
marck would be able to escape the pursuit by King George V�252 The Admiralty 
directed Rear Admiral William F� Wake-Walker (1888–1945), commander of CS 
1, to “continue to shadow Bismarck even if you run out of fuel, in order that the 
commander in chief [Tovey] may catch up in time�”253
At 0801, Lütjens sent a repeat message to the SKL and both naval group com-
manders about the encounter in the Denmark Strait� He also reported that the 
free fairway in the Denmark Strait was some fifty miles wide and contained 
floating mines�254
After the engagement with Prince of Wales, the Bismarck group sailed on a 
southwesterly course� Bismarck tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to shake off 
the shadowers� Suffolk masterfully used RDF to maintain contact�255
In the meantime, the Admiralty made a series of tactical decisions to direct a 
number of ships in the Atlantic to take part in the pursuit of Bismarck� Collec-
tively these decisions resulted in an operational concentration� Rodney had sailed 
from the Clyde on May 21 en route to Boston for refit, accompanying the troop 
transport Britannia� The Admiralty gave the position of Bismarck and directed 
Rodney to close in, leaving Britannia behind, with one destroyer to screen it�256 
At 1022, Rodney, then some 520 miles west of Bloody Foreland, county Donegal, 
Ireland, was directed to steer best course to close the enemy� Ramillies, which 
was escorting Convoy HX127, was then a thousand miles south of the Bismarck 
group; at 1144, it was ordered to leave the convoy and proceed to contact the en-
emy from the west�257 At 1234, the Admiralty ordered Revenge to sail from Halifax 
and overtake Convoy HX128� The cruisers Edinburgh (then cruising near latitude 
45 degrees N and longitude 21 degrees W) and London (escorting the 19,000-ton 
troopship Arundel Castle from Gibraltar) received orders to “give up their task 
and steer toward the enemy, husbanding fuel against future needs�”258
At 1340, the SKL and both naval group commanders received Lütjens’s mes-
sage sent at 0801 on May 24� This was when they first learned about the outcome 
of the encounter in the Denmark Strait, the extent of damage to Bismarck, and 
Lütjens’s intent to sail for Saint-Nazaire�259
At 1400, the Bismarck group’s position was about 240 nautical miles north-
northeast of Cape Farewell�260 Lütjens sent a signal to the SKL and the naval group 
commanders that the battleship King George was maintaining contact with his 
group� If there were no combat, his intent was to break off from the shadowers 
during the night of May 24/25�261 At 1420, Lütjens directed Prinz Eugen to main-
tain its present course until three hours after Bismarck’s maneuver to the west to 
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BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE, MAY 18, 1941
 (F = flagship)
HOME FLEET
CINC, Home Fleet: Admiral Sir John C. Tovey
2 battleships: King George V (F) (at Scapa Flow), Rodney (en route from the 
Clyde to Boston with Britannia)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (825 Sqdn) (at Scapa Flow, to escort Convoy 
WS8B)
1ST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON (BCS 1)
Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron: Lancelot E. Holland
2 battle cruisers: Hood (at Scapa Flow), Repulse (at the Clyde, to escort 
Convoy WS8B)
1 battleship: Prince of Wales (at Scapa Flow)
1ST CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 1)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 1: William F. Wake-Walker
2 heavy cruisers: Norfolk (on Denmark Strait patrol), Suffolk (refueling at 
Reykjavík)
2ND CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 2)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 2: Neville Syfret
4 light cruisers: Aurora, Galatea, Kenya, Neptune (at Scapa Flow)
18TH CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 18)
Commodore C. M. Blackman
4 light cruisers: Manchester, Birmingham (on Faeroes–Iceland passage patrol); 
Arethusa (en route to Reykjavík); Edinburgh (on patrol off the 
Azores)
DESTROYERS
Inglefield, Intrepid (en route to Scapa Flow); Achates, Active, Antelope, An-
thony, Echo, Electra, Icarus, Nestor, Punjabi (at Scapa Flow); Jupiter 
(at Londonderry); Eskimo, Mishona, Somali, Tartar (at sea with Rod-
ney and Britannia)
WESTERN APPROACHES COMMAND (Liverpool)
1 light cruiser: Hermione (en route to Scapa Flow to join CS 2)
5 destroyers (escorts for Repulse): Lance (at Scapa Flow); Assiniboine, Legion, 
Saguenay (at the Clyde); Columbia (at Londonderry)
PLYMOUTH COMMAND
4th Destroyer Flotilla: Cossack, Maori, Sikh, Zulu; Piorun (Polish) (at the Clyde, 
as escorts for Convoy WS8B)
NORE COMMAND
1 destroyer: Windsor (at Scapa Flow)
FORCE H (at Gibraltar)
Flag Officer Commanding, Force H: Vice Admiral Sir James F. Somerville
1 battle cruiser: Renown
1 aircraft carrier: Ark Royal (810, 818, 828 Sqdns)
1 light cruiser: Sheffield
5 destroyers: Faulkner, Foresight, Forester, Fury, Hesperus
AMERICA AND WEST INDIES COMMAND
2 battleships: Ramillies (escorting Convoy HX127), Revenge (at Halifax, Nova 
Scotia)
SOUTH ATLANTIC COMMAND
1 heavy cruiser: Dorsetshire (escorting Convoy SL74)
SUBMARINES
Rear Admiral, Submarines: Max K. Horton (Aberdour / north London)
P-31 (at Scapa Flow); Sealion, Seawolf, Sturgeon (in English Channel); Pan-
dora (en route from Gibraltar to United Kingdom); Tigris (at the 
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shake off the shadowers. Prinz Eugen then would refuel from a tanker (Belchen 
or Lothringen)� After receiving the signal “Hood,” it would operate independently 
and conduct commerce raiding�262
At 1440, Dönitz issued an instruction to the U-boats to establish a patrol 
line southeast of Cape Farewell� The aim was to lure enemy ships approaching 
from the north� At that time, Lütjens’s intent was to operate in the area halfway 
between Greenland and Newfoundland� The Bismarck group would carry out a 
swing and lure pursuing enemy forces over the U-boat patrol line� The distance 
of the U-boat patrol line from the British coast was about 1,400 nautical miles�263 
The depth of the patrol line would be ten nautical miles� Dönitz ordered the U-
boats to reach their assigned positions by 0600 on May 25�264
At 1445, the Admiralty requested that Admiral Wake-Walker provide infor-
mation on the percentage of fighting effectiveness Bismarck retained and about 
his intent to have Prince of Wales reengage� In his response at 1545, Admiral 
Wake-Walker stated that he had no evidence that the damage the enemy had 
received had reduced his speed at all� Wake-Walker also believed that the enemy 
would not reengage but would try to avoid any combat�265 Wake-Walker also 
stated that Prince of Wales “should not reengage until the other heavy ships are in 
contact and unless interception fails; doubtful if she has speed to force action�”266 
The reason for not reengaging Bismarck was that the cruisers of CS 1 might be 
damaged and thereby forced to reduce their speed� This would make it impos-
sible to maintain contact with Bismarck. Admiral Tovey believed that, under the 
circumstances, Wake-Walker was justified in his decision� Tovey believed that his 
forces were more likely ultimately to destroy Bismarck if he used the cruisers to 
maintain contact until the approaching reinforcements arrived�267
At 1455, Tovey reported that Victorious, escorted by CS 2 (Galatea, Aurora, 
Kenya, and Hermione), was detached to launch an aerial torpedo attack at about 
2200, when within a hundred-mile range of the enemy�268 The aim was to reduce 
Bismarck’s speed� Tovey believed that keeping Victorious with the Battle Force 
Clyde); H44 (at Rothesay); Minerve (Q185) (French) (off Norway’s 
southwestern coast)
RAF COASTAL COMMAND
No. 15 Group (Liverpool)
No. 16 Group (Chatham, Kent)
No. 18 (Pitreavie Castle, Scotland)
Sources: Training and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty, 
London, “Appendix A: Bismarck Operations; List of H.M. Ships, C.B. 3081 (3),” in Battle 
Summary No. 5, pp. 38–40; Schofield, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 72–75; Air Marshal, 
CINC, Coastal Command, “Dispatches of CINC Home Fleet on the Sinking of the Bis-
marck,” September 3, 1946, app. A, AIR 15/204, TNA; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship 
Bismarck (1980), pp. 264–67; Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 
pp. 63–64.
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until the morning of the next day (May 25) would not be helpful in locating Bis-
marck if it had slipped away during the three hours of darkness� The remainder 
of the Battle Force (King George V and Repulse) and its escorts steered an inter-
cepting course� The aim was to bring the enemy to action soon after sunrise�269
At 1800, Tovey was with King George V, Repulse, Victorious, and two cruis-
ers�270 CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and Arethusa) was returning from a point 
northeast of Iceland to Hvalfjord to refuel� The battleship Revenge left Halifax at 
1505 to overtake Convoys HX128 and SC32� Admiral Somerville, with his Force 
H (Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield, and a half dozen destroyers), was directed to 
join Convoy WS8B after daylight on May 26�271
In the meantime, the shadowers shortened the distance to Bismarck. At 1830, 
Bismarck opened fire on Suffolk� Prince of Wales fired several salvos at Bismarck 
from thirty thousand yards� However, this brief encounter did not result in dam-
age to any of the ships�272
At 1842, Naval Group Command West sent a radio message in which it agreed 
with Lütjens’s intent to release Prinz Eugen to operate independently� It informed 
Lütjens that preparations were under way at Saint-Nazaire and Brest to receive 
Bismarck� It also suggested that if Bismarck successfully broke away from its 
shadowers it should remain in its present isolated area�273 However, Bismarck’s 
reduced speed made breaking off contact more difficult� Neither Raeder nor the 
two naval group commanders knew whether Lütjens had considered the pos-
sibility of avoiding the enemy by moving northward, or which factors he had 
considered when he selected Saint-Nazaire�274
At 2210, nine Swordfish torpedo bombers took off from Victorious; at 2300, 
they were followed by three Fulmar fighters; at 2400, two more Fulmars took off� 
The weather was showery with squalls, good visibility, and a northwesterly wind� 
Sunset was at 0052�275 At about midnight on May 24/25, twelve aircraft (seven 
Swordfish and five Fulmars) from Victorious carried out a torpedo attack on Bis-
marck; however, they claimed just one hit on the ship� This first air attack failed 
to inflict any serious damage on Bismarck.276
In the meantime, at 2331, the Admiralty sent new orders to Force H “to steer 
so as to intercept Bismarck from the southward� Enemy must be short on fuel, and 
will have to make for an oiler; her future movements may guide to this oiler�”277
Loss of Contact with Bismarck, 0213 May 25
CS 1 lost contact with Bismarck at 0213 (Prince of Wales claimed this happened 
at 0126) on May 25�278 Heretofore, despite frequent and abrupt changes in the 
visibility, Norfolk and Suffolk had maintained contact with Bismarck skillfully for 
thirty hours�279 When Tovey received the information that contact with Bismarck 
was lost, he believed that the German battleship had three options: rendezvous 
with a tanker, possibly off the east coast of Greenland or farther south, such as 
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near the Azores or Canary Islands; make for a dockyard on the west coast of 
France, or possibly an Italian port in the Mediterranean; or return to Germany 
for repairs�280
At 0300, Force H was approximately 850 miles west of Porto, Portugal� Heavy 
seas had delayed its progress�281 CS 2, with Victorious and four accompanying 
cruisers, was directed to organize a search northwest of Bismarck’s last known po-
sition� Norfolk and Suffolk, after remaining at the enemy’s last known position for 
some time, proceeded westward to cover the southwestern sector� Rodney, with 
three destroyers, reported that it was steering to intercept the enemy if it showed 
up in the southeastern sector� Repulse had yet to be detached to Newfoundland 
to refuel, while Prince of Wales was directed at 0620 to join Tovey’s Battle Force� 
The Admiralty directed London to search the area around latitude 25° 30ʹ N, lon-
gitude 42° W, where an enemy tanker was believed to be located�282
At 0800 on May 25, Bismarck was some one hundred miles astern of King 
George V, sailing southeast�283 At 0854, Lütjens sent a message in which he erro-
neously stated that the enemy ships still were shadowing Bismarck. The sending 
of this signal gave away his position to the British radio-intercept operators� At 
1030, Tovey received from the Admiralty a series of DF fixes� They indicated that 
the signals appeared to come from the same ship that had transmitted several 
signals soon after the torpedo attack by aircraft from Victorious the previous 
night (i�e�, Bismarck)� When these fixes were plotted incorrectly on King George 
V, they showed a position too far north� This provided a misleading indicator 
that the enemy was retreating northward toward the North Sea� This informa-
tion confirmed Tovey’s existing belief that Bismarck was heading north�284 This 
is why Tovey directed the entire Home Fleet to search to the north� King George 
V changed course to 055, increased speed to twenty-seven knots, and headed 
toward the Iceland–Faeroes passage�285 But Tovey’s decision was unsound�
The Admiralty, for its part, apparently was not entirely convinced that Bis-
marck was sailing northward� So at 1023 the Admiralty directed Admiral Somer-
ville and CS 1 to proceed “on assumption that enemy turned towards Brest�”286 
In another signal sent at 1100, the Admiralty signaled to Somerville to “act as 
though the enemy is proceeding to a Bay of Biscay port�” The Admiralty had great 
difficulty obtaining accurate information about the position of Bismarck. A DF 
fix at 1320 located Bismarck at a position within fifty miles of 55° 15ʹ N, 32° W� 
The Admiralty transmitted this information to Tovey at 1419, and he received 
it at 1530� At 1428, the Admiralty directed Rodney to ignore the signal sent at 
1108, which had directed the battleship to proceed in the direction of Brest, and 
to comply with Tovey’s instructions that assumed Bismarck was proceeding to 
Norway via the Iceland–Scotland passage� At 1621, Tovey sent a query to the 
Admiralty: “Do you consider that enemy is making for Faroes�”287 
Winter2019Review.indb   122 12/4/18   11:13 AM
128
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1
 V E G O  1 2 3
However, by the late afternoon and early evening of May 25 the Admiralty’s 
view about Bismarck’s movements had changed in favor of the Bay of Biscay 
destination� At 1805, the Admiralty canceled the signal it had sent to Rodney at 
1428 and directed the ship to act on the assumption that the enemy was proceed-
ing toward a French port� Finally, at 1924, the Admiralty informed Tovey and all 
other forces that it believed Bismarck was heading toward a French port� Tovey 
already had come to the same conclusion at 1810, when he decided to turn his 
force onto a southeasterly course, heading toward the Bay of Biscay�288
Final confirmation came in the evening and from an unlikely source� General 
Hans Jeschonnek (1899‒1943), the Luftwaffe chief of staff, sent a message to the 
Naval High Command asking whether Bismarck would be coming into a French 
port for repairs� (The reason for this might have been personal: Jeschonnek’s son 
served in Bismarck.) This message was sent in the Luftwaffe’s Enigma code, and 
hence was readable to the British decoders� Jeschonnek’s message was deciphered 
quickly and passed on to the Admiralty, and at 1812 was sent to Tovey as well� 
Tovey’s error had given Bismarck a chance to escape�289
In the meantime, at 1320 on May 25, Raeder briefed Hitler on Bismarck’s 
situation� He reported that during the night of May 24/25 the enemy had main-
tained contact with Bismarck. Because the enemy used advanced radar, Bismarck 
had not been able to break off contact� Near Bismarck were one battleship (King 
George V), two heavy cruisers, and one carrier� Lütjens reported around midnight 
on May 24 that Prinz Eugen had been detached for refueling in the mid-Atlantic� 
This maneuver went unobserved by the enemy� Lütjens intended to reach Saint-
Nazaire� All available U-boats and light naval forces would be used to support 
Bismarck�290 
At 1932, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens about pending 
actions in support of Bismarck. Air units would be used during the approach 
phase to a French port� Luftwaffe aircraft would conduct reconnaissance out to 
longitude 15 degrees W� Bombers would be used out to longitude 14 degrees W� 
Long-range reconnaissance would be conducted out to longitude 25 degrees W� 
By 1313 on May 25, six U-boats had deployed to their assigned positions (see 
map 1)� The approaches to Brest and Saint-Nazaire would be strongly controlled� 
There also was a possibility that Bismarck could return to the port of La Pallice�291 
In the evening on May 25, Tovey still had Repulse in company with King 
George V� Rodney was sailing on a southeasterly course toward the Bay of Biscay� 
The Admiralty recalled Ramillies to rejoin Britannia and sail to Boston� At 2100, 
CS 1 was at latitude 55° 50ʹ N, longitude 31° 28ʹ W� It sailed on a southeasterly 
course (120) at twenty-six knots� It was some one hundred miles behind Tovey’s 
Battle Force� However, it was low on fuel, with only fifty percent remaining� The 
cruiser London proceeded to search for an enemy tanker halfway between the 
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Azores and the Leeward Islands� On the morning of May 26, the cruiser Edin-
burgh’s fuel was at only 13 percent of capacity� That evening, Prince of Wales was 
directed to sail to Iceland for refueling�292
At 0053 on May 26, Naval Group Command West reported that four FW-200s 
would provide loose coverage between latitudes 43° 30ʹ N and 54° 25ʹ N and out 
to longitude 25 degrees W� With additional aircraft they would provide heavier 
coverage out to longitude 19 degrees W in the northern part and to longitude 14 
degrees W in the southern part� Despite bad weather, the four FW-200s covered 
their assignment� Because of the stormy weather it was not possible to send Ger-
man destroyers to the area to relieve the enemy pressure on Bismarck.293 
Bismarck’s situation worsened on May 26� That morning Bismarck was some 
seven hundred nautical miles away from the French coast� Some thirty-one 
hours had passed since the British cruisers had lost contact with Bismarck, but 
now three British forces were converging on Bismarck, plus several single large 
surface combatants� The 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Cossack, Sikh, Zulu, Maori, and 
Piorun) was detached from Convoy WS8B� The ships were directed to join and 
screen King George V and Rodney� One destroyer (Jupiter) at Londonderry was 
directed to join the same screen� After receiving the first enemy report on the 
morning of May 26, the cruiser Dorsetshire left Convoy SL74 and proceeded to 
join the Battle Force�294
In the meantime, other British forces that were unable to reach Bismarck’s 
most probable track moved to cover its alternative possible movements� Two light 
cruisers (Manchester and Birmingham) of CS 18 patrolled within the Iceland–
Faeroes passage, while another light cruiser of the same squadron (Arethusa) 
patrolled the Denmark Strait� Victorious and CS 2 were positioned to prevent 
the enemy from gaining access to the Iceland–Faeroes passage� If necessary, 
CS 2 would be detached to fuel at Hvalfjord� Prince of Wales was on the way to 
Hvalfjord and destroyers were directed to screen both Prince of Wales and CS 2�295 
Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic was instructed to arrange air and 
submarine patrols to prevent passage of the Strait of Gibraltar� The battleship 
Nelson was recalled from Freetown to Gibraltar to reinforce the forces converg-
ing on Bismarck. The cruiser London was recalled from its search for the enemy 
tanker between the Azores and the Leewards and was directed to escort Convoy 
SL75, which was approaching the Bay of Biscay� Suffolk was sent to search in 
the Davis Strait (between Greenland and Canada’s Baffin Island) for the enemy 
supply ships and tankers believed to be in the area and from which Prinz Eugen 
might refuel�296 
The Admiralty’s arrangement on May 25 provided for RAF commands to 
cooperate by conducting reconnaissance from Iceland and the Faeroes to and 
including the coast of Norway� Canadian aircraft conducted six-hundred-mile 
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searches from Newfoundland� One of the American air squadrons based in New-
foundland also took part in the searches�297 Coastal Command established two 
patrols across Bismarck’s probable track, from latitude 52° 19ʹ 30˝ N to 48 degrees 
N, out to longitude 23° 30ʹ W�298 
Contact with Bismarck Restored
Finally, at 1030 on May 26, Bismarck was detected some six hundred nautical 
miles west of Land’s End, by a Catalina seaplane of Coastal Command based at 
Plymouth�299 However, the Catalina lost contact because of antiaircraft (AA) fire 
from Bismarck.300 Ark Royal launched two long-range aircraft to search for Bis-
marck.301 At 1114, an aircraft from Ark Royal reestablished contact with Bismarck. 
Bismarck’s position was latitude 49° 20ʹ N, longitude 20° 50ʹ W, or forty miles 
from the position the Catalina had reported some forty-five minutes earlier�302 
After this point, Bismarck was kept under almost continuous surveillance for 
the rest of the day�303 Visibility in the area was variable, the wind northwesterly 
at force 7–8�304 Bismarck steered a southeasterly course at twenty-two knots� The 
distance between Bismarck and Tovey’s Battle Force was too great to close unless 
Bismarck’s speed could be reduced� This could be accomplished only by a torpedo 
attack by Ark Royal’s aircraft� At 1052, the Admiralty directed Admiral Somer-
ville not to have Renown engage unless Bismarck already was engaged heavily 
with King George V or Rodney�305 
A major and increasingly critical problem for the Home Fleet was the fuel 
situation, especially regarding the battleships� King George V had only 1,200 tons 
of fuel remaining, or 38 percent� Rodney had to part company at 0800 on May 
27� When these ships joined the Battle Force, they had to share the A/S screen 
provided by only three destroyers (Somali, Tartar, and Mishona)—and those de-
stroyers had to leave that night for lack of fuel� The British suspected that there 
were several U-boats in the area� They also assumed that every available enemy 
destroyer and U-boat in western France would be ordered to sail out as well� The 
Admiralty warned Tovey to expect heavy air attacks�306 
Tovey considered it essential to have fuel reserves sufficient to allow battle-
ships to return to their home bases� After the loss of Hood and the damage in-
flicted on Prince of Wales, King George V was the only effective battleship in home 
waters� Tovey was not willing to expose King George V unscreened and sailing at 
low speed to almost certain attack by U-boats unless there was a good chance to 
achieve results that were commensurate with the risk� Tovey’s decision was that 
unless Bismarck’s speed was reduced, King George V would leave the pursuit at 
2400 on May 26 and proceed to refuel�307
At 1115, Bismarck reported its position some six hundred nautical miles west 
of Brest� In the afternoon Lütjens was directed that if the bad weather in the Bay 
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of Biscay prevented him from proceeding to Saint-Nazaire he should steer toward 
Brest� Reichsmarschal Göring directed the Luftwaffe to make all efforts with the 
aircraft available to support Bismarck’s return.308
At 1315, Somerville detached the cruiser Sheffield�309 The Admiralty also 
directed Somerville not to engage Bismarck until other battleships arrived in 
the vicinity; Force H’s Renown was no match for Bismarck�310 In the afternoon, 
Sheffield obtained contact with Bismarck� The first aerial striking force from Ark 
Royal flew at about 1450�311 Sheffield vectored the attack in.312 The aircraft reached 
Bismarck at about 1550 and carried out their torpedo attack�313 However, all the 
torpedoes missed their target�314 
At 1630, an aircraft from Ark Royal reported Bismarck’s position at latitude 
47° 40ʹ N, longitude 18° 15ʹ W� Bismarck was steering a southeasterly course 
(120) at twenty-two knots� Somerville directed Sheffield to maintain contact with 
Bismarck, while he kept Ark Royal and Renown outside the effective range of 
Bismarck’s heavy guns�315 
In one message from Lütjens, the SKL learned that Bismarck’s loss of fuel from 
its ongoing leak was more serious than hitherto believed� Naval Group Com-
mand West considered sending one supply ship (Ermland) during the night of 
May 26/27 to refuel Bismarck�316 By the evening the situation was considered very 
serious, but the SKL expected that Bismarck would be able to defend itself against 
torpedo attacks and in the early morning would be within the effective range of 
Luftwaffe aircraft�317
Six U-boats were concentrated not far away from Bismarck; four had torpe-
does, while two were without� At 1900, one U-boat (U-48) was directed to sail at 
highest speed toward Sheffield, yet it never established contact�318 At 2000, one 
U-boat (U-556) obtained contact with a battleship of the King George class, and 
the carrier Ark Royal passed within effective range, but the U-boat had no torpe-
does, and it lost contact�319
At 1910, fifteen Swordfish aircraft flew off from Ark Royal�320 Sheffield directed 
them to Bismarck�321 Weather conditions were bad: skies 7/10 covered by low 
rain clouds; winds force 6; seas rolling, with a northwesterly swell; and daylight 
fading�322 The first wave of aircraft attacked at 2053�323 The British attack was 
not synchronized, spreading over thirty-eight minutes, and only two of thirteen 
torpedoes fired scored a hit� One torpedo hit the armor belt and had little effect� 
But the second torpedo sealed Bismarck’s fate: it damaged the ship’s propellers, 
wrecked its steering gear, and jammed its rudders�324 This severely affected Bis-
marck’s ability to maneuver, and therefore to continue sailing toward a French 
port�325 The German AA fire was intense and accurate; Bismarck’s AA guns shot 
down seven British aircraft�326
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The Germans intercepted many of the British radio messages to the destroy-
ers and Force H�327 Observation and radio intercepts indicated that Bismarck was 
surrounded by at least three, possibly four, battleships; the carrier Ark Royal; two 
heavy cruisers; one light cruiser, and possibly a second; and the 4th Destroyer 
Flotilla, with many modern destroyers�328 This spelled a situation that was hope-
less for Bismarck� It was also tragic, because, except for being unable to maneuver, 
the ship retained its full striking power�329 At that time, Bismarck was only four 
hundred nautical miles from Brest, but enemy forces in the vicinity made it im-
possible to bring tankers to refuel�330 Very bad weather prevented the Germans 
from using their destroyers or bringing out tugs to take Bismarck in tow� Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau were undergoing repairs� Bismarck’s only support would 
come from the Luftwaffe and the U-boats operating in the Bay of Biscay�331 
Admiral Tovey decided to detach from the Battle Force all five destroyers of 
the 4th Destroyer Flotilla� They were directed to shadow and attack Bismarck. 
Their reports to Tovey throughout the night were invaluable� Tovey requested 
that Force H, with Ark Royal and Renown, withdraw southward to clear the way 
for his battleships to close with Bismarck in the morning� The heavy cruiser Nor-
folk also arrived in the area�332
At about midnight, Lütjens sent a message to Naval Group Command West: 
“Ship is able to defend itself and propulsion plant intact� Does not respond to 
steering with engines, however�”333 The weather conditions were unfavorable� The 
horizon was clear from northwest to northeast, but other sectors experienced 
rainstorms and poor visibility� Bismarck made frequent changes of course be-
tween southwest and northeast� Its speed was only ten to twelve knots�334 Between 
0122 and 0146 on May 27, three British destroyers (Cossack, Zulu, and Maori) 
carried out torpedo attacks on Bismarck� Each destroyer achieved one hit�335 Bis-
marck’s speed was reduced to only eight knots and its movements became even 
more erratic� Yet Bismarck still was able to deliver heavy and accurate fire�336
At 2400, Lütjens sent a message to Hitler: “We fight to the last in our belief 
in you, my Führer, and in unshakable confidence in Germany’s victory�” At the 
same time he also sent a message to Naval High Command and Naval Group 
Command West: “Unable to maneuver� We fight until the last grenade� Long live 
the Führer�” At 0153, Hitler sent a message to Lütjens: “Thank you in the name of 
the entire German people�” He also addressed Bismarck’s crew: “All of Germany 
is with you� What can still be done will be done�”337 
At 0542, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that two FW-200s 
had taken off at 0330 to conduct reconnaissance from 0445 to 0515, with an-
other three bomber groups taking off at 0530�338 This was despite the fact that 
the weather was highly unfavorable for air operations�339 Some German aircraft 
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established contact with enemy cruisers and destroyers, but their effect on the 
Bismarck situation was negligible�340 
At 0835, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that at about 1100 on 
May 27, the Spanish cruiser Canarias and two destroyers would leave El Ferrol 
en route to Bismarck’s position, to be available to render assistance� They would 
proceed at twenty to twenty-two knots�341 
The End
In the morning on May 27, weather conditions were winds northwesterly at force 
8, skies overcast, rainsqualls, and visibility of thirteen miles or so� Sunrise was at 
0702�342 Bismarck sailed on course 330 at ten knots (see map 2)� At 0755, Tovey’s 
force had the enemy on bearing 120 at twenty-one miles� Tovey directed a course 
change to the east (080) to close with Bismarck�343 At 0900, King George V and 
Rodney turned to a southerly course (170) and opened fire with their main guns� 
By 0930, Bismarck was on fire and virtually out of control; however, its speed was 
not reduced, and its main guns still were firing� It also used its secondary arma-
ment�344 At 0954, Norfolk joined the action� All three ships fired independently at 
ranges as short as 3,300 yards� By 1000, Bismarck’s main guns were out of action, 
and ten minutes later the secondary guns stopped firing� Bismarck was now a 
wreck, on fire fore and aft and wallowing heavily�345 Tovey ordered a stop to the 
action, and all firing ceased at 1022� The cruiser Dorsetshire (which had left Con-
voy SL74) had just arrived at the scene of the action�346 Tovey ordered Dorsetshire 
to close in to finish off Bismarck by torpedoing� So perhaps it was Dorsetshire’s 
torpedoes that sank Bismarck, although German sources maintain that the ship 
was sunk by activating scuttling charges�347 Bismarck sank at 1037, at latitude 48° 
10ʹ N, longitude 16° 12ʹ W� Its colors still flew�348
Out of 2,200 men aboard the ship, only 115 were saved�349 The cruiser Dorset-
shire took aboard eighty-five survivors and the destroyer Maori twenty-five� Then 
the British ships stopped their efforts because of their concern that U-boats were 
in the vicinity� U-74 saved three men and one weather steamer (Sachsenwald) 
picked up two men on May 28�350
Bismarck showed a remarkable resilience� Out of seventy-one torpedoes fired, 
at least eight, if not twelve, hit the ship�351 The number of hits by 16-inch shells 
is unknown, but must have been very large� World War I had demonstrated the 
Germans’ ability to build tremendously stout ships, and apparently they had not 
lost it during the interwar years�352
Withdrawal of the Home Fleet
The ships of the Home Fleet returned to their bases in northern Scotland� King 
George V and Rodney, with three destroyers (Cossack, Sikh, and Zulu), proceeded 
northward� Dorsetshire and Maori rejoined them at 1230 on May 27, and nine 
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other destroyers rejoined at 1600 on May 28� They received several signals warn-
ing of heavy enemy attacks on that day, but only four enemy aircraft appeared� 
However, at 1200 on the 28th, one hundred miles to the south, destroyers Misho-
na and Tartar suffered heavy attacks, and Mishona was sunk� Rodney, screened by 
Maori, and Columbia were detached to the Clyde at 1700 on May 28� Dorsetshire 
was detached to the Tyne at 2316� Fog delayed the battleships, but they entered 
Loch Ewe eventually, at 1230 on May 29�353
In his after-action report, Tovey wrote: “She [Bismarck] had put up a most 
gallant fight against impossible odds, worthy of the old days of the Imperial 
German Navy�” He opined that it was unfortunate that “for political reasons” 
this fact could not be made public�354 Tovey praised the cooperation, skill, and 
understanding that all forces had displayed during the prolonged chase of Bis-
marck; flag officers and commanding officers invariably acted as “I would have 
wished before and without receiving instructions from me�”355 The Admiralty 
exercised excellent strategic control� The coordination of the movements and 
actions of the many disparate forces across a large part of the northern Atlantic 
was superb� Admiral Tovey wrote that “the accuracy of information supplied by 
the Admiralty and the speed with which it was passed were remarkable, and the 
balance struck between information and instructions passed to the forces out of 
visual touch with me was ideal�”356
The failure of RHEINÜBUNG and the sinking of Bismarck had a major effect 
on the future employment of German heavy surface combatants against British 
and Allied shipping in the North Atlantic� Admiral Raeder wrote later that prior 
to May 27, 1941, he had considerable freedom of action in determining the em-
ployment of heavy surface ships, as long as there were no negative effects on the 
actions of other services of the Wehrmacht� But because of the loss of Bismarck, 
Hitler in his subsequent instructions greatly limited that freedom� Among other 
things, he prohibited the sending of heavy ships to conduct commerce warfare 
in the Atlantic, and the Kriegsmarine attempted no such operations for the re-
mainder of the war�357
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The main reasons for the failure of RHEINÜBUNG were as follows: the German 
surface ships’ base of operations was extremely unfavorable in multiple ways; the 
plan was overly reliant on the ships breaking out into the North Atlantic unde-
tected; and—perhaps most important—air reconnaissance was inadequate, and 
the ships were operating beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft�
The deployment and combat employment of the forces opposing RHEIN­
ÜBUNG took place over the vast space of the North Atlantic� The harsh weather 
conditions significantly affected the employment of surface ships and aircraft 
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and the effectiveness of their weapons and sensors� Bad weather in the Denmark 
Strait favored the Germans because it greatly enhanced the chances of an unde-
tected breakout into the North Atlantic�
The German surface ships and aircraft operated from a very long and frag-
mented base of operations� Gaining access from the Arctic to the open waters 
of the North Atlantic was extremely difficult� The British not only controlled 
Iceland and all three passages to the Atlantic but also kept under surveillance the 
southern part of the Arctic and southern Norway� Any German attempt to break 
out to the North Atlantic was inherently a high-risk endeavor� Although the 
Germans were well aware that British monitoring of the northern passages had 
improved steadily over the course of 1941, they apparently were overconfident 
in their ability to use bad weather to make an unobserved breakout through the 
Denmark Strait�
Success in a war at sea is difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve without 
favorable positions for basing one’s naval forces and aircraft. Disadvantages of 
geography can be reduced but not eliminated by having highly capable ships and 
aircraft. One of the key responsibilities of operational commanders and their staffs 
is to evaluate realistically all aspects of the operating areas. In planning a major 
naval/joint operation, it is critical to maximize the advantages and minimize the 
disadvantages of one’s base of operations.
Both the Kriegsmarine and the Royal Navy were highly centralized organiza-
tions� Admiral Raeder was generally reluctant to allow full freedom of action 
to subordinate operational commanders� The operational, and in many cases 
the tactical, organization of the Kriegsmarine underwent frequent—and some-
times unnecessary—changes� The establishment of naval group commands did 
not simplify but instead considerably complicated the C2 of German seagoing 
forces� Naval group commands should not have been entrusted with operational 
command of fleet forces� Raeder made an unsound organizational decision by 
directing Lütjens, a four-star admiral, to command a single combat group at sea; 
by doing so, Lütjens became subordinate in some matters to a junior admiral 
(Saalwächter, the commander of Naval Group Command West)� Perhaps such a 
decision would have been appropriate if the entire operation had been carried out 
using four battleships, as originally envisaged� The Kriegsmarine failed to move 
the fleet headquarters ashore� If that had been done, the fleet commander would 
have been a supported commander, while the naval groups’ commanders would 
have been supporting commanders�
In the Royal Navy, the Admiralty exercised strategic, and in some cases opera-
tional, control over all seagoing forces and shore commands� It also often usurped 
the responsibilities of subordinate commanders by making purely tactical deci-
sions� The Home Fleet was the largest and most important seagoing force in 
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home waters� Like the Kriegsmarine’s Fleet Command, the Home Fleet consisted 
of several type commands� Each of these was responsible for both administra-
tion and operations� In combat, it is far more flexible and effective to organize 
diverse forces into task forces/groups subordinate directly to the respective fleet 
commanders� Type commanders should be responsible solely for combat training 
and administration�
A major factor in the successful outcome of a major naval/joint operation is 
sound operational command organization. Optimally, unity of effort should be 
based on unity of command. A single operational commander should have full au-
thority over and responsibility for subordinate tactical forces. Such authority should 
not be shared among two or more commanders. Prior to the planning process, 
higher authority should designate a single supported commander. All other com-
manders should support the supported operational commander fully�
Both British and German operational and tactical intelligence relied pri-
marily on information obtained via air reconnaissance� Especially useful was 
photoreconnaissance� At this time the British ability to penetrate and read the 
German Enigma messages was not as effective as it would be later in the war� In 
contrast, the German B-Dienst seems to have been highly effective in decrypting 
British radio messages� One of the German advantages was that B-Dienst teams 
embarked in major surface combatants, and they usually were very quick in de-
crypting enemy messages� The major advantage the British enjoyed over the Ger-
mans was their establishment of a highly effective network of agents in Norway 
and other Scandinavian countries; perhaps the most effective of these was the Brit-
ish naval attaché in Stockholm and his helpers within the Swedish secret service�
Operational intelligence is one of the key elements for preparing sound plans for 
a major naval/joint operation. It combines strategic and tactical intelligence. Op-
erational intelligence should be based on information collected from diverse sources. 
Human intelligence is a critical and irreplaceable source for obtaining an accurate, 
timely, and relevant operational picture of the situation.
German naval operational planning was methodical and thorough� Nor-
mally, plans for a major operation were based on a relatively large number of 
staff studies and critical comments on these studies by the SKL and naval group 
commanders� The SKL and naval group commanders usually would issue broad 
instructions, while tactical commanders would draft operations orders for sub-
ordinate commanders� The SKL’s objective was to employ the Kriegsmarine’s 
heavy surface forces and auxiliary cruisers to complement the U-boats in their 
war on the British transatlantic convoys� Raeder’s intent was to weaken British 
naval strength in either home waters or the Mediterranean, and either to increase 
convoy defenses or to reduce the number of convoys�
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For the Germans, an almost insurmountable problem was their numerical in-
feriority in surface forces and a lack of adequate and reliable air support� Hence, 
the loss of any major surface combatant such as a battleship would have a much 
greater negative effect than such a loss would have on the Royal Navy� For all the 
high quality of its staff studies and the solid planning it conducted, the SKL made 
some very unrealistic assumptions about the effect that employment of battle-
ships would have on the naval situation in the North Atlantic� Perhaps the single 
most important reason they were unrealistic was geography� Even if the Germans 
incrementally had achieved sea control in the North Atlantic, they were not in a 
position to maintain that control for any length of time; both the Kriegsmarine 
and the Luftwaffe lacked sufficient strength and favorable bases of operations to 
control such a vast area of ocean�
Sea control cannot be achieved by focusing on destroying the enemy forces de-
fending convoys. Doing so invariably will result in a protracted war of attrition. Sea 
control is accomplished primarily by destroying a major part of the enemy forces in 
a major naval/joint operation in the initial phase of the war at sea. The obtaining 
of sea control aims at accomplishing an operational or strategic objective; however, 
consolidating one’s operational/strategic success by maintaining sea control also is 
critical—otherwise the fruits of victory will be lost.
There is no doubt that the decision Raeder faced—whether to employ the 
Bismarck combat group by itself in a new major operation against enemy con-
voys in the Atlantic—was a difficult one� The original intent—employing four 
battleships—probably had a much greater chance of success� Another good 
option would have been to delay the operation until Tirpitz, at least, was fully 
operational� The employment of both Bismarck and Tirpitz jointly would have 
compounded greatly the British problem in terms of preventing their breakouts 
and their subsequent attacks on the transatlantic convoys� In using the Bismarck 
group alone, Raeder took a high—and imprudent—risk� Everything depended 
on the Bismarck group breaking out undetected; otherwise, it was reasonable to 
expect (and not just in retrospect) that the British would make an all-out effort 
to destroy the Bismarck group� Even if Bismarck successfully avoided detection 
and subsequently attacked the convoys, it was almost certain the British would 
do everything possible to prevent its return either through the Denmark Strait 
or into a French port in the Bay of Biscay� Raeder’s concept of employing heavy 
cruisers and auxiliary cruisers to attack enemy ocean shipping was essentially 
sound; however, battleships—especially those of the Bismarck class—were an-
other matter� The risk involved in employing such major surface combatants 
beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft was simply too great, and hence 
unacceptable� The Germans were well aware of the air threat to their surface 
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ships, yet apparently their faith in their ability to break them out into the North 
Atlantic undetected was too strong�
The operational deployment of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Kors-
fjord, Bergen, proceeded uneventfully� But after the Admiralty and Home Fleet 
received information from the naval attaché in Stockholm about the passage of 
the Bismarck group through the Great Belt, they acted quickly� The cruise patrol 
in the Denmark Strait was strengthened� A part of the Home Fleet then in Scapa 
Flow was put into a state of increased combat readiness� Air reconnaissance of 
the Norwegian ports and Arctic waters was intensified� Admiral Tovey properly 
evaluated the situation and made sound decisions for the subsequent disposition 
of his forces� Prior to the encounter in the Denmark Strait, Tovey’s dispositions 
of the Battle Force and cruiser patrols covered all three northern passages, while 
keeping his Battle Force centrally positioned and able to intervene in a timely 
fashion toward the west or east�
The Germans suspected that British agents had sighted the movement of the 
Bismarck group, but Admiral Lütjens made no major changes to his plans despite 
his suspicions� Perhaps the chances of a successful breakout into the North At-
lantic would have been greater if the Bismarck group had sailed to Trondheim 
instead of Korsfjord, and had remained there for several weeks� This would have 
kept the British in suspense about the direction and timing of the group’s next 
movement�
Tactically, Lütjens handled the Bismarck group much better than his counter-
part, Admiral Holland, handled his forces� The gunnery of both Bismarck and 
Prinz Eugen was superior to that of the British ships� Holland made a mistake in 
detaching his destroyers prior to the encounter, thereby missing the opportunity 
to use them for a torpedo attack on the Bismarck group� Lütjens made a sound 
tactical decision in not pursuing the damaged Prince of Wales; his main mission 
was to attack enemy convoys, not to engage enemy heavy surface ships� Bismarck 
had suffered damages in the encounter with Prince of Wales and their extent was 
not precisely known at the time he had to make his decision� Reengaging Prince 
of Wales might well have resulted in additional damage to Bismarck.
Why Admiral Lütjens decided on the morning of May 24 to steer for Saint-
Nazaire instead of turning north and heading for Trondheim or Bergen is not 
known� He probably had good reason to believe that it would be possible to break 
away from his pursuers and make a westward swing into the open spaces of the 
North Atlantic� Yet he was well aware that once his group was discovered the 
British would make an all-out effort to destroy it� He also was much concerned 
with the threat that enemy carrier-borne torpedo planes posed� At the same time, 
the Bismarck group would operate well beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe 
bombers� In retrospect, it seems that after the encounter with BCS 1 the sound 
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decision would have been to withdraw back through the Denmark Strait� If 
Lütjens had made the decision to do so quickly, he would have had a very good 
chance of not encountering enemy heavy forces on his way to Trondheim or Ber-
gen� In addition, the Bismarck group would have reached the protective cover of 
Luftwaffe aircraft much sooner than on the route to Saint-Nazaire�
The British cruisers’ masterful use of their search radars made it impossible for 
the Germans to shake off their pursuers� This was a major reason the Admiralty 
and Admiral Tovey eventually were able to concentrate an overwhelming force 
against Bismarck� The Admiralty took a high but prudent risk in detaching so 
many ships from convoy duty to take part in the pursuit� In the final phase of the 
operation, Bismarck’s chances diminished steadily� Perhaps if Bismarck had not 
unluckily received the torpedo hit that disabled its rudder there would have been 
some chance for the ship to reach the safety of a French port� Whether that would 
have allowed Bismarck to survive is a question no one can answer for certain�
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american grand strategy
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American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump, by Hal Brands� 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2018� 256 pages� 
$25�99 (paperback)�
Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition, 
by David Hendrickson� New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 2017� 
304 pages� $34�95�
These two books reach dramatically different conclusions, but both authors start 
from similar premises� David Hendrickson is deeply rooted in what one might 
call the Old Testament in American foreign policy: as the American founders 
established it, with a heavy emphasis on neutrality and nonintervention in for-
eign conflicts—that is, restraint� Hal Brands is no less rooted in what one might 
call the New Testament in American grand strategy: as practiced from the Cold 
War to the present, and focused on preserving 
the post–World War II, American-led liberal in-
ternational order, which he sees as dependent on 
continued American primacy�
Each man is troubled by heresy, so to speak, 
with Hendrickson fearful that the American peo-
ple have come to worship the “golden calf of em-
pire” and Brands worried that in the age of Presi-
dent Trump they will throw away all they built 
from the rubble of the Second World War� This 
quasi-religious terminology seems appropriate, 
because both Hendrickson and Brands understand 
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that—whatever partisan differences Americans may have—American grand 
strategy depends on a consensus akin to what Abraham Lincoln called a “po-
litical religion” about what the strategy is for� Both authors agree on something 
fundamental, made famous at the dawn of the Cold War by the journalist Walter 
Lippmann: that the grand strategic dimension of foreign policy entails “bringing 
into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s com-
mitments and the nation’s power” (Brands, p� 128; Hendrickson, pp� 172–75)�
As Brands discusses the issue, there are three generic solutions to this prob-
lem: (1) “decrease commitments, thereby restoring equilibrium with diminished 
resources”; (2) “live with greater risk,” either by gambling that adversaries will 
not test vulnerable commitments or by employing riskier approaches, such as 
nuclear escalation or cyber warfare, to “sustain commitments on the cheap”; or 
(3) “expand capabilities and thereby restore strategic solvency” (Brands, p� 128)�
Moreover, both writers express some admiration for Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger for attempting a grand strategic reassessment meant to correct Ameri-
can overextension by reducing some commitments and shifting some burdens to
American allies during the Vietnam War (Brands, pp� 115, 118, 140; Hendrick-
son, pp� 175–80)� The difference is that Hendrickson stresses reducing commit-
ments, while Brands stresses increasing capabilities, to close what can be called
the Lippmann Gap� In theory, either solution might work; but which is best?
That depends, in part, on how one understands what grand strategy is for� 
Hendrickson is emphatic: Americans have lost their way� Like an Old Testament 
prophet, he tries to recall us to the original covenant� Primacy, or empire, was 
never the ultimate purpose of the American republic� The purpose of the Ameri-
can regime is to secure republican liberty, not everywhere—however much one 
might wish well to those who seek it elsewhere—but at home, with the survival 
of liberty in America a beacon of hope to those other places� So Hendrickson 
stresses the primacy of domestic policy� All grand strategic decisions must be 
evaluated not merely in terms of how well they secure life and material prosperity 
but, ultimately, and most fundamentally, in terms of how well they secure liberty 
for ourselves and our posterity�
Like Brands, Hendrickson is aware that the pursuit of continued primacy, or 
the ability to dominate in any conflict, has animated the grand strategic visions 
of every American president since the end of the George H� W� Bush adminis-
tration� Both agree that there is far more continuity than change in this pursuit; 
usually disagreements occur over different emphases� These include soft versus 
hard power; with allied support or not; and through forward presence in Europe, 
Asia, and the Middle East, at the risk of encouraging free riders, or by some light 
footprint meant to limit American liability and avoid local and international 
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blowback� For Hendrickson, however, the primary issue is how well these ap-
proaches serve liberty at home and American principles of liberty abroad�
Hendrickson is damning in his critique of primacy as a threat to just about 
everything the American republic is meant to stand for� Empires tend to need 
emperors—which leads to imperial presidencies� Since September 11, 2001, 
presidents have used the original authorization to use military force against Al 
Qaeda to justify interventions, well, almost everywhere in Northeast Asia, the 
Middle East, and Africa, and Congress has failed to provide a serious check� 
And the increasing growth of the national security state—what Dwight D� Eisen-
hower, who was no liberal, called the military-industrial complex—constitutes an 
enormous transfer of power to unaccountable elites� Drunk on the ideology of 
spreading democracy everywhere, Americans, as John Quincy Adams long ago 
warned might happen, have gone abroad in search of monsters to destroy but 
have become monsters themselves, wreaking havoc with unnecessary wars and 
creating anarchy in Libya and Iraq in the name of regime change�
So Hendrickson advocates restraint, although it looks a lot like retrenchment� 
Fearful of aggravating conflict further, he suggests that American grand strategy 
focus on avoiding giving unnecessary offense� It would be prudent, he thinks, for 
the United States to adopt a policy of self-limitation—which others might see as 
accepting spheres of influence, for Russia and China especially� War with a resur-
gent Russia and a rising China would be less likely if the United States changed 
its policy, and also its strategy� Forward deployments of American military forces 
give unnecessary offense and should be minimized� Maritime strategies to fight 
anywhere near the coast of China are unduly provocative and probably doomed 
to fail, while attritional strategies on the high seas have better odds of success� 
Consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States should shift the burden 
of defense and deterrence as much as possible onto regional allies, and hold its 
forces in reserve until required� Hendrickson’s approach, by limiting American 
reach, might prevent strategic overextension, which he sees in political more than 
military or economic terms� The more the United States acts like an empire, the 
greater the threat to the republic, so restraint is essential to the true purposes of 
an American grand strategy�
Not so fast, says Brands, to all advocates of restraint today� Yes, the Iraq War was 
almost certainly a mistake, but the New Testament in American grand strategy 
has accomplished unprecedented good� The American-led liberal international 
order has prevented great-power war—the greatest killer in history—since 1945; 
that is, for over seventy years� In Europe and Asia especially, this has produced a 
security community with a degree of wealth and liberty almost unimaginable a 
hundred years ago� It is based on two premises: the reality of security, economic, 
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and other forms of interdependence; and the continuing indispensability of the 
United States as the hegemon (not to be confused with emperor) of a voluntary 
and usually cooperative network of alliances, in Europe and Asia especially, and 
more problematically in the Middle East�
Of course, Hendrickson, like many other advocates of restraint, does not want 
to throw this extraordinary accomplishment away; he supports preserving the 
American network of regional alliances, but at the lowest possible level of cost, 
risk, and effort, to minimize the dangers the national security state might pose to 
liberty at home� In contrast, Brands warns against attempting to hold the liberal 
international order together on the cheap� Prudence requires understanding that 
as Americans retrench, allies may not pick up the slack, or even might “bandwag-
on” over to the side of challengers� And Brands is at his best critiquing theories 
of offshore balancing and limited liability as ways of closing the Lippmann Gap� 
Maybe retrenchment might lower short-term costs, but it also might increase 
the risks that other powers will fill a vacuum, which would lead to higher costs 
later if Americans decided to reintervene, as they did in Iraq after the rise of ISIS� 
Costs might be lower with a sustained, minimal presence in theaters deemed stra-
tegically vital to the United States—but only maybe� So Brands is unapologetic 
in insisting that the best grand strategy for our time is to increase capabilities 
substantially—on the level of the increase of the Carter and Reagan administra-
tions, that is, by 50 percent, although he insists this would amount to no more 
than 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), much lower than during the 
hottest periods of the Cold War� So, ironically, he too seems to think there are 
cheap solutions to America’s grand strategic problems�
In truth, both Hendrickson and Brands are living in semi-ideal worlds� Even 
in the age of President Trump, the option of Lippmann’s that Americans are most 
likely to pick—deliberately or through inertia—is the one about which neither 
Hendrickson nor Brands talks much: accepting higher risk� Americans do not yet 
wish to downgrade commitments to the level Hendrickson advises, nor to pay 
the cost of increased capabilities at the level Brands advocates� This is obviously a 
dangerous predicament, but not unlike those of the Cold War, when, to cut costs, 
Americans accepted greater risks by threatening massive nuclear retaliation and 
the escalation that might ensue�
But, as Clausewitz teaches, strategy, even grand strategy, is about the imagina-
tive search for options, and then selecting the best, according to such criteria as 
cost, risk, theory of victory, and probability of success� Brands is so much a part of 
the New Testament orthodoxy, and so fearful of the heresies of the 2016 election 
and its aftermath, that he says nothing—absolutely nothing—about the dangers 
to the American republic arising from the quest for primacy� And Brands is too 
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facile on the subject of “democracy promotion” as an end of American grand 
strategy� As a student of John Quincy Adams, Hendrickson is all too aware that 
this can lead, and often has led, to a form of democratic imperialism incompat-
ible with American principles, rightly understood� Yes, the Old Testament is old, 
but it is not “overcome by events�” It is still worth reading precisely because it calls 
us back to first principles�
Are there any other grand strategic options? Of course� One such might split 
the profound difference between Hendrickson and Brands� It would accept 
the necessity of primacy, but not at all times and all places against everyone—
a recipe for strategic overextension and moral decline, with the United States 
risking emulating the Roman Republic in becoming a new Roman Empire� It 
would suffice for the United States to be primus inter pares (first among equals) 
within the liberal order, which it built, not altruistically, but to serve American 
security and principles� Limited primacy—to lead a coalition, not to dominate 
the globe—might preserve the liberal international order, so long as burdens are 
adjusted more equitably�
Hard military power is largely a function of economic power� Today, the Unit-
ed States produces 24 percent of global GDP; the European Union 23 percent; 
Japan 4�1 percent; and South Korea 1�8 percent—the latter the same as resurgent 
Russia’s! China has 18�5 percent, and its share is growing; but, given its demo-
graphics and other problems, how long that will remain true is unclear� Throw 
in some other possible allies, such as India or Vietnam, and the United States 
and its current allies—sometimes called the West, even when some reside in the 
East—are still in the catbird seat�
These countries just have to work together as members of a team—a question-
able proposition in current political circumstances, but not inconsistent with 
practice since the end of the Second World War� It just requires the United States 
to lead, rather than divide, its own team�
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sea power does europe still get it?
Martin N. Murphy
The Decline of European Naval Forces: Challenges to Sea Power 
in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty, by 
Jeremy Stöhs� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018� 290 
pages� $36�95�
This is a lucid tour d’horizon of a dispiriting subject: Europe’s navies� With the 
partial exceptions of the British and French navies, and the peculiar exceptions 
of Norway and Sweden—which exist under the dark shadow of Russia—all other 
European navies have suffered from deliberate neglect, wishful thinking, and 
poor decision-making� Furthermore, they appear to view the world as Europe’s 
politicians want it to be rather than as it is�
Underpinning all this credulity is the assumption that America will ride to 
Europe’s rescue; most of Europe’s navies could not operate without at least some 
degree of U�S� support� President Donald J� Trump’s harsh warning that North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies—Germany especially—need to in-
crease their defense spending should be repeated regularly until they do� They 
should not see the U�S� Defense Department’s recent actions—deliberations 
about whether to maintain a carrier regularly in the Mediterranean to counter 
an increasingly assertive Russian naval presence in the region and the announce-
ment from the Chief of Naval Operations that the Second Fleet will be reestab-
lished because of the marked rise in Russian submarine activity in the North 
Atlantic—as excuses to believe that things have returned to some faux–Cold War 
normal and they once again can shelter under a U�S� umbrella�
To be sure, Russia is breathing down Europe’s neck, but it is China that pre-
sents the real danger� The world’s seas are gaining importance: for trade, fish, 
energy, minerals, and, of course, great-power confrontation� Key to all these is sea 
control underpinned, from a Western perspective, by a freedom of the seas that 
China is seeking to deny to others except on its own terms� The front line lies in 
the waters around Taiwan, stretching down into the South China Sea and slowly 
extending into the eastern Indian Ocean�
So far, the only state standing in China’s way 
is the United States, with Japan in support� The 
United States already is concentrating its forces 
in the Indo-Pacific theater and making it clear 
that it is looking to other states to join it and 
Martin N. Murphy is a research fellow at the Corbett 
Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College 
London and an associate fellow of the Royal United 
Services Institute.
© 2018 by Martin N� Murphy
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internationalize the pushback against the fundamental threat that China presents 
to the existing global maritime order� Europe’s problem, in other words, is that 
not only is the United States largely leaving Europe to fend for itself in its own 
waters, but it is expecting its allies to join the only fight that counts (pp� 18–19, 
23, 27)�
Britain and France alone are taking steps to support the United States and 
Japan� However, the help they can provide is largely moral, given the damage 
that a quarter century of cuts has imposed on their fleets and absent a substantial 
recommitment to their naval capabilities� Unless other navies join this effort and 
their political leaders support it, then, as Stöhs writes, Europe will have “relegated 
itself to the outer fringes of a world centered on the Pacific” (p� 8)�
Stöhs, who is an analyst at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy and 
an adjunct at its Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, describes his main 
objective as giving readers an insight into the developments and changes that 
have occurred in Europe’s navies since the end of the Cold War� He succeeds ad-
mirably� He examines all of Europe’s principal naval powers comparatively from 
a platform-centric point of view, using graphs to illustrate the steep declines in 
their military expenditure and warship numbers�
Stöhs shows how little Europe’s current navies resemble their Cold War prede-
cessors� Britain and France remain powerful, but even they are no longer in the 
first rank of naval powers� The disappearance of the Soviet threat after 1991 left 
politicians across the continent eager to spend the so-called peace dividend and 
their navies scrambling for something to justify their existence�
Like the U�S� Navy, they mostly found that justification in power projection 
and expeditionary operations, first in Iraq and later in support of humanitarian 
assistance and the war on terror� However, each of these functions sacrificed 
the skills and equipment to fulfill traditional naval missions, a decline that is 
most noticeable at the upper end of the conflict spectrum� Germany is the most 
egregious example; effectively, it is taking advantage of its neighbors’ sea power 
as Europe collectively takes advantage of the sea power of the United States� As 
Stöhs puts it, numerous indicators suggest that “Germany will remain unwill-
ing to conduct any form of high-intensity warfighting in the foreseeable future” 
(p� 129)� In other words, although naval forces across Europe look powerful on 
paper, that strength—with the partial exceptions of Britain and France—is con-
centrated at the lower level of the intensity scale�
This stands in stark contrast with Indo-Pacific navies that are configured for 
war fighting� Europe’s smaller navies, moreover, have continued the Cold War 
practice of niche specialization as an answer to inadequate funding� To make that 
work, great strides have been made to improve interoperability� However, what 
was justifiable and practical as part of NATO in the face of the relatively narrow 
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range of Cold War threats looks imprudent now in the face of challenges that are 
less predictable and more distant� Many European states rely on the naval forces 
of neighbors (and the United States) to fill capability gaps to make them relevant 
at all (pp� 187–89)�
This is an important and timely book� Europe lies on the periphery of Amer-
ica’s vision� It catches our eye largely because of Russia’s newfound adventurism� 
Yet it remains important to us, not least because of the growing confrontation 
with China that is driven by rival values as well as by rival power� Europe should 
be our ally� Given the importance of the sea in future power balances, economic 
as well as geopolitical, and Europe’s reliance on the sea for its own economic well-
being, our mutual interest should be obvious across a continent whose history is 
so rooted in sea power�
But it is not� As Stöhs notes, it is difficult to persuade any nation’s taxpayers 
of the sea’s importance, especially in the absence of clear political leadership, 
and across Europe that leadership, political and military, cannot agree on com-
mon goals (pp� 182, 192)� These divisions well may widen when Britain leaves 
the European Union (EU) and the European Commission attempts to boost its 
much-vaunted “defense union” at the expense of NATO�
NATO operates on consensus, which it is hard to believe will extend to the 
East Asia littoral absent a clear and present danger, a recognition that is muddied 
by the economic leverage that China has gained over powerful political interests 
in several member states� The EU, despite its political posturing, is largely irrel-
evant for the moment� If that changes, from a defense perspective as it already 
has from an economic one, Europe is likely to become more insular, less global, 
and even less naval in its outlook�
Sea power, both economic and military, will play a critical role in the world’s 
future� The question Stöhs raises (p� 6) for Europe is: Whose sea power will it be?
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WHEN ELEPHANTS DANCE
World War II at Sea: A Global History, by Craig L� Symonds� New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 2018� 792 
pages� $34�95�
Craig Symonds evidently believes in 
taking on roles that reasonably could be 
regarded as tough acts to follow�  
He followed the eminent Professor  
E� B� Potter at the U�S� Naval Academy 
and he is currently Professor John B� 
Hattendorf ’s successor as (appropri-
ately) the Ernest J� King Distinguished 
Visiting Professor of Maritime 
History at the Naval War College�
Consequently, whereas most scholarship 
on World War II tends to concentrate 
on single geographic areas, such as the 
Pacific, the Atlantic, or the Mediter-
ranean, or specific themes, Professor 
Symonds has undertaken the daunting 
task of describing and explaining in 
one volume the complex, interrelated 
“impact of the sea services from all na-
tions on the overall trajectory and even 
the outcome of the war” (p� xii)� True to 
his word, Symonds includes, unusually, 
not only the major states engaged at sea 
(the United States, Japan, Great Britain, 
and Germany), but also the Italians, 
French, and Russians, who, in other 
accounts, usually appear in walk-on 
parts or as foils to the main combatants�
In many areas he is, of course, treading 
a well-worn, generally familiar path, 
whose main features are hallowed by 
decades of specialist scholarship, folk 
memory, and innumerable memoirs 
and monographs� Having entered the 
field with influential contributions to 
the scholarship of the maritime history 
of World War II, most notably The 
Battle of Midway (Oxford Univ� Press, 
2011) and Neptune: The Allied Invasion 
of Europe and the D-day Landings 
(Oxford Univ� Press, 2014), Symonds, in 
World War II at Sea, filters a very wide 
selection of primary and secondary 
sources to provide an authoritative, 
comprehensive account that covers 
the full range of maritime decision-
making and combat� His main theme 
is that the sea provides the essential 
unity and definition to a world war� 
Moreover, if you want to win a world 
war, first you have to win it at sea�
The challenge for the narrative 
historian in emphasizing the seamlessly 
interrelated character of a world war 
at sea comes in maintaining focus and 
balance in the face of a wide range of 
parallel issues, simultaneous campaigns, 
and geographically dispersed combat 
episodes� Happily, the way in which 
maritime campaigns unfolded in World 
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BOOK REVIEWS
WHEN ELEPHANTS DANCE
World War II at Sea: A Global History, by Craig L� Symonds� New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 2018� 792 
pages� $34�95�
War II—first in and around Europe, 
then across the Atlantic, before spread-
ing to Russia and the Indo-Pacific 
region—assists in this regard� After 
Pearl Harbor it becomes more difficult, 
and Symonds employs a useful device 
by regularly reminding the reader what 
is going on elsewhere� For example, 
he notes that D-day in Normandy in 
June 1944 virtually coincided with the 
amphibious assault on Saipan� Indeed, 
the fact that “the Allies could mount 
two major invasions on opposite sides 
of the world only nine days apart 
underscored the global character of 
the war as well as the depth of Allied 
resources” at that stage of the war (p� 
538)� Elsewhere, the simultaneous fates 
of Malta and Guadalcanal are linked in 
a single chapter, while another entitled 
“Landing Ships, Tank (LSTs)” provides 
a useful unifying thread for amphibious 
campaigns in the Pacific (the Gilbert and 
the Marshall Islands), the Mediterranean 
(Anzio), and D-day in Normandy�
In three dispersed chapters on “the war 
on trade,” he neatly combines several 
disparate themes and underlines how 
the Allies’ ability to access the sea for 
their own use and to deny its use to 
their enemies was critical to victory� 
The Japanese, Italians, and Germans 
progressively were deprived of the raw 
materials, food, and, most importantly, 
fuel to sustain their fighting power and 
populations, while the Allies’ eventual 
control of the sea enabled them to secure 
their home countries from attack, 
maintain their populations, and project 
decisive combat power at and from 
the sea� In particular, Symonds details 
how the highly destructive antiship-
ping campaign against the Japanese 
by American submarines and aircraft, 
the British interdiction of German and 
Italian supplies to North Africa, and the 
effective blockade of the European Axis 
powers were decisive in this regard, even 
as Axis naval forces were destroyed at 
sea� Conversely, he describes how the 
Germans and Italians in the Atlantic 
and beyond were unable to—and the 
Japanese, in the Pacific, did not care to—
interdict Allied supply routes decisively�
In this carefully researched and elegantly 
structured account, Symonds combines a 
highly engaging narrative style with the 
rare ability to describe both complex is-
sues and potentially confusing maritime 
campaigns and actions in a concise and 
lucid way� A tiny scattering of technical 
inaccuracies will distract only the deep 
specialist or pedant� Meanwhile, both 
professional and armchair historians will 
recognize and appreciate his well-judged, 
finely drawn—if conventional— 
characterizations of the major politicians 
and commanders, distinctively illuminat-
ed by entertaining anecdotes and asides�
There are also plenty of lessons for the 
discerning practitioner, particularly 
in reminding the twenty-first-century 
navy, by implication, about the realities 
and exceptional demands of high-end 
maritime combat, most of which have 
been forgotten or discarded� The 
most striking strategic lesson is that 
in a global conflict at sea, choice and 
priorities really count; one cannot be 
strong everywhere simultaneously, 
whether in landing craft, antisubmarine 
escorts, or merchant shipping� In a 
faint echo at the tactical level, I recall 
serving on a destroyer under heavy air 
attack in San Carlos Water near the 
Falklands in 1982, earnestly wondering 
(complaining) why it was that the 
Royal Navy had not laid smoke screens, 
maximized the number of machine guns 
on deck, and deployed barrage balloons�
Another lesson that applies today 
is that none of the Allied powers 
could have prevailed in World War II 
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against Germany or Japan without the 
industrial muscle, logistical support, 
and fighting power of the United 
States, even before Pearl Harbor� This 
dependent relationship against major 
opponents persists today and links to the 
evidence in this book that a continental 
power cannot expect to prevail against 
a major power on another continent 
without the ability to use the sea to 
its advantage and to deny its use to an 
opponent� One might be forgiven for 
thinking that an industrially charged 
China has absorbed these lessons�
CHRIS PARRY
Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life, by Thomas Al-
exander Hughes� Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ� 
Press, 2016� 544 pages� $35�
Fleet Admiral “Bull” Halsey was the 
object of wide-ranging publicity during 
the Second World War� After the war, 
Halsey published his memoirs, and since 
then half a dozen biographers have told 
his story and many have visited his cam-
paigns in thematic approaches� With so 
much already done, readers might tend 
to overlook this volume as just more of 
the same� Doing that would be a mis-
take� Thomas Hughes’s well-researched 
study of Halsey is a masterfully crafted, 
revisionist work that brings new insights 
to the understanding of one of the most 
complex and controversial command-
ers in American naval history� In this 
volume, Hughes draws a clear distinc-
tion between “Bull” Halsey, the wartime 
leader whom the press celebrated and 
made into a larger-than-life caricature, 
and the real Bill Halsey, whose story 
the author tells in this volume�
Halsey’s wartime career is well-known 
and continually debated, but few readers 
have known much about his family 
background and earlier years� Hughes 
describes these aspects of life with great 
insight� Fleet Admiral Halsey liked 
to boast that he was descended from 
generations of hard-drinking, rowdy 
sailors and adventurers; this hardly 
was the case� The Halsey family had a 
distinguished heritage� On his father’s 
side, his ancestors had arrived in Puritan 
Massachusetts in 1638 and soon became 
large landowners on Long Island, New 
York� In the early nineteenth century, 
one of them, Charles Halsey, married the 
granddaughter of Rufus King, a signer 
of the Constitution, one of America’s 
first ambassadors to Great Britain, 
and a very wealthy man� Rufus King’s 
son Charles King married a daughter 
of Archibald Gracie of New York, 
whose stately home became the official 
residence of New York’s mayor� Charles 
King was publisher and editor of New 
York newspapers and became president 
of Columbia University� Charles Halsey’s 
son William married Anne Brewster, 
a direct descendant of Elder William 
Brewster, the primary author of the 
Mayflower Compact and the leading 
religious figure of the Plymouth colony� 
Their son was Admiral Halsey�
Before William Jr� joined the U�S� Navy, 
only a few of his Brewster ancestors 
had been seafarers, and none were of 
the swashbuckling variety� Admiral 
Halsey’s father and namesake entered 
the Naval Academy in 1869 and 
graduated in 1872� He retired as a 
captain in 1907 but continued to work 
for the Navy’s Bureau of Construction 
and Repair until 1919� While he was 
at sea in 1882 aboard USS Iroquois 
on the Pacific station, his son—the 
future admiral—was born at his wife’s 
family home in Elizabeth, New Jersey� 
During his career, William Sr� attended 
the summer course at the Naval War 
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College in 1897 and heard Theodore 
Roosevelt speak as Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy; but for the future admiral, 
the Naval War College became a much 
more important aspect of his career�
In the early part of his career, William 
Jr� served under William S� Sims in the 
destroyer flotilla, along with Dudley 
Knox and others� Knox may have been 
the key to the younger Halsey’s assign-
ment to the Office of Naval Intelligence 
in 1920 and six months later as naval 
attaché in Berlin, where he reported 
extensively on German naval develop-
ments in the early years of the Weimar 
Republic� In 1932–33, Captain Halsey Jr� 
followed his father’s earlier example by 
attending the Naval War College� One 
of his classmates was another future 
five-star admiral, Captain Ernest J� King� 
Halsey and his wife lived in Jamestown 
and commuted daily across the bay to 
the College� Although no star student at 
the Naval War College, he was initially 
considered as a choice for the faculty� 
After some false starts with other orders, 
Halsey eventually went on in the next 
year to the Army War College, then 
located in Washington, DC, where 
his classmates included Jonathan 
Wainwright and a future Army five-star 
general, Omar Bradley� Again he did not 
distinguish himself academically, but his 
time there gave him unusual perspective 
as one of the very few to graduate from 
both the Army and Naval War Colleges�
However, that may well have been 
Washington’s way of putting him 
in a holding pattern preparatory to 
going on to the aviation positions that 
Admirals Leahy and King had been 
recommending for him� In 1934, Halsey 
went to Pensacola for training as a flight 
observer, but soon bent the rules of the 
system to earn his pilot’s wings as the 
oldest newly qualified naval aviator, 
at the age of fifty-two� Thus, Halsey 
cleared the way for a series of aircraft 
carrier commands that eventually led 
to his wartime career in the Pacific�
Hughes has researched Halsey’s wartime 
career carefully and writes judiciously 
and with great authority using his 
extensive new research� Among many 
interesting points, Hughes finds an 
explanation for the mysterious skin 
ailment that forced Halsey out of 
commanding the Enterprise Task Force 
just before the battle of Midway in 
1942� While a fungal infection probably 
caused dermatitis, it likely was related 
to a bacterial infection in five of his 
teeth, all of which Dr� Warren Vaughan, 
a noted dermatologist from Richmond, 
Virginia, brought under control in 
early 1943 so that Halsey could return 
to command in the Pacific theater�
Controversies about Halsey as a combat 
commander undoubtedly will continue, 
and Hughes’s excellent book will not be 
the last word on the subject, but there is 
no doubt that it should be the first book 
on the subject that one should consult�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense 
and American Strategy in Asia, by Ian Easton� 
Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2017� 406 
pages� $20�
Ian Easton examines and discusses 
in fair detail the difficulties that the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) would face during an invasion 
of Taiwan� He provides overall orders 
of battle for both Taiwan and China; 
explains which beaches on Taiwan are, 
or are not, suitable for invasion; provides 
monthly historical estimates of the 
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weather with which an invasion likely 
would have to contend; and describes 
the defenses and policies Taiwan has 
created to deter, or defeat, such an 
invasion� Easton also describes, albeit 
to a lesser degree, some of the aspects of 
the Chinese bombardment and blockade 
campaigns that likely would precede 
or accompany an invasion of Taiwan�
The author builds a case that China’s 
military is well aware of the many 
problems and issues that would have 
to be overcome if the PLA were to 
invade Taiwan successfully, and that 
Taiwan is well positioned, trained, and 
equipped to repel such an effort� He 
concludes that “Taiwan has little to fear 
of invasion for right now” (p� 272)�
A strength of the book is that the 
author uses current and authoritative, 
or at least well-situated, Chinese and 
Taiwan sources in making his estimates� 
Consequently, the bibliography is a 
valuable resource for anyone devoted to 
studying the military balance across the 
Taiwan Strait� Also noteworthy is the 
fact that the author of this volume works 
at the 2049 Institute� Furthermore, 
he acknowledges Mark Stokes as a 
long-term mentor and thanks Randal 
Shriver, until recently the 2049 Institute’s 
director, for his leadership and support� 
Stokes, of course, is as knowledgeable 
about many aspects of the PLA as any 
Westerner, and Shriver currently serves 
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs� Read-
ers therefore can assume that the book 
offers insights into some of the current 
administration’s potential inclinations 
regarding defense support to Taiwan� In 
those important ways, the book is im-
pressively informed and worth reading�
Despite those strengths, the author’s 
sincere sympathy for Taiwan leads to a 
tendency to overreach, which sometimes 
results in unsubstantiated assumptions� 
For example, while demonstrating 
that Taiwan will have ample strategic 
warning of a Chinese invasion, he 
asserts that in the immediate run-up to 
an invasion “farm animals, especially 
pigs, would be gathered in huge herds 
to feed the troops” (p� 76)� One wonders 
why the invading forces would require 
substantially more fresh pork than they 
consumed beforehand� On the next page 
he writes, “Shipyards would probably 
be operating at breakneck speeds for at 
least three months prior to the invasion, 
working on 24 hour shifts and brightly 
lit up at night� Light and noise travel 
great distances over water, making them 
easy to pickup with submarines and 
surveillance ships�” That any such in-
creases in noise and light could correlate 
definitively to landing ship construction, 
from miles offshore, and through a peri-
scope, is at best doubtful� This tendency 
toward inconsistent logic is repeated on 
page 97, where he asserts, “China cannot 
effectively blockade Taiwan without 
bombarding it and Taiwan cannot be 
bombed until it has been blockaded�” 
Another example occurs on page 259, 
when in a discussion of the perils of 
mirror imaging he states, “It is too easy 
to forget that reality and facts are things 
that are arbitrary and subjective�” Better 
editing would have helped this volume�
More significantly, the author’s bias for 
Taiwan sometimes leads to dubious 
conclusions� An example occurs when 
the author states that “Taiwan’s spy-
catchers have discovered and arrested 
traitors soon after China has recruited 
them, ensuring that security breaches 
were short lived” and that “experts point 
out that Taiwan has done an extraordi-
nary job in recruiting well-placed agents 
in China who can provide early warning 
information to the Presidential Office 
(and the White House)” (p� 70)� One 
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hopes that Taiwan’s counterintelligence 
efforts are indeed that good, but readers 
probably recall that the John Walker spy 
ring operated for over fifteen years in the 
United States during the Cold War, caus-
ing enormous harm� Doubtless, Taiwan 
works hard to catch spies—as did the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation during 
the Cold War—but it just does not 
seem credible that Taiwan is immune 
to effective Chinese espionage efforts� 
Readers also might be forgiven for 
doubting the author’s claim of Chinese 
counterintelligence ineptitude if recent 
reports in the press describing Beijing’s 
destruction of Central Intelligence 
Agency networks in China are accurate�
The perils inherent in the book’s 
analytical tilt in favor of Taiwan extend 
to other areas, perhaps most critically 
to the author’s assessment (which relies 
on some of his previous, similar work) 
that the threat that China’s conventional 
missile force and counterair systems 
pose to Taiwan’s air force and navy is 
manageable� This is important because 
if this conclusion is wrong Taiwan’s 
exposure to Chinese bombardment 
and blockade, and even invasion, is 
far higher than the author asserts� 
This vulnerability—which depends on 
whether Chinese long-range precision 
strikes can be effective against Taiwan’s 
defenses—will remain a critical factor 
in Taiwan’s ability to deter or withstand 
Chinese uses of force� The implications 
of this competition extend far beyond 
Taiwan� This work would be better 
if it had addressed this issue more 
thoroughly� Another subject that falls in 
this category of insufficient treatment 
is China’s ability to use its maritime 
militia during an invasion of Taiwan�
Nonetheless, there is value in this 
book� Its sources, and the author’s 
background and experiences, provide a 
basis for optimism regarding Taiwan’s 
ability to resist an invasion, which 
the author relates enthusiastically�
WILLIAM S� MURRAY
Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, Economics, and 
the Rise of American Naval Power, 1881–1921, by 
Paul E� Pedisich� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2016� 304 pages� $39�95�
The subject of Paul E� Pedisich’s newest 
work, Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, 
Economics, and the Rise of American 
Naval Power, 1881–1921, is apparent 
from its title� Pedisich proposes that it 
was Congress—rather than the ex-
ecutive branch—that was most directly 
responsible for funding and building 
the U�S� Navy during this pivotal period� 
This well-researched work considers 
four decades of presidential actions, 
congressional legislation, and USN 
policy and their role in the buildup of 
U�S� naval power and capabilities�
These four decades (1881–1921) are 
in many ways the most important in 
U�S� naval history and development, 
spanning the aftermath of the Civil War 
through the end of the First World War� 
At the beginning of this period, Pedisich 
demonstrates the relative feebleness of 
the U�S� Navy in comparison with Euro-
pean naval powers, most notably Great 
Britain� However, this study demon-
strates how the efforts of nine presidents 
and their cabinets, sixteen Secretaries 
of the Navy, and innumerable members 
of Congress were able to transform the 
U�S� Navy from a neglected, presteel, 
and defensively focused organization 
into—in the aftermath of World War 
I—the world’s premier naval power�
Pedisich’s study is notable for its focus 
on the legislative branch’s central place 
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in developing the nation’s maritime 
power and naval war-fighting capabili-
ties� Consequently, it should be noted 
that this work is not a study of naval 
warfare, tactics, or strategy� Rather, 
Pedisich’s extensive research of the 
congressional sources explores the 
personal and political negotiations and 
decisions, and the attendant legislation 
and congressional appropriations, 
that in essence “built” this new Navy 
over the course of four decades�
Perhaps this book’s greatest strength 
is as a catalog of the wealth of 
primary-source material from which 
Pedisich drew: personal and private 
correspondence, political speeches, and 
military and congressional records� 
The book is also rich in a level of detail 
that constitutes a microhistory of the 
period’s naval and congressional politics� 
One thing readers will not be lacking 
after reading this book is information�
Yet Congress Buys a Navy has numerous 
weaknesses� Perhaps the most obvious is 
a lack of clear purpose� While this work 
extensively chronicles naval politics in 
Washington—including congressional 
appropriations, arguments, voting 
records, and political maneuvers—as 
well as decisions from the various Navy 
Secretaries and the rest of the executive 
branch, it falls short in providing the 
larger historical contextualization for 
making sense of this plethora of specific 
information� Furthermore, Pedisich 
does not explain the meaning of this 
massive data dump in any conclusive 
manner� Most significantly, Pedisich’s 
overall assessment of this period is 
uncertain: Did the Navy (and the 
United States) need more funding? 
Less? The reader is left uncertain� 
Despite Pedisich’s richness of detail, 
his assessment of the specific pro-
cesses that transformed the Navy from 
a weak, presteel force into a premier 
fighting force remains ambiguous�
Despite Pedisich’s attention to 
consecutive legislatures, congressional 
appropriations, funding, and various 
Secretaries of the Navy and politicians, 
he does not give the reader regular, 
intermediate updates regarding the 
exact strength and capability of the Navy 
for this period� Occasionally, Pedisich 
does draw attention to numerical values 
of naval forces, but when he does he 
offers little in the way of explanation 
of the lethality and functionality of the 
Navy� As a result, the reader may be 
disappointed at the lack of details on 
the status of naval forces, such as ships 
in use and those under construction�
Absent a consistent and overarching 
metanarrative, the book ultimately reads 
more as a collection of case studies 
on congressional processes and as 
an encyclopedic compilation of at-
tendant economic and political facts 
and statistics—all perhaps of lesser 
interest to armchair naval historians� 
However, Congress Buys a Navy is 
a thoroughly researched work that 
warrants accolades for highlighting 
the key role that Congress played 
in creating a modern U�S� Navy�
BLAKE I� CAMPBELL
Everything under the Heavens: How the Past Helps 
Shape China’s Push for Global Power, by Howard 
W� French� New York: Knopf, 2017� 352 pages� 
$27�95�
As a journalist who has done his 
historical research, Howard W� French 
has produced a highly readable book 
that probes the Chinese concept of tian 
xia, roughly meaning China’s “natural 
dominion over everything under 
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heaven” (pp. 3–4), and particularly on 
its impact on the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) as it drives toward regional 
and international dominance. His focus 
on the cultural and racial nature of the 
traditional Chinese view of the world 
evolved from a different direction from 
that of other scholars and analysts. It 
comes from his years reporting from 
Africa for the Washington Post, service 
that produced a book on Africa’s devel-
opment as “China’s second continent.” 
Subsequent assignments with the New 
York Times brought him to Japan and 
China and a familiarity with the written 
Japanese and Chinese languages.
Unlike other journalists, who create 
books primarily out of interviews and 
opinions, French uses interviews spar-
ingly, instead relying on the writings of 
noted scholars and experts to contex-
tualize current issues. In addition to 
numerous mainland Chinese and other 
Asian scholars, French also quotes 
Andrew Erickson, a noted China 
scholar on the faculty of the Naval War 
College. Professor Erickson points out 
that, concerning the strategic military 
competition among China and its 
neighbors and the United States, as 
“the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] 
approaches leading edge capabilities, 
the more expensive and difficult it 
will be to advance further . . . [since] 
China’s cost advantages decrease as 
military equipment becomes less 
labor-intensive and more technology-  
and materials-intensive. The more 
sophisticated . . . the less relative benefit 
China can derive from acquiring and 
indigenizing foreign technologies, and 
less cost advantage it will have in pro-
ducing and maintaining them” (p. 271).
Such assurance may be cold comfort 
to those technology companies whose 
intellectual capital may have been 
pilfered via Chinese industrial espio-
nage. However, French also uncovers 
a critical trend concerning this 
long-term competition: because of the 
one-child (primarily boys) policy and 
other factors, China’s population will 
peak in 2025; because of immigration, 
America’s population is forecast to 
continue to increase. At the existing 
rate, the four-to-one population ratio in 
China’s favor will shrink to two-to-one, 
with an aged Chinese population and 
decreasing productivity as the country’s 
manufacturing advantage declines. 
French quotes Chinese demographer Yi 
Fuxian: “People say we [China] can be 
two to three times the size of America’s 
economy. . . . I say it is totally impossible. 
It will never overtake America’s because 
of the decrease in the labor force and 
the aging of the population” (p. 281).
In assessing China’s historical relation-
ship with the world, French recounts 
a continuing Chinese effort to achieve 
tian xia through intimidation or 
force, not through attraction or mutu-
ally balanced economic relationships. 
Instead of being enamored of the PRC’s 
myth of the peaceful precedent of the 
eunuch Zheng He’s trading voyages of 
the fifteenth century throughout the 
Indo-Pacific (one of the reasons Beijing 
claims to own the South China Sea), 
French chooses well and relies on the 
late Edward L. Dreyer, one of the most 
thorough historians of Chinese wars. 
Dreyer maintained that the modern 
idea of Zheng He as explorer, trader, 
and nonimperialist was “a creation of 
Western scholarship. Zheng He’s fleet 
was actually an armada, in the sense that 
it carried a powerful Army that could 
be disembarked, and its purpose was to 
awe the rulers of Southeast Asia and the 
Indian Ocean into sending tribute to 
China” (p. 104). Taking twenty thousand 
Ming dynasty troops to explore and 
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negotiate trade agreements is a little like 
using the Third Fleet to achieve adjust-
ments to NAFTA� Frankly, that is exactly 
what French sees as the future role of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), 
once the PLAN’s growing size helps to 
reduce U�S� influence in China’s sphere�
French’s most significant observation— 
unique among similar books—is that the 
American-centric nature of most assess-
ments of the PRC’s rise blinds us to the 
fact that most Chinese do not regard the 
United States as its primary, long-term 
enemy� Rather, Japan is perceived as the 
once-and-future foe that deserves the 
most retribution for China’s “century 
of humiliation�” French illustrates the 
popularity of this mainland view by 
examining the composition of the PRC’s 
entertainment media� “[T]o turn on 
the television in China is to be inun-
dated with war themed movies, which 
overwhelmingly focus on Japanese 
villainy� More than two hundred 
anti-Japanese films were produced in 
2012 alone, with one scholar estimating 
that 70 percent of Chinese TV dramas 
involve Japan-related war plots” (p� 21)� 
Thus, in French’s estimate, it would not 
be tension over islands (some of them 
false) in the South China Sea that would 
result in inadvertent war, but rather an 
escalating dispute over the Senkakus�
French has done an excellent job of iden-
tifying the ties between dynastic China’s 
open tian xia policies and PRC president 
Xi Jinping’s aspirations for the future� 
French points out the ironic similarities 
between Xi’s rhetoric and that of the 
Chinese communists’ greatest enemy, 
Chiang Kai-shek, over the rightful domi-
nance of China in Asia� Their desired 
rules for international politics resemble 
those represented in Thucydides’s 
Melian Dialogue� French recounts that 
when a Singaporean deputy expressed 
support for a maritime code of conduct 
at a recent multilateral conference, 
Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi 
responded, “China is a big country and 
other countries are small countries 
� � � and that’s just a fact” (p� 126)�
Everything under the Heavens is both 
an informative book and an enjoyable 
read� One hopes it will make the overly 
optimistic think a little bit harder about 
future relations between China and the 
rest of the world� However, in the end, 
French—whether by personal nature or 
intellectual predilection—feels com-
pelled to offer only optimistic recom-
mendations� “A China that is treated 
as an equal with much to contribute to 
human betterment,” he writes, “but met 
with understated but resolute firmness 
when need be, is a China that will 
mellow as it advances in the decades 
ahead, and then most likely plateau” 
(p� 284)� Of course, how to be both 
understated and resolute in an increas-
ingly shrill world is the unanswered 
dilemma� The problem with hugging 
(or scolding) the panda is that it bites�
SAM J� TANGREDI
Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in 
Norway, 1940, by John Kiszely� New York: Cam-
bridge Univ� Press, 2017� 390 pages� $44�99�
Anatomy of a Campaign by John 
Kiszely provides an excellent historical 
review of the military campaigns in 
Norway in 1940� In his book, Kiszely 
takes the reader on an exciting journey 
following the British expeditionary 
military campaign in Norway� He 
asks for and investigates the reason 
behind the failure� Was it poor military 
performance, lack of intelligence, or just 
poor strategy and decision-making? 
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This journey takes the reader beyond the 
obvious historical causes and looks at 
the underlying reasons for the blunders 
in operational and strategic decision-
making� Compared with other books 
written about the German and British 
campaigns in Norway, this dissection 
of the “anatomy” of a campaign is more 
applicable to military campaigns today�
Kiszely looks into the structural 
functions of the campaign and how they 
related to each other to find out what 
did and did not work� Since the military 
campaign links the political objective to 
military ways and means, he claims the 
outcome of the campaign was a given—
even before the first shot� The book is 
valuable because the lessons from the 
Norwegian campaign demonstrate the 
relations between strategy and policy 
and the effect on the operational and 
tactical levels� Modern campaigns build 
on experience from the past, and readers 
will appreciate this honest dissection as 
the author shares his own insight from 
joint strategic military and operational 
experience� Kiszely is a retired, highly 
decorated British officer and a soldier 
with operational command experience 
in national and international operations, 
as well as service on the Joint Staff�
The author examines the challenges 
that Great Britain faced in the transition 
from peace to war� How does a country 
move from a peacetime organization and 
optimize the ways and means to achieve 
strategic ends? His insight into British 
decision-making and the relationship 
between military leaders and their 
political masters is an outstanding as-
sessment of a strategy-policy mismatch 
and shows how a service-oriented 
approach to a military campaign utterly 
fails� Modern, theater-level campaigns 
are orchestrated at the operational level 
to synchronize joint-service contribu-
tions� Kiszely claims that unique, 
British, service-oriented leadership 
contributed to a disconnect between 
strategic- and tactical-level objectives� 
British military culture at that time was 
founded on superior improvisation and 
ad hoc adaptation� Services conducted 
separate operations driven by German 
military initiatives, and those operations 
sometimes were counterproductive 
to the theater campaign� Today’s 
commanders should not overlook the 
lessons that his insight provides�
The author makes a convincing argu-
ment that understanding expeditionary 
operations and campaigns is vital to 
managing the strategic and grand 
strategic environments� On the grand 
strategic level, the British struggled to 
formulate common political objectives 
with its allies, which had a direct 
effect on the conduct of the campaign� 
Domestic politics influenced the 
national decision-making, and the need 
to do something haunted the Allied 
coalition� Even as the security situation 
obviously required the Allies to build 
up forces on the continent to meet 
the threat from Germany, forces were 
diverted to a secondary front in Norway, 
for which they were not prepared�
Those directing multinational 
operations need to consider how to 
build political and military unity into 
a campaign� According to Kiszely, the 
Allies and Germany approached strategy 
and policy very differently because of 
their opposing political orientations: a 
democratic coalition on the one hand 
and an authoritarian regime on the 
other� The German decision-making 
in this phase of the war had strategic 
advantages, as its policy and campaign 
plans were synchronized, whereas the 
Allied coalition was not able to adapt 
to the operational tempo and unite 
around a coherent grand strategy�
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Kiszely provides a convincing argument 
that the foundation for German success 
was theater-level strategy and manage-
ment of the campaign� Even though the 
Allies had local successes, as demon-
strated in the battle of Narvik, their 
tactical achievements were not embed-
ded in a grand strategy or theater-level 
objective for winning the campaign�
In conclusion, Kiszely claims that the 
campaign in Norway was a decisive 
victory for the Germans, in that they 
achieved strategic surprise and dominat-
ing airpower� The main reason for the 
British campaign failure is found in 
the link between policy and plans� The 
ends were not supported by available 
means and ways, and policy became 
divorced from reality� Such determina-
tions leave the reader to evaluate and 
decide where the responsibility for 
the failure of the campaign lies�
The book summarizes key military 
lessons learned and strategic guidance� 
I strongly encourage national security 
advisers and military leaders to read it�
LARS SAUNES
The Cold War: A World History, by Odd Arne 
Westad� New York: Basic Books, 2017� 720 pages� 
$40�
Odd Arne Westad has taken on a 
difficult task: providing a one-volume 
history of the Cold War� The U�S�-Soviet 
confrontation lasted over four decades 
and had many episodes� Cramming the 
entire story into one book—even one 
that is over seven hundred pages long—
is no simple thing� Westad made his task 
even harder by taking an international 
focus and starting his coverage in the 
1890s, with the politicization of the 
confrontation between labor and capital�
However, Westad is certainly up to the 
task� He is something of a transnational 
man� Although Norwegian, he holds a 
PhD from a U�S� school (the University 
of North Carolina) and has taught in 
both the United Kingdom and the 
United States� This book is the product 
of research in archives around the planet 
(Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Russia, South 
Africa, and the United States) and the 
reading of other source material pub-
lished in German, French, Chinese, and 
Norwegian� An important advantage to 
this book is that it is an easy read, which 
is crucial, given its length� It is easy for 
historians to get trapped in the details of 
their research and skimp on their analy-
sis and writing� That is not the case here� 
Westad covers events in a compelling 
but concise manner� At times, though, 
the reader might wish that he had 
provided more documentation of his 
arguments, since his footnotes often do 
not show from where his evidence came�
The chapter on the ideological elements 
of the confrontation before the 1940s 
is less than convincing, but fortunately 
short� Westad sustains these arguments 
better in the body of the text� In World 
War II, capitalism and communism 
worked together not because of the Nazi 
threat but only because of the Germans� 
“Some form of postwar conflict was 
next to inevitable” (p� 68)� Joseph Stalin 
was a brutal dictator, but he also was 
indecisive and let European affairs 
drift, while the United States acted� As a 
result, Washington had more to do with 
turning the postwar confrontation into 
a sustained Cold War than did Moscow�
One of the central arguments of this 
book is that the Cold War was about 
more than the United States and the 
Soviet Union� On this point, Westad is 
certainly correct; the question is one 
of emphasis� He gives a good deal of 
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coverage to China and India; Latin 
America and Africa also get attention� 
However, the theme of these sections 
seems to be impact rather than influ-
ence, and while that focus makes sense 
for the argument he wants to make, 
it does seem to divert attention away 
from more-significant developments�
The individuals most responsible 
for moving the Cold War away from 
dangerous confrontation were Richard 
M� Nixon and Leonid I� Brezhnev� Both 
wanted détente, but for different reasons� 
Westad argues that this period was 
basically a truce� In many ways, détente 
turned out to be much better for the 
United States� The competition did not 
go away, but it turned to soft power, in 
which global trends ended up favoring 
capitalism and the United States� Nixon 
also managed to turn China into an ally 
during this period� Westad argues that 
this development occurred more because 
of the incompetence of Mao Zedong as a 
statesman than Nixon’s skills as a strate-
gist� Mao had weakened China, and his 
policies often brought about situations 
that were exactly the opposite of what 
he wanted� Rejecting the argument of 
most historians, Westad argues that the 
Americans rather than the Soviets killed 
détente, mostly because of American 
domestic politics� These arguments 
are well sustained, and although many 
might have trouble accepting these 
contentions, they are basically correct�
Why did the Cold War end with a U�S� 
victory? “Like its enemy, the United 
States had its portion of Cold War 
successes and failures� It is just that 
the balance sheet came out differently, 
and better, than that of the other side” 
(p� 620)� The assets that worked to the 
advantage of the United States included 
long-term alliances, economic growth 
and transformations, technological 
change, and diplomatic skill�
This book is hardly the last word on the 
Cold War; given its significance, the 
period will be studied for decades to 
come� But Westad has given his readers 
an important, thought-provoking 
account, and that is no small thing�
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
 
Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Co-
operation with Russia and China, 1945–2016, by 
David F� Winkler� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2017� 336 pages� $31�95�
In the summer of 1988, I stepped aboard 
USS Yorktown (CG 48) as a young 
midshipman during my orientation 
cruise and noticed a ship silhouette 
painted on the bridge wing� When 
members of my class inquired about 
its meaning, the crew regaled us with 
the story of the shouldering incident 
with the Russian frigate Bezzaventnyy 
just a few months earlier in the Black 
Sea—the incident pictured on the cover 
of David F� Winkler’s recently updated 
Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation 
and Cooperation with Russia and China, 
1945–2016� Winkler began studying 
the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention 
of Incidents on and over the High Seas 
(also known as the Incidents at Sea 
Agreement, or INCSEA) after experienc-
ing such events firsthand as a junior 
officer in the Sea of Japan in the mid-
1980s� Since then, he has established 
himself as an authority on the subject at 
the Naval Historical Foundation� With 
a foreword by the chief U�S� negotiator 
of INCSEA, former Secretary of the 
Navy John W� Warner, this edition of 
Winkler’s book builds on the original 
(published in 2000) by addressing the 
expanding influence of China and 
the resurgence of Russia as global 
competitors in the maritime domain�
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Incidents at Sea takes a chronological 
approach to the intricate relationship 
between the American and Russian 
navies beginning at the end of World 
War II, through the growth of the Soviet 
navy, into the post–Cold War tensions 
with Russia, to the emergence of China 
as a global maritime force� Drawing 
from oral histories and extensive 
personal interviews, Winkler puts a 
human face on these interactions by 
relating the experiences of junior officers 
aboard USN ships, senior naval leaders, 
and senior government officials� He also 
provides intimate details about the inter-
actions of the members of the American 
delegation with their Soviet counterparts 
during the initial INCSEA negotiation 
and subsequent annual reviews�
No single event precipitated this un-
precedented agreement; instead a series 
of dangerous, and sometimes deadly, 
interactions between the two nations’ 
navies and air forces reached a tipping 
point in 1971, resulting in a Soviet call 
for action� American naval leaders had 
sought such an agreement in the decade 
prior, but senior State Department 
officials were wary that these discussions 
might derail ongoing American efforts 
regarding territorial sea claims� Given 
assurances from the Russians that this 
would be a navy-only discussion, the 
State Department acquiesced, and 
then–Under Secretary of the Navy 
Warner headed the U�S� negotiating 
team for initial talks� After months of 
preparation, the American delegation 
went to Moscow in October 1971, and 
the resulting agreement included all the 
points it desired� A follow-on meeting in 
Washington, DC, in March 1972 ironed 
out remaining details, and Secretary 
Warner signed the INCSEA agreement 
with the Soviet navy’s commander in 
chief, Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, 
on May 25, 1972, at President Richard 
M� Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid 
I� Brezhnev’s Moscow summit�
INCSEA marked the first formal 
interaction between the two superpow-
ers� Discussions involved more than just 
negotiating sessions; they also included a 
social agenda, with each side showcasing 
the strengths of its culture and economy� 
Winkler presents the social agenda 
as a key element in the breakdown of 
barriers between the two ideologically 
different sets of participants� Another 
key to INCSEA’s success was its bilateral 
and navy-to-navy nature� Limiting the 
scope of the agreement created more 
common ground for the two parties� 
Winkler notes something I also have 
observed in bilateral navy staff talks: 
naval officers have a common shared 
experience of operating at sea that 
cuts across the politics of nations�
Since the signing of the historic agree-
ment, U�S�-Russian relations have ebbed 
and flowed, but INCSEA remains a 
stalwart of international agreement and 
cooperation� Winkler illustrates how—
despite other sources of tension between 
the two countries—both sides have 
maintained civility during the annual 
INCSEA reviews� He also describes sev-
eral tense international situations during 
which following INCSEA protocols kept 
a cold war from turning hot� Yet despite 
its success, INCSEA has not prevented 
all unsafe interactions at sea—witness 
the Bezzaventnyy-Yorktown incident 
in February 1988� More recently, since 
the Russian resurgence under President 
Vladimir Putin, the number of incidents 
between the two nations has increased, 
especially as American warships and 
aircraft reassert the right to navigate 
freely in the Black and Baltic Seas�
The growth of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army Navy in the 1990s 
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brought increased interaction with 
American warships, naval auxiliaries, 
and military aircraft, reminiscent of 
the Cold War� The United States and 
China signed the Military Maritime 
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 
1998, modeled after INCSEA� Winkler 
notes, however, that the MMCA lacks 
the level of trust established between 
the Soviet and American navies, and 
therefore has been less effective�
The high seas and contested littorals 
were the front line of U�S�-Soviet interac-
tion during the Cold War� Winkler’s 
book provides an intimate look at 
the development and execution of a 
landmark agreement between adversar-
ies that provided a key mechanism 
for ensuring that their interaction at 
sea remained professional and kept 
the Cold War from becoming hot�
JAMES P� MCGRATH III
The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945, by Da-
vid Hobbs� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2015� 480 pages� $59�95�
This work is the latest in a series 
of books from this author about 
Royal Navy aircraft carriers, and British 
carrier aviation in particular� It takes 
the story forward from where his last 
work on the British Pacific Fleet left 
us—in the misty waters of Tokyo Bay 
in September 1945� Hobbs shows how 
the ethos of naval strike warfare that 
had been developed and honed in the 
rigors of World War II survived the 
many and varied challenges that the 
postwar era threw at it� Most obviously, 
perhaps, it is a study of naval retrench-
ment under that most demanding of 
scenarios: demobilization after a world 
war coupled with a broader and ongoing 
retreat from global preeminence� It is 
no surprise, then, that budgetary issues 
take center stage, but Hobbs manages 
to make his account much more than 
a mere litany of what might have been� 
He charts moments of gritty determina-
tion and ingenuity mixed with some 
unforgivable and almost criminal areas 
of waste and abuse—features that are 
certainly familiar to anyone involved in 
military planning� Above all, though, 
an unswerving belief from within the 
service about the value of its aviation has 
allowed the capability to be resurrected 
almost from the dead in recent years, 
in the form of two large carriers with 
real strike capability� This fact alone 
makes this book a compelling read�
It is difficult to imagine a more qualified 
individual than Hobbs to guide us 
through this story� After a thirty-year 
naval career as an aviator that spanned 
the last years of the “big deck” carriers, 
the “through-deck” cruiser era, and 
right up to the “renaissance” after the 
Falklands War, Hobbs capped this off 
with a period working in naval records 
and as the curator of the Fleet Air Arm 
Museum� This gave him almost unparal-
leled access to the necessary archival 
material, a resource he has used to 
great effect in this volume� The book is 
nothing short of exacting in its research�
That said, and although he tries valiantly 
to hide it, Hobbs clearly has a message 
he is anxious to communicate� It is, as he 
freely admits, “in part my own story” (p� 
vii)� His thesis, which he openly reveals 
in the last few pages, is that Britain 
would have been better served had it 
continued to replace its strike carriers 
from the 1960s onward� While an un-
derstandable and legitimate viewpoint, 
it is just that—a viewpoint—and many 
will bemoan this lack of objectivity, 
particularly as the broader constraints 
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acting on the British government during 
this period are given scant attention� 
Equally, the work would have benefited 
from a deeper dive into the effectiveness 
of the military advice to the politicians, 
something that the loss of the service 
ministries in 1964 did little to improve�
Although broadly chronological, the 
book is perhaps best examined in terms 
of its three main themes: the carrier 
operations themselves, the ongoing 
innovations to overcome operating 
constraints, and the political consider-
ations surrounding carrier acquisition� 
As explained above, the author is 
perhaps least successful with the last of 
these, where his experiences at the front 
line have tended to cloud his objectiv-
ity� Where, for example, is a balanced 
assessment of any opposing political 
constraints? Luckily, though, Hobbs is at 
his best with the other two, which makes 
the work valuable in its own right and 
tends to carry it through any shortcom-
ings elsewhere� The day-to-day coverage 
of the main carrier operations is detailed 
but easy to follow and clearly fulfills 
the need to demonstrate the ongoing 
relevance of this capability to a maritime 
nation with global interests, such as 
Great Britain� Likewise, the coverage 
of the British innovations that have 
made carrier airpower the formidable 
asset it is today is comprehensive� The 
angled deck, the mirror landing aid, 
the steam catapult, the development 
of helicopter carriers, and the ski 
jump—all are given the prominence 
they deserve, along with some other 
ideas that were less successful�
In the end, the ongoing relevance of a 
discussion over the viability of carriers, 
particularly given the expense of the new 
Ford class and their perceived vulner-
ability to a new generation of antiship 
weapons, is sure to encourage a wide 
interest in this book, particularly from 
within the U�S� Navy� This is a good 
thing, since many of the constraints 
that Great Britain had to face are 
essentially cyclical in nature and tend 
to recur in similar forms over time� 
In particular, though, I commend this 
book to the acquisition community, if 
only to gain an appreciation for how 
out of step with each other politi-
cians and operators can become�
ANGUS ROSS
 
The Law of War: A Detailed Assessment of the US 
Department of Defense Law of War Manual, by 
William H� Boothby and Wolff Heintschel von 
Heinegg� Cambridge, U�K�: Cambridge Univ� 
Press, 2018� 479 pages� $150�
Perhaps no recent document published 
by the Department of Defense (DoD) 
has been more studied, reviewed, and 
criticized than its Law of War Manual� 
Initially released in June 2015, it already 
has received multiple updates� These up-
dates occur partly because of the flurry 
of well-considered criticism from both 
academics and practitioners� However, 
no effort at reviewing the manual has 
been more exhaustive than this recently 
published book by two of Europe’s most 
eminent international law scholars�
The Law of War represents a remarkable 
effort and should occupy a spot on the 
bookshelf of anyone seriously studying 
international law as it applies to military 
operations� However, readers also should 
be careful to understand what it is� It is 
not a traditional treatise on the law of 
war; rather, it is a deliberate— 
paragraph-by-paragraph—review of 
DoD’s Law of War Manual and must 
be read alongside that document� 
Those readers lacking an existing 
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understanding of the law of armed 
conflict will find the book difficult and 
cumbersome� However, the scholar 
trying to place DoD’s manual within the 
context of coexisting understandings 
will have found an indispensable guide�
This view of The Law of War should 
not be understood as a criticism� No 
book can be all things to all readers� 
Had the authors attempted to craft the 
book in such a way that it aided the 
reader in learning the fundamentals of 
the law of armed conflict, there would 
have been little space for their in-depth 
critiques of DoD’s positions� Indeed, 
the authors are up-front about the 
book’s intended audience: “[m] ilitary  
lawyers, commanders, specialists 
in military doctrine, military staff 
colleges, ministry and military policy 
staffs, academics,” and those with an 
interest or professional involvement 
in the subject� Although this list may 
be a bit broad, given the nuanced 
legal arguments covered throughout 
the book, the authors are correct in 
identifying the need for previous 
experience in the subject matter�
In truth, the study of international law 
applicable to military operations can be 
a vexing enterprise� In addition to trea-
ties that often vary in interpretation and 
applicability, international law places 
heavy reliance on legal custom— 
that is, the combination of state practice 
and that state’s understanding of when 
its actions are constrained or required, 
as the case may be, by legal obligations� 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that widely 
divergent views on the law of armed 
conflict exist� The book is at its best 
when it identifies where the position 
stated in the DoD manual is inconsistent 
with some—or even most—other 
states’ interpretations� The authors 
also perform an excellent service in 
pointing out when DoD’s position is 
either vague or inadequately sourced�
An example of the strength of The Law 
of War is the discussion of the propor-
tionality rule as it applies to conducting 
military attacks� The authors correctly 
point out the differences between the 
manual’s definition of the rule and 
that of Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions (API)� Although 
the United States is not a party to API, 
the majority of its allies and partners are� 
Additionally, the United States does hold 
that API’s targeting provisions generally 
constitute customary law binding on the 
United States� Thus, any study of the rule 
limited to examining DoD’s definition 
and interpretation would be deficient in 
any academic review� By using The Law 
of War alongside the manual, research-
ers easily can avoid such mistakes�
If any criticism of the book is valid, it 
is that the work occasionally displays 
the same opaqueness and repetitiveness 
for which it criticizes the DoD manual� 
The authors seem to take such pains to 
present a balanced review of the manual 
that it becomes difficult to ascertain the 
precise parameters of their criticism� 
Additionally, much of their criticism 
appears to stem from a desire that the 
DoD manual be something it is not� 
The DoD manual is not an academic 
treatise; it is a U�S� practitioner’s guide 
to advising on military operations� The 
DoD manual continually references U�S� 
policy documents that, while perhaps 
not relevant to a purely academic view 
of the law, are vital to a practitioner 
looking to place the law in context�
The Law of War is an invaluable 
contribution to scholarship in the 
field� The next move of any researcher 
studying the DoD manual’s position on 
any topic should be to review The Law 
of War for analysis regarding where the 
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manual is lacking or what additional 
wwviews exist� For this herculean effort, 
the authors should be commended�
JEFFREY BILLER
Soldiers and Civilization: How the Profession of 
Arms Thought and Fought the Modern World into 
Existence, by Reed Robert Bonadonna� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 336 pages� 
$35�
A former Marine colonel with a 
PhD from Boston University and 
the retired director of the ethics and 
character development program at 
the U�S� Merchant Marine Academy, 
Reed Bonadonna makes the daring 
assertion that the profession of arms 
and the culture of Western civilization 
are inextricably bound together in a 
symbiosis of mutual influence� The 
subtitle wittingly captures the central 
thesis of his book: how the profession 
of arms thought and fought the modern 
world into existence� Although it may 
seem contradictory to suggest that 
military service and civilization are in 
any way constitutive of each other in an 
interdependent relationship, Bonadonna 
carefully illustrates how warriors can be 
destroyers yet, ironically, guardians of 
civilization as agents of both continuity 
and change� Once the book has been 
read, Bonadonna’s daring assertion 
seems less daring and quite reasonable, 
given the skillfully presented historical 
evidence� In this respect, Bonadonna 
successfully defends his thought-
provoking thesis and achieves a balance 
of overarching generalization and 
sufficient detail to deliver a compelling 
examination of the role of the military in 
the development of Western civilization�
Whereas Bonadonna furnishes in the 
main body of his work a historical 
narrative delineating the advance of 
the profession of arms, in the conclu-
sion he ventures to offer strategies for 
emerging trends in the twenty-first 
century� One among the several 
fascinating topics explored is the issue 
of humanitarian assistance (HA)� At the 
2005 World Summit, the United Nations 
adopted the doctrine of “responsibility 
to protect” as a moral imperative for 
multinational forces to intervene 
in countries where humanitarian 
crises are egregious, thus in effect 
amending the nation-state sovereignty 
established by the Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648� Bonadonna observes that HA 
operations have become increasingly 
important initiatives for addressing 
global problems of hunger, genocide, 
and disease in the twenty-first century�
While the need for HA seems appar-
ent, Bonadonna rightly highlights the 
complications of intervention: the threat 
of imperialistic encroachments on the 
territorial sovereignty of nation-states 
by “helping” neighboring states; the 
resentment of local authorities to the 
intrusion of outside aid; the disruption 
of the existing, albeit fragile, order; and 
miscalculations, as a result of misinfor-
mation, that prompt violent resistance� 
Bonadonna cites the relief campaign 
in Somalia as an HA operation that 
backfired and achieved the opposite 
of the intended results, pointing to the 
Black Hawk helicopter incident in the 
battle of Mogadishu in 1993� Since that 
time, a number of military leaders have 
come to believe that other government 
organizations and nongovernment 
organizations can take the lead more 
effectively on such campaigns, 
with limited military support�
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Bonadonna also cautions that humani-
tarian interventions require subtlety in 
the conduct of nonkinetic operations� 
Whatever the multinational solutions 
are to the humanitarian crisis, coalition 
forces must treat the endemic political 
and social causes, not only the outward 
symptoms of human suffering� Further-
more, transnational forces should be 
sensitive to the anthropological customs 
and sociological systems that have 
cultural meaning and historical value 
for the indigenous society being helped�
With those caveats articulated, Bona-
donna expresses the viewpoint that the 
military will continue HA operations 
because of its organic medical and 
security capabilities and the mobile and 
mission-ready assets it has available 
for rapid deployment� Bonadonna 
concludes that humanitarian operations 
at their best exemplify the central goals 
of the military profession through the 
maintenance of global stability and the 
protection of human rights� The altruis-
tic ethics of HA underscores the eminent 
value of nonkinetic missions that foster 
and protect the common dignity of every 
man, woman, and child, befitting the 
highest standards of human flourishing�
Although Soldiers and Civilization may 
be criticized for what is not included in 
this ambitious historical undertaking, 
the reader undoubtedly will be enriched 
by this intellectual journey from 
classical antiquity to postmodernity� 
Warfighter and policy maker alike 
will encounter the larger-than-life 
personae of legendary heroes such 
as Ulysses, Alexander the Great, and 
Charlemagne—to name only a few— 
accompanied by a keen analysis of their 
strategies, operations, and tactics� For 
example, the game of chess may seem 
like a harmless pursuit passed benignly 
from one generation to the next, but 
Bonadonna reveals how the game that 
once embodied medieval strategy and 
feudal society eventually evolved into 
the Prussian Kriegsspiel (war game) in 
the nineteenth century for the Prussian 
general staff� Here and in many other 
places, Bonadonna introduces profound 
insights worthy of serious consideration, 
and in so doing distinguishes himself 
as an exceptional historian, military 
strategist, and ethicist� The coverage 
of military history and civilization 
in the East would prove an excellent 
sequel to this outstanding overview of 
military professionalism in Western 
civilization� Suffice it to say, Soldiers 
and Civilization is a significant ad-
dition to the study of war fighting as 
the basis for the literature, culture, 
and politics of Western civilization�
EDWARD ERWIN
 
Selling War: A Critical Look at the Military’s PR 
Machine, by Steven J� Alvarez� Lincoln, NE: Po-
tomac Books, 2016� 384 pages� $34�95�
Selling War is a mixed bag� Like the pro-
verbial description of the North Platte 
River, it is simultaneously “too thick to 
drink and too thin to plow�” Steven Alva-
rez, an experienced former Army public 
affairs officer (PAO), suggests as much 
when he describes his work as “part 
memoir, part public relations handbook, 
part after-action review, part white 
paper, part catharsis, and a firsthand 
account of [his] yearlong mobilization” 
in Iraq from 2004 to 2005 (p� xxi)� The 
result does partial justice to each of these 
perspectives, but full justice to none�
Alvarez is a severe critic of Army public 
affairs� He convincingly appraises the 
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public affairs efforts of both the military 
and the Coalition Provisional Authority 
in Iraq as colossal failures� These failures 
are all the more painful given that Alva-
rez was able to produce limited successes 
that pointed to what might have been� 
For example, the authorities’ refusal to 
engage the Arab press, most notably 
Al Jazeera, created lost opportunities; 
in contrast, Alvarez’s work with the 
Saudi television channel Al Arabiya was 
so successful that insurgents killed its 
personnel when they presented factual 
stories pointing out coalition successes�
Selling War is indeed part memoir and, 
clearly, part catharsis� Alvarez, a former 
enlisted soldier and then a commis-
sioned line officer, is painfully aware of 
the difference between the lifestyle he 
experienced and that of frontline sol-
diers and Marines� His writing indicates 
a personal level of conflict when he 
contemplates not only how much easier 
his life was than theirs but also the even 
easier lives of other Army personnel 
and their civilian counterparts assigned 
to duties in Baghdad’s Green Zone� 
Further, Alvarez does not shy away 
from telling of actions that place him 
in a less-than-flattering light� He takes 
responsibility for programs that went 
wrong and ideas that went astray� He ad-
mits to participating behind the scenes 
to get an immediate superior removed�
However, even as he often holds himself 
accountable for failure, he is equally 
or more scathing when looking at the 
failings of others� Alvarez’s assignment 
involved working extensively with Iraqi 
officials, and he details the frustration 
of working within a system pervaded by 
nepotism and corruption� Yet Alvarez 
also is very sensitive to the plight of 
Iraqis who sincerely worked to better 
the country and the lives of its citizens� 
Alvarez’s account raises the very real 
question whether the shortcomings of 
the Iraqi government were so great as to 
prevent the United States from achiev-
ing its victory objectives� In Alvarez’s 
experience, the rare Iraqi individual 
who worked for the greater good was so 
massively outnumbered by those who 
worked only for themselves that failure 
to reach the Iraqi ideal was guaranteed�
Alvarez served as General David  
Petraeus’s PAO, and contends that the 
general understood, better than many, 
the value of communication in counter-
insurgency operations� Alvarez praises 
Petraeus as a natural PAO and gifted 
communicator� He assiduously refrains 
from claiming credit for Petraeus’s ideas 
on communication and counterinsur-
gency; however, Alvarez points out that 
he was developing and putting into effect 
many of the practices that Petraeus even-
tually turned into policy and doctrine�
From his service with Petraeus, Alvarez 
is able to provide a unique view of 
the man� Alvarez also discusses his 
interaction with noteworthy journalists, 
ranging from Christiane Amanpour, 
Dan Rather, and Peter Jennings to 
Geraldo Rivera� Somewhat surprisingly, 
the senior representatives of the fourth 
estate come off well, especially in the 
case of Rivera� As Alvarez tells stories 
of his personal experiences with these 
journalistic legends, he mounts a 
passionate argument that dealing with 
reporters in an openhanded way will 
serve the military far better than keeping 
them at arm’s length and treating 
them as little better than the enemy�
This is not a scholarly work, nor is it 
intended to be, and there are issues 
pertaining to style and tone� Words and 
phrasing are as much Alvarez’s tools 
as the plumber’s pipe wrench or the 
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mathematician’s calculator� Word choice 
is deliberate and made with intent� Thus, 
when Alvarez lavishly employs profanity, 
obscenity, and testosterone-laden invec-
tive, it is natural to ask why and to what 
desired effect� The author is no longer 
a salty sergeant or a junior officer of 
limited erudition and expression; to the 
contrary, he is a professional wordsmith, 
valued for his ability to paint a picture 
and explain an idea with words� One 
presumes the intent was for the reader 
to perceive the author as a fighting man 
with a pen, but the practice detracts 
from a persona as a coolly analytical 
observer and participant whose recom-
mendations are rooted in rationality�
Perhaps this dichotomy reflects the 
actual experience of the U�S� com-
munication effort in Iraq� Alvarez 
clearly cared about succeeding there� 
He employed creative methods and 
pursued avidly those that produced 
positive results� At the same time, he 
encountered organizational timidity, 
a lack of professionalism in his field, 
venality and indifference from many of 
his counterparts, and failure� Perhaps, 
under such conditions, frustration and 
invective are all that ever remains�
RICHARD J� NORTON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Jeffrey Biller is a lieutenant colonel in the U�S� Air Force and a military professor in the Stockton 
Center for International Law at the Naval War College� The Stockton Center is the world’s premier 
research institute for the study of international law and military operations throughout the land, 
sea, aerospace, and cyberspace domains� Stockton Center faculty teach in the core curriculum and 
electives at the Naval War College, as well as in advanced international law courses around the 
world�
Blake I. Campbell is an independent researcher, reviewer, book review editor, and adjunct professor�
Edward Erwin is a lieutenant commander in the U�S� Navy and a chaplain who holds a PhD in 
theology and ethics from Duke University� Erwin has taught courses in world religions at Troy 
University and in ethics at the University of Maryland University College� He has written a num-
ber of articles for leading academic journals and professional magazines�
John B. Hattendorf is the Ernest J� King Professor Emeritus of Maritime History at the Naval War 
College� He is the author, coauthor, editor, or coeditor of more than forty books on British and 
American maritime history and naval warfare�
James P. McGrath III, Captain, USN, a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer, is currently a mili-
tary professor of joint military operations at the Naval War College� He received a bachelor of arts 
in history from Virginia Tech and a master of arts in military history from Norwich University, 
and is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College� He commanded Maritime Expeditionary 
Squadron 7 and has served on the staffs of the Seventh Fleet and European Command, as well as 
the Joint Staff�
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William S. Murray is a professor and the director of the Halsey Bravo research effort at the Naval 
War College� He graduated from the State University of New York at Buffalo with a bachelor of sci-
ence in electrical engineering, and he earned a master of arts degree from the Naval War College� 
Professor Murray served on and qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines in the U�S� 
Navy, retiring in 2003� He served on the operations staff at the U�S� Strategic Command and as a 
member of the faculty of the Naval War College’s Strategic Research Department�
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College� He is a retired 
naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University� 
His most recent publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and Marine Corps 
University Journal�
Chris Parry is a retired Royal Navy rear admiral, aviator, and warfare officer who now leads a 
strategic forecasting company� He is a visiting fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge, and a senior 
research fellow at the University of Swansea/Abertawe in Wales�
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer and a graduate of and professor of joint military 
operations at the Naval War College� He received a second MA from Providence College and is 
currently pursuing PhD studies, studying naval transformation prior to the First World War� His 
recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the 
Royal Navy and the U�S� Navy in the wake of the Dreadnought revolution�
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is an associate professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College� 
He earned a BA from the University of Texas, an MA from the University of Kentucky, and a PhD 
from the University of Southern California, all in history� He is the author of five published books 
and is currently writing books on the battle of Manila and the home front in World War II�
Lars Saunes retired as a rear admiral from the position of chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy in 
August 2017 and is now a CNO Distinguished International Fellow at the Naval War College� 
Among other schools, he is a graduate of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, the Naval War 
College, and the Norwegian National Defense College� He is a submariner by trade and held com-
mand positions on Kobben- and Ula-class submarines, as well as many other commands�
Sam J. Tangredi is the director of the Institute for Future Warfare Studies and a professor of 
national, naval, and maritime strategy at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College� 
He is the author of Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013) 
and two earlier books on the future security environment�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program. 
n each article in this series, we have attempted to encourage sailors at all levels to 
develop a habit of reading books related to their profession as maritime warriors 
and related to their greater role as informed citizens of our great republic� The 
CNO’s Professional Reading Program identifies over 140 great titles to consider� 
Reading any one of them will enrich your life�
We also would like to commend to you a “one-stop” menu of books: The 
Leader’s Bookshelf, published in 2017 by the U�S� Naval Institute� It can serve as a 
gateway to over fifty superb volumes that can help make each reader a better lead-
er� On its website (www�usni�org), the publisher describes the book as follows: 
Adm� James Stavridis and his co-author, R� Manning Ancell, have surveyed over two 
hundred active and retired four-star military officers about their reading habits and 
favorite books, asking each for a list of titles that strongly influenced their leadership 
skills and provided them with special insights that helped propel them to success in 
spite of the many demanding challenges they faced� The Leader’s Bookshelf synthe-
sizes their responses to identify the top fifty that can help virtually anyone become 
a better leader� Each of the works—novels, memoirs, biographies, autobiographies, 
management publications—are summarized and the key leadership lessons extracted 
and presented� Whether individuals work their way through the entire list and read 
each book cover to cover, or read the summaries provided to determine which appeal 
to them most, The Leader’s Bookshelf will provide a roadmap to better leadership�
Highlighting the value of reading in both a philosophical and a practical sense, The 
Leader’s Bookshelf provides sound advice on how to build an extensive library, lists 
other books worth reading to improve leadership skills, and analyzes how leaders use 
what they read to achieve their goals� An efficient way to sample some of literature’s 
greatest works and to determine which ones can help individuals climb the ladder of 
success, The Leader’s Bookshelf is for anyone who wants to improve his or her ability 
to lead—whether in family life, professional endeavors, or within society and civic 
organizations�
I
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This book is a true treasure� I hope it will kindle a thirst for reading, writing, 
and learning that will be unquenchable� It includes an interview with former 
Marine Corps general James Mattis (now the Secretary of Defense), in which he 
discusses his personal library of over six thousand volumes and how they traveled 
with him from duty station to duty station during his active-duty career (p� 249)� 
He advises as follows: 
So as you think through how to put together a personal library, remember that it is an 
intensely personal adventure� You may be entranced with the ability to hold a book in 
your hands, scribble in the margins, show the volume to friends who are visiting� Or 
you may want an entirely electronic library that resides remotely in the Cloud, avail-
able in a moment over your smart phone, tablet, or home computer�
Your personal library may be seven books you deeply value or seven thousand, and 
it may be beautifully organized and alphabetized or simply arranged by the color of 
the book’s cover� What matters is that it is your library, invested with your intellectual 
capital, and serves as a garden of the mind to which you can return again and again�
No matter how busy you may be, finding time to read will pay great dividends� 
JOHN E� JACKSON
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